Mighty Derringer
U.S. Nuclear Terrorism Exercise Leaves Indianapolis in "Ruins"
Fictional Scenario Results in Nuclear Destruction of Large Part of City
1980s Secret Exercise Judged Positively But Underscores
Range of Potential Problems - Bomb Detection, Interagency Coordination,
Containment of
Contamination, General "Confusion"
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 380
Posted - May 29, 2012
For more information contact:
Jeffrey T. Richelson
William Burr - 202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu
Washington, D.C., May 29, 2012 -
A secret exercise in 1986 by a U.S. government counter-terrorist
unit uncovered a host of potential problems associated with disrupting a
nuclear terrorist
plot in the United States. Declassified documents released under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and posted today by the National
Security Archive
offer the first detailed public look at the inner workings of the
agencies, military units and other U.S. entities responsible for
protecting the country
from a terrorist nuclear attack.
Today's posting consists of over 60 documents related to MIGHTY
DERRINGER, an exercise that focused on Indianapolis in December 1986.
The materials provide
background on the creation, in 1974-1975, of the Nuclear Emergency
Search Team (NEST), a group assigned to respond to plausible threats of
nuclear
terrorism or extortion. Today, NEST (now the Nuclear Emergency
Support Team) and conducts exercises to assess its capability to respond
to the possible presence of a terrorist device and test the ability of
NEST and critical cooperating organizations (including military units)to
work together.
While the MIGHTY DERRINGER exercise and resulting documents are over
two decades old, the institutions participating in the exercise retain
their roles
today, and the issues confronting them in 1986 are similar to the
ones that they would face in responding to a nuclear threat in 2012 (and
beyond).
This posting is notable for being the first publication of documents
that provide in-depth exposure into all aspects of such an exercise -
including the
state-of-play at key points and the array of issues involved in
disabling terrorist devices. Of particular interest are references to
the participation of
the Joint Special Operations Command and Delta Force - mirroring the
role they would have in a real-world incident. In addition,
after-action reports
reveal the assorted problems that can arise in coordinating the
response to a nuclear terrorist threat among a large number of
organizations.
* * * *
THE MIGHTY DERRINGER EXERCISE
In late January and early February 2012, members of the Department
of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) patrolled Lucas Oil
Stadium as well as
surrounding areas of Indianapolis as a precautionary measure in
advance of Super Bowl XLVI. An initial survey to gather information on
background levels of
radiation was followed by an actual search for signatures associated
with either a nuclear explosive device or a radiation dispersal device
(a 'dirty
bomb').
1 Fortunately, none was found.
Over twenty-five years earlier, for a few days in early December
1986, NEST personnel also patrolled Indianapolis, also in search of a
nuclear device. That
search was triggered by an intelligence report that suggested that
an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) might have been smuggled into the
city by terrorists.
With the assistance of the Delta Force, U.S. personnel were able to
recover and disable the device in a fictitious neighboring country;
unfortunately the Indianapolis
device exploded and 20 square blocks in downtown Indianapolis were
completely destroyed
.
As it happens, the terrorist group, the intelligence report, and the
detonation were fictional - elements of a NEST exercise designated
MIGHTY DERRINGER,
one of a number of tests designed to anticipate and prevent the
potential real-world catastrophe of a terrorist nuclear strike in a
major American city.
Documents published today by the National Security Archive provide
newly declassified details on how the MIGHTY DERRINGER exercise unfolded
and how the
participants later evaluated it.
This is the most extensive set of declassified documents on any
nuclear counterterrorism exercise, covering every phase of the response,
from concept to
critiques, and it offers valuable insights into a world that is
usually hidden from public scrutiny. Among the disclosures:
§ The role of the top secret Joint Special Operations Command's
Delta Force in carrying out the assault on the terrorist cell in the
fictional country
of Montrev.
§ Descriptions of the different types of disablement techniques U.S.
forces utilize - emergency destruct, standard destruction, and hard
entry.
§ Assessments of the coordination problems and different
perspectives of agencies that would be involved in a real-world
response.
The instruction to establish NEST, known until 2002 as the Nuclear
Emergency Search Team, took the form of a November 18, 1974 memo from
Maj. Gen. Ernest
Graves, the Atomic Energy Commission's assistant general manager for
military application, to Mahlon Gates, the manager of the commission's
Nevada
Operations Office. (
Document 1).
Gates was "directed and authorized" to assume responsibility for the
planning and execution of field operations
employing AEC radiation detection systems for the "search and
identification of lost or stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear
materials, bomb threats,
and radiation dispersal threats."
Personnel for NEST would come from AEC's nuclear weapons
laboratories - Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos - as well as
key AEC contractors. Almost
all those individuals would continue in their regular positions
full-time and become part of a NEST effort when required.
