Life takes us in many strange directions and wonderful discoveries. It never turns out the way we thought it would.
Saturday, June 29, 2024
Friday, June 28, 2024
Thursday, June 27, 2024
Wednesday, June 26, 2024
What Happens If Trump Or Biden Drop Out Of The Presidential Race?
As this year started, Zanny Minton Beddoes and the team at The Economist Magazine took out a crystal ball to predict what would happen in the upcoming U.S. presidential election. Their conclusion was: "Anything can happen." That was their prediction. The Financial Times of London has come out with an excellent article on what would happen if either Joe Biden or Donald Trump dropped out of the presidential election. Donald Trump is 78 years old. Joe Biden is 81 years old. Both men have lived longer than the normal life span for a male in the U.S. The first contingency is one where one of the men dies or becomes unable to continue the campaign before the nominating conventions. In this case, the nominating convention would take the form of nominating conventions from decades past. The delegates would be released from their commitment to Trump or Biden. There would be a floor fight to pick the nominee for president and vice president.
If one of the candidates was forced to drop out or died after the nominating convention, the party committees would vote to nominate a new candidate. This process would be a mighty succession battle with deep social unrest and uncertainty.
If Trump or Biden is actually elected president and then dies or has to drop out, the vice president would take over and be inaugurated as president. A new vice-president would be nominated and approved by the Senate. The Constitution is clear on this point.
Tuesday, June 25, 2024
Monday, June 24, 2024
Sunday, June 23, 2024
Saturday, June 22, 2024
Friday, June 21, 2024
Thursday, June 20, 2024
Wednesday, June 19, 2024
Tuesday, June 18, 2024
A Brilliant German General That History Has Forgotten
Icon for Mera Article Meri Duniya
Mera Article Meri Duniya ·
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May 21
Who was history's greatest general?
A little-known German general that, who, with a tired and depleted division, defeated an entire Soviet army, where he was outnumbered 7:1 in tanks, 11:1 in infantry and 20:1 in artillery: Hermann Balck.
Balck’s story begins in World War II, where he was a German infantry soldier that served on the front lines for four years. Despite being wounded seven times, Balck persisted in his service and received an Iron Cross; he was also nominated for the highest German military honor — Pour le Mérite — but the war ended before he could receive his award.
At one point, he was selected for the German General Staff, a common path to power in the German military. Yet, he opted to turn the offer down, preferring to stay on the front lines.
When WW2 started, Balck began the war as a staffing officer but was placed in charge of a Panzer division in 1940. After brief stints in Belgium and Greece, he was transferred to the Soviet front during the initial German invasion — a time where his greatness really showed through.
Let’s take a look at the situation when he arrived:
At the time, the German army in Stalingrad had pretty much been fully encircled by the Soviet forces, and the Germans were unable to reach them. As you can see on the map, the yellow marks the extent of German advancement — Soviet forces had trapped the 6th Army in Stalingrad.
Installed as head of a weary, understrength 11th Panzer Division, Balck was instructed to reinforce Romanian forces on the battlefront and help retake the city. When he arrived, however, he found a situation in shambles: his entire division defended a 37 mile front with ONE howitzer. His troops, suffering acutely from the Russian winter, were severely under-equipped and out-numbered by their Soviet counterparts.
Indeed, on that very day (Dec 6, 1942), the Soviet Fifth Army launched a huge assault, penetrating deep within his lines.
Balck immediately recognized the need to regroup and attack.
He initially believed the Soviets were trying to engulf his unit, so he organized anti-tank and anti-air weapons on his flanks, while maneuvering his units into a “hammer.” As the Soviets prepared their next attack on his unit, he let the heavy weaponry of his hammer fly, decimating 53 tanks, and wiping out the Soviet 1 Tank Corps.
With this, Balck began a brilliant, high-pressing strategy to fight back.
Each time the Soviets attacked, he reformed and used his Panzer tanks and artillery to counter-attack and push back. For eight days straight, making use of night cover and shock action, Balck steadily held off Soviet firepower and pushed back. In his memoirs, he described the battle as follows:
Each day was like the next. Russian penetration at Point X, counterattack, everything cleared up by evening. Then, another report 20 kilometers eastwards of a deep penetration into some hasty defensive position. About face. Tanks, infantry, and artillery march through the winter night with burning headlights. In position by dawn at the Russians’ most sensitive point. Take them by surprise. Crush them. Then repeat the process the next day some 10 or 20 kilometers farther west or east.