What inspired
Graves'
memo was an
incident that had taken place in May of that year. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation
received a letter demanding $200,000. Failure to comply would result
in the detonation of a nuclear bomb somewhere in Boston. Personnel and
equipment were
quickly assembled and transported to Griffiss Air Force Base in
Rome, New York. But before the team could make it to the threatened
city, the crisis
receded when no-one came to pick up the $200,000 in phony bills left at
the designated site.
2
But the incident and the difficulties involved in responding to the
threat convinced senior leaders that there was a need for a dedicated
capability to
deal with any attempt at nuclear extortion or nuclear terrorism.
From its inception, NEST devoted considerable time and effort to
conducting exercises
designed to allow the team to test its readiness, procedures, and
equipment in a variety of scenarios. In addition, since confronting a
nuclear threat
would involve not only NEST but a multitude of organizations,
exercises provided an opportunity to identify potential problems in
interagency cooperation.
MIGHTY DERRINGER was a particularly notable exercise in exploring
the organizational, governmental, and technical problems that might
arise in responding
to a nuclear terrorist threat. While the existence of MIGHTY
DERRINGER has been reported previously, the documents obtained by the
National Security
Archive and posted in this briefing book provide far more detail
than previously available on the scenario, results, and after-action
assessments of the
assorted organizations involved. Since NEST and these other
government entities are still critical components of America's
counter-terrorist capability,
these records are valuable for the insight they offer into how a
current-day nuclear detection operation would unfold and particularly
what kinds of
problems might be encountered.
3
The exercise took place in two locations - Camp Atterbury, Indiana,
near Indianapolis, and Area A-25 of the Energy Department's Nevada Test
Site - which
corresponded to the two locations involved in the exercise scenario.
One of the those locations was Indianapolis while the other was the
country of
'Montrev' - a rather transparent fictional version of Mexico (since
Montrev shared a border with the United States, its capital city was
'Montrev City',
and its primary security agency was the Directorate for Federal
Security - the same as Mexico's).
Montrev was the initial focus of the exercise, with a terrorist
group commanded by "Gooch" threatening to detonate an improvised nuclear
device (IND) near
the country's Bullatcha oil field. According to the scenario,
terrorists had stolen the devices from a new nuclear weapons state.
Eventually, the
participants discovered that that there was a second nuclear device
and it appeared that it was being infiltrated into the United States,
possibly with
Pittsburgh as a target - although it was subsequently determined
that the target was Indianapolis. While the U.S. Delta Force was able to
recover and
disable the device in Montrev, Indianapolis experienced a 1 kiloton
nuclear detonation that resulted in "total devastation over a 20 square
block area." (
Document 38) The scenario had originally posited a successful disarming, but the exercise controllers decided to introduce a new element.
The scenario allowed for all aspects of a possible response to a
nuclear terrorist/extortionist threat to be practiced - from initial
assessment of the
threat to the management of the "consequences" of a detonation. The
documents posted cover, with varying detail, the core aspects of a
response -
intelligence collection, technical and behavioral assessments,
search, access/defeat of terrorist forces, recovery of a device,
diagnostics, hazards and
effects estimation, disablement and damage limitation, safe
transportation of the device, and consequence management of a
detonation. In addition, they
also concern a variety of important aspects of a response -
including security, command and control, communications, logistics,
radiological measurement
and containment, weather forecasting, public information, and
interaction with local officials.
The documents also identify the large number of organizations
involved in the exercise. There is NEST and the organizations that
contributed members or
capabilities - including Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los
Alamos National Laboratory, and contractor EG&G. Additional
organizations whose
participation is evident include the State Department, Central
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Special
Operations Command,
Special Forces Operation Detachment - Delta (Delta Force), several
military explosive ordnance disposal units (from the Army and Navy), the
Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Beyond detailing participants and describing different aspects of the
exercise and static plans, some of the documents (the 'Sitreps'-
Document 19,
Document 23,
Document 32)
provide a more dynamic view of the state of play at various points in
the exercise. In addition, the post-exercise
critiques provide different individual and institutional
perspectives as to either the realism of the exercise or what the
exercise revealed about
strengths and weaknesses of the then current U.S. ability to respond
to a nuclear terrorist threat.
Thus, Vic Berkinklau, an engineer with the Atomic Energy Commission, in addition to describing MIGHTY DERRINGER as an "
Excellent,
well managed
exercise," had an additional eight observations which concerned
subjects such as uncertainty as to the number of NEST personnel needed
in Montrev, the
relationship between NEST and the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD)
team, and the need for more detailed analysis of the consequences of a
nuclear
detonation in a populated area (
Document 43).
L.J. Wolfson of the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center
contributed an eight-page
single-spaced analysis concerning a variety of topics, including the
nuclear device, assessment and intelligence, command and control and
disablement. He
observed (
Document 47) that "there is too great a prevalence to believe what might, and probably is, very inconclusive intelligence information" and
that "the entire operation was slowed and overburdened by the number of personnel involved."
Commenting on the terrorism phase of the exercise (
Document 50),
William Chambers, NEST member and site controller for the Indianapolis
component of
the exercise, wrote that liaison between the FBI's Hostage Rescue
Team, NEST, and EOD personnel was "excellent" but that "the joint
procedures for
withdrawing the HRT and survivors, securing the perimeter, and clearing
access to the device need clarification." An unattributed comment (
Document 66) suggested that the Delta Force players did not appreciate the "gravity of dealing with a nuclear device."
In the subsequent twenty-five years, NEST and other organizations
concerned with nuclear terrorism have conducted a significant number of
exercises -
particularly following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
4 However, because of its scale and
scope MIGHTY DERRINGER remains one of the more notable nuclear counterterrorism exercises.
The Energy Department is keeping secret significant aspects of
MIGHTY DERRINGER, but more may be learned about the exercise and the
State Department's role
in it from the response to a pending request. Moreover, files on
MIGHTY DERRINGER at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library will
eventually be declassified
and shed light on the National Security Council's role.
(
Note: A list of abbreviations used in the documents appears below.)
READ THE DOCUMENTS
Background
Document 1:
Ernest Graves, Assistant General Manager for Military
Application, Atomic Energy Commission, to M.E. Gates, Nevada Operations,
"Responsibility for
Search and Detection Operations," November 18, 1974. Secret.
Source: Department of Energy FOIA Release
With this memo General Graves assigned Gates and the AEC's Nevada
Operations Office responsibility for search and detection operations
with respect to lost
and stolen nuclear weapons and special nuclear material as well as
responding to nuclear bomb and radiation dispersal threats. The memo
became the basis
for the creation of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).
Document 2:
Director of Central Intelligence, IIM 76-002, The Likelihood of the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorist Groups for Use Against the United States, January 8, 1976. Secret.
Source: CIA FOIA Release.
An interagency group of intelligence analysts explored the
constraints on the exploitation of nuclear explosives, attitudes and
behavior toward the United
States, means of acquiring nuclear explosives, the ways in which
nuclear devices might be used against the United States, and the
capabilities of existing
terrorist groups. While the authors considered it unlikely that the
U.S. would be the target of a nuclear terrorist attack "in the next year
or two," they
also noted that, in the longer term, "we would expect a
corresponding erosion of the constraints against terrorist use of
nuclear explosives."
Document 3:
Energy Research and Development Administration, "Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST)," n.d. (but 1977). Unclassified.
Source: Energy Research and Development Administration
NEST began its existence as an unacknowledged government
organization, but in 1977 it was concluded that NEST would have to
interact with local law
enforcement and political authorities in dealing with nuclear
threats, and thus its existence would need to be acknowledged. This fact
sheet, distributed
to the press by ERDA, was the means by which NEST's existence was
quietly announced.
Document 4:
E.J. Dowdy, C.N. Henry, R.D. Hastings, S.W. France, LA-7108, Nuclear Detector Suitcase for the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, February 1978.
Unclassified.
Source: Los Alamos National Laboratory
This technical paper describes one piece of equipment designed
specifically for NEST personnel - a portable Neutron Detection system
that could be carried
in any vehicle. The paper describes the detectors, the electronics,
and the operations.
Document 5:
Director of Central Intelligence,
NIE 6-86, The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups, April 1986, Secret, excised copy
Source: Mandatory Review Request; release by Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.
This estimate examined several incentives and constraints with
regard to nuclear terrorism - including the availability of nuclear
information, material,
and trained personnel; changing levels of protection for nuclear
weapons and other sources of nuclear/radioactive material; and terrorist
capabilities and
motivations (including possible state support to nuclear terrorism).
The authors concluded that there was only a "low to very low"
probability of nuclear
terrorism that involved detonation of an improvised nuclear device
or nuclear weapon - or the dispersal of radioactive material in a way
that would
threaten mass casualties or produce widespread contamination.
Preparations
Document 6:
William Hoover, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense
Programs, to DCI William Casey, 23 September 1985, with CIA routing
memos,
Confidential
Source: CREST, National Archives II
A senior Energy Department official informed
Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey of the Department's conclusion on the need
for a large-scale nuclear exercise in the early 1987 fiscal year and requested the CIA's participation.
Document 7:
Robert B. Oakley, State Department Counter-Terrrorism Center, to
Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt, MIGHTY DERRINGER Exercise
Planning," 4 April 1986,
with memorandum to Vice Admiral John Poindexter attached,
Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA release
This memorandum, from the head of the State Department's
Counter-Terrorism Center, along with that attached memo to the
president's national security
adviser, described the level of State Department participation in
MIGHTY DERRINGER.