Using this process, he managed to repel the Soviet offensive and was prepared to launch an attack to save the German army trapped in Stalingrad. Yet, just as he was about to cross the Don River, the Soviets struck further south, forcing him to call off the Stalingrad mission.
With this, Balck began another series of well-organized, destructive attacks. The assault began with deception. He instructed his division of just 25 tanks to move into the rear of a line of Soviet tanks, blending in perfectly and then mowing down the forces in front of them. Next, as the Soviets responded by moving their tanks and infantry into the high ground of a hill position, Balck ordered his troops to move into lower ground and aim at a weakest part of the tank: the belly. After 6 days of attrition, deception, and tactically astute defending, the entire Soviet Fifth Tank Army had been wiped out.
Balck was then ordered, with his division, to defend a city Hitler ordered “kept at all costs.” (Mid-December, 1942)
The situation in Stalingrad was desperate. In his memoirs, he recounted that:
The situation was desperate. [The German defenders’] only hope lay with a single tired and depleted division that was coming up in driblets (mine). In my opinion the situation was so dismal that it could only be mastered through audacity—in other words, by attacking. Any attempts at defense would mean our destruction. We needed to crush the westernmost enemy column first in order to gain some swing space. We would just have to hope—against reason—that the hodge-podge of troops covering the city would hold for a day.
When Soviet forces again met his, Balck continued the same strategies. He ordered his tanks to stick to the rear of the Soviet tank columns, which led the Soviet commander to (logically) consolidate his forces around a hill.
With just 8 tanks to their name at the time, Balck and his forces encircled the hill the Soviets were at, trying their hardest to keep the Soviets trapped. After Christmas day passed, on December 28, the Soviets decided to try fighting their way out of the bubble of German forces. Although 12 tanks escaped initially, as soon as Balck learned of the attempt, he ordered his forces to forces to hammer the numerically-superior Soviets inside the bubble, then chase down the remaining forces. When he succesfully did so, his 11th Panzer Division won the code-name of “Hannibal.”
While Stalingrad was ultimately a lost cause, Balck went on to fight many other battles. During the period from December 7, 1942, through January 31, 1943, the 11th Panzer Division was credited with destroying 225 tanks, 347 antitank guns, 35 artillery pieces, and killing 30,700 Soviet soldiers. Balck’s losses for the same period were 16 tanks, 12 antitank guns, 215 soldiers killed in action, 1,019 wounded, and 155 missing.
He started the war as a staff officer, and ended at the German equivalent of a 3-star general. He was also one of only 27 soldiers to earn the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds, equivalent to 3 major honors in the US military.
Amazing.
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India Hired A Hit Man
The Hit Squad
INDIA
An Indian national accused of involvement in a plot to kill a Sikh separatist in the US appeared before a New York court Monday, in a case that has the Indian government being accused by Western Allies of ordering the assassination of Sikh separatist figures abroad, NBC News reported.
Over the weekend, authorities in the Czech Republic extradited Nikhil Gupta to the United States to stand trial. Czech authorities arrested Gupta last year following a request by the US Justice Department.
US officials alleged that Gupta is an associate of an Indian government “senior field officer” and that together they worked to organize the murder of Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, who is also an American citizen. The plot was thwarted by US authorities.
Pannun is a critic of the Indian government and authorities there have labeled him a terrorist. He has advocated for an independent region in India for its Sikh population.
Prosecutors said that Gupta, claiming to be a drug and weapons trafficker, unknowingly contacted an undercover officer of the US Drug Enforcement Agency posing as a hitman. In June 2023, Gupta offered $100,000 in a murder-for-hire scheme and provided surveillance photos.
It was around the same time as another incident in Canada in which an unknown gunman murdered another Sikh separatist, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, in the province of British Columbia. Gupta later bragged to the officer that Nijjar “was also the target” and “we have so many targets.”
The extradition is the latest development in a year-long scandal in India: Last year, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused New Delhi of being involved in Nijjar’s murder, sparking a diplomatic row between the two countries.
The Indian government has vehemently rejected the allegations as “absurd” and has launched its own investigation into the matter, the Hindu noted.
Gupta has also denied the accusations and claimed he was “unfairly charged.”
He currently faces charges of murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, both of which carry sentences of up to 10 years in prison.
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Puppet Masters
CANADA
Lawmakers in Canada’s Parliament are in uproar over the release of a classified report this month that showed extensive foreign interference by China and India in Canadian democracy, Bloomberg reported.
The report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) alleges that some lawmakers accepted money and colluded with foreign officials. It said foreign powers, primarily China and India, have attempted to interfere in Canadian politics, businesses, nonprofits and academic institutions.