Document 8:
Peter Borg, State Department Counter-Terrorism Center, to
Richard Kennedy et al., "Exercise MIGHTY DERRINGER," 6 October 1986,
Secret
Source: State Department FOIA release
A number of State Department officials were recipients of this
secret memo, which informed them of the nature of MIGHTY DERRINGER, when
it would take
place, some requirements for the exercise to be realistic, and the
State Department's participation.
The Exercise
Document 9:
Don McMaster, Behavioral Assessment Report/PLC, n.d. [circa 2 December 1986], Incomplete copy, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This behavioral assessment mirrors the earliest phases of responding
to an actual threat, especially trying to assess its credibility. It
discusses the
reliability of a source, motivations of other key figures in the
terrorist group, and concludes that a credible threat exists to both the
United States and
'Montrev.'
Document 10:
F.W. Jessen, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "Summary Assessment," 2 December 1986, Secret, Incomplete copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This assessment, conducted at Lawrence Livermore, where much of the
credibility assessment effort has been located, reports that the
available information
suggests that the terrorist group possesses two improvised nuclear
devices but that LLNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory disagree over
the technical
credibility of the threat.
Document 11:
"Aggregate Assessment - - One Hour - - Of Threat Message and Sketch,"
n.d., Secret, Page 1 only
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The title of this memo indicates that a sketch of a device was
included with the threat message. Technical experts had already begun to
draw conclusions
about the device in Montrev as well as the implications for finding a
second device in the United States.
Document 12:
Thomas R. Clark, Manager, Nevada Operations Office, Department
of Energy, "NEST Alert Status," 3 December 1986, Confidential, excised
copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This message, from a Department of Energy manager, informs NEST
participants at key laboratories and contractors that NEST is on
"alert." The Department of
State has received a threat and the Department of Energy has been
asked to evaluate it. Other actions have been taken.
Document 13:
"Security Plan for NEST Retrograde Operation, December 1986," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The plan described in this document notes the classification levels
and types of information involved in the exercise as well as measures
for the
protection of cryptological matter and classified documents.
Document 14:
Peter Mygatt, Exercise Mighty Derringer, "Chronological Media Play, 'Site City,' Beginning 12/7/86," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The MIGHTY DERRINGER scenario writers assumed that if it was a
real-world event, part of it would be visible and covered extensively by
the media. This
document summarizes reports of fictional news services and
television stations as well as interaction between the media and FBI and
Department of Energy.
Document 15:
NEST On-Scene Commander, Subject: Event Mighty Derringer Sitrep No. 1 OCONUS, Prepared at 00:15 PST on 12/06/86, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The first Situation Report (Sitrep) of the part of the exercise that
takes place in Montrev summarizes the current situation (including the
number of
personnel in country) as well as
the status of a variety of subjects - including command and control, intelligence, disablement, and weather.
Document 16:
W. Rogers, NEST Paramedic Coordinator, to V. Withirill,
N.T.S.O, "MIGHTY DERRINGER, MEDICAL EMERGECY RESPONSE," 6 December 1986,
Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This memo reports that MIGHTY DERRINGER was being conducted in area
A-25 of the Nevada Test Site and would involve approximately 450 people.
It focuses on
"areas of responsibility … and those assets available" in the event
of an actual medical emergency.
Document 17:
"NEST Evacuation Plan," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This plan addresses the evacuation of NEST personnel and equipment
from Montrev City in the event of a nuclear detonation at the nearby
Bullatcha Refinery
No. 5. It focuses on execution, logistics, and command and control.
Document 18:
NEST On-Scene Coordinator/Exercise Mighty Derringer, to Director,
Emergency Management Team, DOE-EDC, Washington, D.C., Event Mighty
Derringer Sitrep
No. 2, Prepared at 1100 PST 6 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This report updates the Sitrep that had been prepared just after
midnight on December 6 and reports on the significant developments that
had occurred
during the day. It covers thirteen different topics, and provides
significant details of the terrorist site in Montrev, a summary of the
behavioral
assessment based on communications intelligence, and an assessment
of the device. It notes that a "second nuclear device may be enroute
[to] CONUS" and
there is no confidence that the device is one-point safe (that is,
the probability of a detonation is exceedingly low).
Document 19:
NEST On-Scene Coordinator /Exercise Mighty Derringer, to
Director, Emergency Management Team, DOE-EDC, Washington, D.C., Subject:
Event Mighty
Derringer Sitrep No. 3, Prepared at 00:10, on 12/07/86, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This Sitrep prepared an about one hour after Sitrep No. 2, notes
that "prestaging of equipment for access has been completed."
Document 20:
Assessment/McMaster, to Standard Distribution, "IRT Intelligence Summary 061200-062400," 7 December 1986 02:30, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This assessment reports on attempts to determine the presence of a
nuclear device at the terrorist site, the movements of the terrorist
group's leader, the
weapons and equipment possessed by the group, and a conclusion
regarding the capability of Montrev's armed forces to secure the
terrorist site.