The committee has not yet revealed the specific names and actions of the accused, prompting some lawmakers to demand transparency and accountability.
Center-left New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jagmeet Singh called the suspects “traitors” and called for their prosecution. Singh criticized Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for being lenient on foreign interference, citing instances where the government failed to act on intelligence about Chinese meddling in elections.
He also accused Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre of ignoring the issue, despite evidence that Conservative leadership races were also targeted. Poilievre, who has a significant lead over Trudeau in opinion polls, called for the government to name the implicated individuals.
The government countered that disclosing names would compromise sensitive sources and methods, and potentially damage the reputations of lawmakers without due process. Instead, government officials urged opposition leaders to obtain the necessary security clearances to review the unredacted report.
The allegations of foreign interference have prompted widespread debate on how to protect Canada’s democracy. Intelligence agencies have long warned of such threats, but the latest report is the most direct and alarming yet, the Washington Post added.
Trudeau ordered the NSICOP to launch the probe in response to previous reports of Chinese meddling in the 2019 and 2021 elections. The committee confirmed attempts to influence election outcomes, although they said they did not alter the final results.
Despite the gravity of these accusations, the committee noted the challenges in prosecuting such activities due to the need to protect classified information in court.
Analysts suggested that party leaders must take decisive action against implicated legislators to uphold national security and democratic integrity.
Monday, June 17, 2024
Sunday, June 16, 2024
Saturday, June 15, 2024
Friday, June 14, 2024
Thursday, June 13, 2024
The West Will No Longer Be Dependent On Rare Earths From China
If I say the words "rare earths" to you, many of you will get a blank look on your face. Those of you with training in the sciences, engineering, and geology will have a good idea of what these words mean.
Rare earths are rare elements found primarily in China. I could confound most of you with a list of these elements. To make a long story short, our technological world could not continue without the input of these elements. Your mobile phone, your flat screen television on the wall, your dishwasher, your washer/dryer, your central heating and air conditioning systems, your car (be it gasoline or electric), and your smartwatch, would not work without the input of these elements. On a macro level, electricity could not be generated without the high-technology components that depend on rare earths inputs. When you go to the doctor's office or the hospital, the advanced machines that keep you healthy would not work without rare earths.
The government would not function without the high-technology items that depend on rare earths. Most of your jobs would not be possible without high technology inputs. I could continue listing items for a long time.
Today, China produces 68.75% of the world's rare earths. This causes fear and deep concern. What if China decided to stop providing the West with these elements? What if China dramatically raised the price of these elements?
This week a company named Rare Earths Norway made a surprise and stunning announcement. They have discovered huge deposits of these rare earths at the Northern tip of Norway. This means that the West is on its way to no longer depending on rare earths from China. Here is a link for those curious:
Norway just loosened China’s stranglehold on rare minerals critical to the global economy—and it’s a huge win for Europe and the U.S. (newsbreak.com)
Wednesday, June 12, 2024
Tuesday, June 11, 2024
Mexico's President Spent 4 Years In The San Francisco Bay Area
https://www.dailyitem.com/wire/what-do-claudia-sheinbaum-s-years-in-the-bay-area-reveal-about-how-she-will/article_ccf1ecc2-8b60-5cc7-a935-772637c7628b.html
Monday, June 10, 2024
Evil State Actors Are Hiring Street Gangs To Do Their Dirty Work
My radar is always on a 360-degree sweep. I want to catch stories that major media outlets miss or pay scant attention to. I have been studying a trend for several weeks. I have put together some pieces of a puzzle with troubling results.
I first was alerted when a plot to assassinate former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton by the Iranian government. The FBI broke up this plot. Iranian Revolutionary Guard officials were so amateurish that they advertised openly on the web for hit men. As this story broke, it came out that several Iranians opposed to the regime had been kidnapped or subject to assassination plots here in the U.S. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard had hired local criminal gangs to carry out their dirty work.
Next came a report from a Swedish intelligence agency that I have very high regard for. They reported that Russian GRU operatives were hiring street gangs in Sweden to assassinate and harass anti-Putin dissidents in that country.
What followed was a report from law enforcement agencies in the European Union. Sabotage incidents are taking place all over Europe. At first, they were unexplained. There seemed to be no pattern to them. Savvy law enforcement people connected the dots and found a pattern among incidents in several different countries. Further investigation revealed that local street gangs in these countries carried out the sabotage. When perpetrators were apprehended, some confessed that they had been paid by the Russian GRU. The motive was revenge for the support that these countries were supplying to Ukraine.