Document 21:
Assessment/McMaster, to Standard Distribution, "Status Montrev Forces," 7 December 1986 05:30, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The status of Montrev's forces is reported in this memo, which is
based on information received from the Defense Intelligence Agency. It
discusses their
location, vehicle lift capability, and maintenance issues.
Document 22:
CN1 to All, "Mighty Derringer," 7 December 1986 8:44, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This memo conveys a report from the IWS news service on events in Montrev.
Document 23:
NEST On-Scene Coordinator, Subject: Event Mighty Derringer, Sitrep No. 4, OCONUS, Prepared at 09:40 on 12/07/86, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This Sitrep indicates a successful assault by forces of the Joint
Special Operations Command, resulting in their control of both the north
and south sites
that had been under terrorist control. It reports on the status of
the nuclear device and the initial implementation of the emergency
disablement plan.
Document 24:
Summary Assessment to Standard Distribution, "Summary Assessment," 7 December 1986 10:30, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The technical assessment has been entirely redacted from this
document, but the operational and behavioral assessments have been
released in their
entirety. They note that "The adversary has set up the Montrev
situation in such a way that if and when he surfaces in CONUS and makes
an explicit threat
and demand, he must be taken seriously."
Document 25a:
CN1 to All, "Mighty Derringer," 7 December 1986 12:28, Secret
Document 25b:
CN1 to All, "Mighty Derringer," 7 December 1986 13:07, Secret
Document 25c:
CN1 to All, "Mighty Derringer," 7 December 1986 15:48, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
These bulletins convey various media reports of developments in Montrev, including the presence of NEST personnel.
Document 26:
Assessment/F. Kloverstrom to Standard Distribution, "Results of
examination of containers found in south building," 7 December 1986
18:10, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This memo reports on the discovery, after the assault, of two containers, which appear to contain radioactive material.
Document 27:
Jim Boyer, "Suggested Procedure for Joint DOE/Montrev News Releases," 7 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Among the recommendations in this short memo are obtaining input
from the Montrev Ministry of Information "to get an idea of what El
Presidente will
approve," developing a cover for the NEST operation, but preparing
to admit NEST participation during the last phase of the operation.
Document 28:
"Time Line/Event/Decision Sequence," 8 December 1986 19:00, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This document focuses on the essential steps in disabling the
nuclear device seized in Montrev and limiting damage. Thus, it addresses
access, diagnostics,
disablement, damage limitation, and hazards and effects.
Document 29: "Damage Limitation Containment Implementation,"8 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This eight-page memo has been almost completely redacted but the
opening paragraph notes the location of the Montrev device and that its
location presents
a "formidable problem" but that all participants reached a common
conclusion for the solution.
Document 30:
"Hazards and Effects Analysis Prior to Montrev Disablement," n.d. [8 December 1986?], Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This three-paragraph memo notes that hazard predictions (involving
fallout dose and exposure rates) considered a variety of possible
yields, wind
projections, and the vulnerability of "the small village of Taco
Caliente."
Document 31:
A/I [Assessment & Intelligence] Behavioral, "Booby Traps/Tamper Proof," n.d. [8 December 1986?], Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This assessment focuses on the likelihood that the terrorist group
and its leader would have installed booby traps to prevent tampering
with the nuclear device seized in Montrev. It notes the implications of
the extensive anti-personnel attack defenses around the area.
Document 32:
James K. Magruder, On-Scene Commander, to Director, Emergency
Management Team, DOE-EOC, Washington, D.C, Event Mighty Derringer Sitrep
No. 7, 8
December 1986 23:00, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This Sitrep notes presumed deadlines for nuclear device detonation
and a proposed disablement schedule, the number of personnel on site, an
extensive
report on current intelligence, and that an "emergency destruct plan
has been prepared."
Document 33:
Assessment & Intelligence/F. Jessen to Standard Distribution, "A&I Summary/8 December 2130," 8 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This assessment notes the credibility of a threat message claiming
the existence of a second nuclear device based on experimental
measurements of the
device seized in Montrev. The memo's contents suggest a U.S. target
for the second device.
Document 34:
J.A. Morgan, Disablement Team Leader, to On-Scene Commander, "Disablement Plan," 9 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The memo includes a computer sketch of the terrorist nuclear device
and the disablement method, as well as the reentry and evacuation plans -
all of which
have been redacted.
Document 35:
"Exercise Mighty Derringer Post-Event Plan to Safe and Remove the Device," circa 9 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This heavily-redacted memo covers four topics - the situation,
mission, execution, and administration and logistics. The released
portion notes that
disablement action had been completed and that an intact physics
package had been recovered.
Document 36:
"NEST Demobilization Plan," 10 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This memo marks plans for the ending the exercise - specifying the
responsibilities of the individual organizations, procedures for
transportation to the
airport and the loading of aircraft, and command and control.
Document 37:
Assessment/M. Miron, to Standard Distribution, "Resemblance of Montrev Device to Tahoe Bomb," 9 December 1986 20:35, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
In 1980, a sophisticated improvised (non-nuclear) explosive device
placed at Harvey's Wagon Wheel Casino did substantial damage when
disablement efforts
failed. The memo suggests that publicly available information about
the device may have been employed to construct the Montrev device.
Document 38:
Cal Wood, Livermore National Laboratory, to Bob Nelson,
Controller Team Leader, "Preliminary Evaluation of Players' Device
Estimate," 10 December 1986,
Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This heavily redacted memo notes that "the diagnostic techniques
used by the team produced a rather good estimate of both the materials
present and their
configuration."
Document 39:
Director FEMA to National Security Council, "Situation Report on
MONTREV/Indianapolis Terrorist Situation," 11 December 1986 17:00 EST,
Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The FEMA director begins with the observation that "At 0700, 11
December 1986, a nuclear detonation occurred in the City of
Indianapolis" devastating 20
square blocks. He does not describe the type of damage produced, for
example, whether the detonation led to any fires, or the extent to
which it caused
local fallout hazards
. The FEMA director then describes the consequence management phase of the exercise, including involvement of state
and federal authorities and agencies.
Critiques
Document 40:
Carl Henry, Los Alamos National Laboratory, "Mighty Derringer
Report," 2 February 1987, enclosing comments by Ray D. Duncan, n.d.,
Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Some weeks after the exercise
, Los Alamos official
Carl Henry sent a large package of commentary on MIGHTY DERRINGER, which
is presented
below, piece by piece, except for the critique by Ray D.
Duncan,which is attached to the Henry memorandum. Duncan, a manager at
the Nevada Test Site,
produced an extensive review which raised a number of issues,
including the "unusual challenges" MIGHTY DERRINGER raised for NEST if
it was ever deployed
to a foreign country for a "covert operation." Perhaps some incident
during the exercise led him to the recommendation for educational
training for Delta
Force and the Joint Special Operations Command so that their members
"understand the potential consequences of moving or unintentionally
shooting an IND
[improvised nuclear device]."
Document 41: Untitled, unattributed document, Secret, incomplete
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This critique gives some detail on how the NEST group entered
Montrev during the crisis. The State Department had created an approved
access list and a
simulated Montrev consulate processed the players when they entered
the country. When players realized that they had forgotten some
equipment, they were
easily able to retrieve it as it was only 65 miles away. The
commentator noted that in a "real world situation, the NEST contingent
could be thousands of
miles away from necessary equipment or supplies."
Document 42: Eric Schuld to Bob Nelson, "Comments on Mighty Derringer - OCONUS Issues," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Schuld listed issues brought up by the "Outside Continental United
States" exercise. For example, the JSOC solved its problem through a
"quick assault"
that created problems for other organizations in the exercise.
Document 43:
Vic Berniklau to Bob Nelson, "Issues/Major Observations/Lessons Learned," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Like many of the commentators, Berniklau saw the exercise as
"excellent" and "well managed," but he raised problems that others also
brought up, such as
fragmentation of information and "confusion."
Document 44:
T.T. Scolman, Comments, n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Scolman, whose role was "Commander for Science," also saw an
information management problem and pointed to other concerns, such as
lack of support staff.
Document 45:
Richard F. Smale, HSE, to Carl Henry/Bill Chambers, "First
Impressions: Mighty Derringer: Consequence Phase," n.d., Classification
unknown
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The "consequence phase" referred to the aftermath of the nuclear
detonation in Indianapolis. Smale saw "great things" in the exercise,
such as its
technical organization, but he pointed to concerns such as the
failure to present information that would be accessible to a
non-technical audience and the
lack of time to "develop good fallout plots
."
Document 46:
L J. O'Neill, "Exercise Impressions," 9 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
O'Neill was impressed by the participation of "foreign speaking
actors" which helped the participants to enter "wholeheartedly into the
play."
Document 47:
L.J. Wolfson to R. Nelson, "Exercise Mighty Derringer," 10 December 1986, Classificaion unknown, excised copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Like O'Neill,
Wolfson pointed to the "good actor play," especially by the actor who had the role of Montrev's "El General." Nevertheless,
he argued that "too many people" slowed down the operation.
Document 48:
William Nelson, Mighty Derringer Washington Controller, to
Captain Ronald St. Martin, National Security Council, "Mighty Derringer
Meeting at FBI
Headquarters, 12 December 1986, Classification unknown
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The discussion at FBI headquarters on organizational issues produced
a consensus on the need for a White House-designated "leader," possibly
at the cabinet
level, responsible for managing post-nuclear disaster recovery
activities.