Yesterday I got another shocking report from Chile. This country is normally peaceful, law-abiding, and with a very low crime rate. Then the Tren de Aragua street gang arrived in Chile from Venezuela. The crime rate has shot up. Some assassinations have taken place. One could infer that some state actors hired them to deal with people objectionable to them.
Countries like the U.S. and Brasil are riddled with street gangs. These gangs are heavily armed and quite experienced at carrying out assassinations. State actors bent on doing evil would find many capable operatives in the ranks of these street gangs.
Law enforcement agencies are going to have to adapt to these new realities. There needs to be close coordination with intelligence agencies that deal with rogue state actors in countries like Russia, Iran, North Korea, etc.
Sunday, June 9, 2024
Saturday, June 8, 2024
Friday, June 7, 2024
Thursday, June 6, 2024
Wednesday, June 5, 2024
Tuesday, June 4, 2024
Monday, June 3, 2024
Sunday, June 2, 2024
"Rinsed:" Money Laundering On Steroids
The author Geoff White is an accomplished true crime author. He has written a new book about money laundering titled "Rinsed." It talks about cryptocurrency and money laundering. In any money laundering operation, there are three distinct stages:
1) Placement: Injecting the hot money into the financial system.
2) Layering: Matching the illegal cash with legal money.
3) Purchasing innocent assets.
Technology has made money laundering much easier and more scalable. The beauty of digital currencies is not only their anonymity and access to deep global markets. Payments can be sliced up and put into millions of digital wallets. This makes the illegal money very hard to detect and trace.
Computer programs called mixers come into play. These programs "slosh together" illegal money and legal money. The illegal money laundering operations can be run from anywhere in the world. The "Dark Web" allows criminal organizations to form alliances and communicate with little interference from law enforcement agencies.
The result is a large increasingly connected illicit economy. Dark Web marketplaces like the Russian Hydra drug dealing website that is a parody of Amazon and eBay. Nigerian gangs like Black Axe conduct all their illegal scams from this Dark Web. Huge heists are also made possible by the new technology of money laundering. One example is the $625 million heist from Singapore-based Sky Mavis in 2022.
The authorities are becoming aware of this giant problem. They have not created the technology to counteract these criminal gangs. The message to each of you is to be careful with your financial matters. Vigilance is very important. Any of you who are curious, please get a copy of the book "Rinsed." Here is a link from Amazon:
https://www.amazon.com/Rinsed-Cartels-Crypto-Industry-Deadliest/dp/0241624835/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2G4D128IGFTR1&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.Yk5GiCqgLIXBMWFUf6cWSP5ll8WDz4KEd-OSm9cmNEw.zP43M3YK4s4ARKx7XAf44IRuceLqQTPNvyyQOhEwGd4&dib_tag=se&keywords=rinsed+geoff+white&qid=1717333724&sprefix=Rinsed%2Caps%2C145&sr=8-1
Saturday, June 1, 2024
The Economist Magazine Cover For 06/01/2024
The Economist
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JUNE 1ST 2024
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Zanny Minton Beddoes
Editor-in-chief
In America and Asia this week we feature the grassroots movement that could yet decide November’s presidential election. Elsewhere we look at the epic choices facing three women with the future of Europe in their hands.
A third of American women aged 15-49 now live in states where abortion is either illegal or impossibly restricted. Some states have passed statutes so severe and vaguely drafted that doctors fear they may be forced to choose between saving a patient’s life and breaking the law. Yet gloomy as this reversal seems, it has also given rise to America’s most dynamic new political movement: a revolt of millions of Americans who think that the government has little business inserting itself into private decisions.
We started with images of protest. Dobbs, the Supreme Court decision that overturned Roe v Wade, made getting a legal termination much harder for millions of women. The court, in effect, assigned people more or less choice depending on where they live.
But we wanted to focus on politics rather than the law. The protesters against Dobbs carry clipboards and tens of thousands of them have gathered millions of signatures to put abortion rules to state referendums. As many as 16 states could hold abortion votes on the same day that Americans will pick their next president.
This is better. Rosie the Riveter represents women who worked in factories in the second world war and has often served as a symbol of economic emancipation. That has not stopped the signature-hunting foot soldiers working against Dobbs from adopting her in their fight for reproductive freedom. The gavel, once again, is wrong—but we thought we could give Rosie something else to wield instead.