Document 49:
Kathy S. Gant, Emergency Technology Program, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, to William Chambers, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 17
December 1986,
enclosing "Comments on Exercise Mighty Derringer," 18 December
1986, Classification unknown
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Seeing a need for better integration of the consequences phase into
MIGHTY DERRINGER, Gant emphasized the need for state and local actors to
play a
stronger role in such exercises to give them greater realism. Her
discussion of the Federal Radiological Response Plan led to a
recommendation that NEST
staffers play a role in post-incident field monitoring of radiation
hazards because they would be the "first available federal personnel."
Document 50:
William H. Chambers, CONUS Site Controller, to Carl Henry, Chief
Controller, "'Quick Look,' Report, Mighty Derringer CONUS," 19 December
1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Chambers provided some detail on the role of the Indianapolis
nuclear detonation in MIGHTY DERRINGER. According to the script, the
device had been
"rendered-safe," but the exercise leaders "deviated" from the script
by improvising a "simulated nuclear detonation."
Document 51:
Zolin Burson, EG&G Energy Measurements, to Carl Henry, 29 December 1986, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Like Gant, Burson pointed to the need for more involvement by state
and local actors in such exercises, suggesting that "if the real
Governor and Mayor"
had been present, "they would have had a much stronger influence."
Document 52:
Richard F. Smale, Associate Group Leader, to Jesse Aragon, HSE
Division Leader, "Trip Report December 7 to 13, Camp Atterbury
(Indianapolis), Indiana,"
7 January 1987, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Smale provides more detail on the role of nuclear devices in the
exercise scenario, noting that "terrorists had stolen two … from a
developing
nuclear capable country." He also observed that "when control of the
device had been obtained, the NEST scientists could have disabled it."
Document 53:
Thomas S. Dahlstrom, EG&G Measurements, to William H.
Chambers, Carl Henry, and Norm Bailey, "Mighty Derringer Observations,"
13 January 1987, Classification unknown, excised copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
After noting that his "overall reaction" was "quite positive,"
Dahlstrom believed that "confusion" emanated from a basic problem: the
players did "not
comprehend the complexity of an OCONUS deployment - specifically how
the State Department controls the matter."
Document 54:
F. Jessen/LLNL to G. Allen and W. Adams/NVO, "Mighty Derringer
Critique," 16 December 1986, Rev[ised] 13 January 1987, Secret, excised
copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Jessen pointed to a number of problems, for example, that "many of
the participating agencies were not serious players," the "unrealistic
background
information" on the "fictitious" countries and people, "bad guidance
on the use of existing proliferant country data," and failure to
recognize that
"information to be assessed related to intelligence reports of a
nuclear terrorist threat." Especially disturbing was the relocation of
the command post to
a "safe location," while NEST personnel were not notified": "the
blatant lack of concern for [their] safety … is inexcusable."
Document 55:
Julie A. Orcutt/HSE, Los Alamos National Laboratory, to Jesse Aragon,
HSE Division Leader, "Trip Report: Mighty Derringer Exercise, Montrev
Site," 13
January 1987, Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
During the exercise, the on-scene commander at Indianapolis had
decided against building a "containment structure" to prevent the spread
of hazardous
material because of the risks. That meant, however, that plutonium
would be scattered about which presented dangers of "lung doses." Los
Alamos staffer
Julie Orcutt recommended the provision of more anti-contamination
equipment, such as foam mitigation, to reduce dangers to officials
entering the blast
area.
Document 56:
J. Doyle to Gylan C. Allen, "EG&G Comments for Mighty
Derringer," 14 January 1987, Classification unknown, excised,
incomplete copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Noting that the exercise provided "very valuable training," Doyle
saw such problems as the "sheer magnitude" in numbers of players,
cramped space, and
inadequate communications staffing.
Document 57:
G.C. Allen, USDOE/NVO, "Mighty Derringer: Comments and
Observations," 15 January 15, 1987, Classification unknown, excised copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Among the shortcomings cited in Allen's rather critical evaluation
were poor communications and weaknesses in interagency coordination.
Document 58:
William E. Nelson, Emergency Response, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, to Carl Henry, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
"'Quick Look,' Report,
Mighty Derringer," 21 January 1987, Secret, excised copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Jumping the gun was a weakness cited in Nelson's critique: players
"did not wait for establishment of credibility before acting," which
made a "shambles of
an orderly assessment of information." He also observed that NEST
search team "escorts" needed "experience in covert operations" to
"prevent inadvertent
acts that would alert terrorists." Nelson's report included a number
of observations made by other participants.
Document 59:
J. Strickfadden, LANL, to Bob Nelson, "Mighty Derringer Comments," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
The overall positive evaluation - the "most realistic exercise ever
conducted by the NEST community" - included some criticisms, such as
"chaotic"
operations at the Working Point [WP] and a shambolic state of
affairs at the "reentry" point (detonation zone).
Document 60:
Milt Madsen (Monitor) to Bob Nelson, "Mighty Derringer Observations," n.d., Secret, excised, incomplete copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Madsen's comments included suggestions for future improvements in
NEST's organization: for example, to avoid fragmented committee
operations, NEST needed a
technical program manager.
Document 61:
Peter Mygatt, "Mighty Derringer - Media Play Report," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Energy Department spokesperson Mygatt's evaluation of the player's
management of the media was generally positive, although he saw a few
failings, e.g.,
the Joint Information Center never called a news conference, "which
is unheard of in an emergency.".
Document 62:
Walter Nervik, Senior Command Controller, to Robert M. Nelson,
Exercise Mighty Derringer Controller, "Lessons Learned," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
An official at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Nervik wondered who
would provide security after JSOC operatives attacked the terrorists in
an overseas
environment. Special forces personnel would leave the scene but the
NEST would still need security resources.
Document 63:
Walter Nervik to Bob Nelson, "Lessons Learned," n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Nervik was critical in another evaluation: the NEST team was far too
large, players were complacent about a nuclear threat, there were no
"penalties" for
making a mistake, and playing conditions were "unreal." With respect
to the latter point, the fact that the Montrev phase of the exercise
occurred on
U.S.-controlled territory, (the Nevada Test Site), "severely limits
the stress placed on players in unfamiliar surroundings, dealing with
strangers, and
relying on untested sources of support." Nervik also saw a danger
that participants would see exercises as "more of a game than a serious
test of all
facets of the NEST capabilities."
Document 64:
Jack Campbell, Public Information, to Robert M. Nelson, Exercise Mighty Derringer Controller, n.d., Secret
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Campbell pointed to a weakness: higher level officials did not
really "play." For example, after the JSOC assault, the State Department
left Montrev, even
though "lives of American correspondents were in jeopardy." Another
surprise was that the Department of Energy NEST team did not establish a
"public
affairs" function, although in real life such a group would be
highly active.
Document 65:
"Mighty Derringer 86," unattributed, n.d., Secret, excised copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
These handwritten notes raised several issues, such as the
interaction between EOD and the Delta force players and the impact of
the "play" in the United
States on decisions in the OCONUS (Montrev) activity. One impact was
that a "risky" disablement option was taken in Montrev in order to
preserve evidence
to help raise the chance for a successful operation in "site city"
(Indianapolis).
Document 66:
"Mighty Derringer," unattributed, n.d., Secret, excised copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
Handwritten notes by another player raised basic organizational
issues. The absence of a "chain of command" prior to the deployment made
it unclear who EOD
worked for. A serious concern was that the Delta Force players did
not appreciate the "gravity of dealing with a nuclear device," an issue
suggested by
other reports (see document 41).
Document 67:
"Mighty Derringer Search Planning," unattributed, n.d., Secret, excised copy
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This document provides a review of organizational arrangements established for the device search in Indianapolis.
Document 68:
"Communications Observations (Site City)," unattributed, n.d., Classification unknown
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This review of communications systems concluded that this was the "best NEST communications exercise that I have observed."
Document 69: Second page of fax to Carl Henry, unattributed document, n.d., Classification unknown
Source: Energy Department FOIA release
This critique points to operational security (OPSEC) as the "real"
problem, noting that players had organizational logos on their clothing
and that "loose
talk" in hotels and bars was "particularly bad."
ABBREVIATIONS
CONUS Continental United States
EG&G Edgerton, Germeshausen, and Grier
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EODTECHCTR Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center (Navy)
ERDA Energy Research and Development Administration
EST Emergency Support Team
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCP Forward Control Point
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRMAC Federal Radiation Monitoring Assessment Center
HRT Hostage Response Team
IND Improved Nuclear Device
JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center
JSOC Joint Special Operations Command
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NVO Nevada Operations Office
OCONUS Outside the Continental United States
OSC On-Scene Commander
REECo Reynolds Electrical Engineering Corporation
SAC Special-Agent-in Charge (FBI)
SFOD Special Forces Operational Detachment - Delta
SITREP Situation Report
TOC Tactical Operations Center
WP Working Point
NOTES
[1]
Charles Wilson and Carrie Schedler, Associated Press, "Indy battens
down hatches for Super Bowl security," www.boston.com, January 30, 2012.
[2] Jeffrey T. Richelson,
Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), pp. 19-21.
[3]For the range of recent views on the risks and probabilities of acts of nuclear terrorism, see John Mueller,
Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Graham Allison,
Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimately Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004), and Michael Krepon, "
Are We Winning or Losing? (Continued)," Arms Control Wonk.
[4] Jeffrey T. Richelson, pp. 91-106, 178-179;
The Nuclear Emergency Search Team, 1974-1996
, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book Number 267, January 12, 2009,
Document 16.
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