At a time when America is divided in two, we also have citizens coming together to fight a single cause. The pro-choice movement involves more of them than any such uprising since Black Lives Matter in 2020 or the Tea Party more than a decade ago.
This new movement is not made up of keyboard warriors vying for attention online, but of people giving up their weekends and evenings to try to persuade their neighbours of their arguments. It is participatory and local, the kind of thing that Alexis de Tocqueville raved about after visiting the country back in 1831. It is how democracy in America is supposed to work.
All that makes the idea behind this cover a good one. Unfortunately, the title betrays its blandness. This is too generic: we could be writing about almost anything.
Rosie the Revitalised is much stronger. The placard is faintly ridiculous—carrying something so polite would get a protester nowhere. However, we thought she could hold a ballot paper.
And that leads to the effect of Dobbs on the presidential election. Abortion seems likely to help the Biden campaign more than it harms it and in a tight race even a modest boost could be decisive. However, the very same outbreak of sanity that makes the pro-choice agenda so heartening means that Republican voters will be more able to separate their views on abortion from their views on the next president. Joe Biden may welcome some windfall votes from Dobbs, but he cannot be confident that the Supreme Court has saved him.
Europe faces Russian aggression, American estrangement and a flood of Chinese exports. Even as it resists the encroachment of the far right, it needs strong leadership. Whether it can pull that off depends on the choices of three women: Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, and Marine Le Pen, the leading French populist.
Here they are in two collages—a suitably complex representation of a complex situation. To win the second term she deserves, Mrs von der Leyen must obtain the support of a majority in the European Parliament, which Europeans will elect on June 6th-9th. For this she looks as if she needs the backing of Ms Meloni’s party. However, Ms Le Pen wants to create a mega-group of nationalists that could yank Europe hard to the right. A firebrand with a long history of xenophobia and sucking up to Russia, she needs the Italian right to be bound to her. Which way Ms Meloni jumps will determine the future of the European Union.
These drafts combine the blue and yellow of the European flag. Unfortunately, they reminded us of the (different) blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag. What’s more, the three women look to be in league, when in reality they are all jockeying for position.
We preferred this ABBA-style album cover.
Our choice would be for Ms Meloni to break from the far right and join Mrs von der Leyen in the centre. That would hobble Ms Le Pen’s plan and fragment the hard right. Disempowering Ms Le Pen might also diminish her appeal in France, where her party leads the polls ahead of national elections in 2027.
European politics has become so fragmented that it is conceivable that no parliamentary majority will be found for Mrs von der Leyen or any other candidate for the commission presidency. As Ukraine fights on and a Trump presidency looms, that would spark a constitutional crisis in Europe at a terrible time.
Cover image
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View large image (“Meet America’s most dynamic political movement”)
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View large image (“The three women who will shape Europe”)
Backing stories
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The pro-choice movement that could help Joe Biden win (Leader)
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The undoing of Roe v Wade has created a mighty political movement (Briefing)
The White House Has Its First Nuclear Drill
Ivory Item: Carter First U.S. President to Participate in Nuclear Drill
President Jimmy Carter with the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown meeting for breakfast, 20 November 1977
President’s Role in War Exercise “Highly Sensitive”
JCS Chief Ordered Military to Destroy Records
Carter Likely Authorized Retaliatory ICBM Launch During Mock Scenario
White House Interest in Crisis Operations Led JCS to Develop Nuclear Attack Simulation
Published: May 31, 2024
Briefing Book #
861
Edited by William Burr
For more information, contact:
202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu
Subjects
Cold War – General
Nuclear Strategy and Weapons
Project
Nuclear Vault
President Jimmy Carter with the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown meeting for breakfast, 20 November 1977
President Jimmy Carter with the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown meeting for breakfast, 20 November 1977. From left to right, clockwise: Army Chief of Staff General Bernard Rogers, Secretary of Defense Brown, President Carter, JCS Chairman General George S. Brown, Marine Corp Commandant General Louis Wilson, Air Force Chief of Staff General David Jones, Vice President Walter Mondale, National Security Adviser Brzezinski (Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Holloway behind Brzezinski) (Photo from Jimmy Carter Presidential Library)
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, his deputy David Aaron, and JCS Chairman David Jones, 20 December 1978
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, his deputy David Aaron, and JCS Chairman David Jones, 20 December 1978. Jones succeeded George Brown as chairman earlier that year. On 6 October 1977, Aaron listened in on the first Ivory Item simulation in which President Carter participated. (Photo from National Archives catalog)
President Carter with NSC military assistant William Odom
President Carter with NSC military assistant William Odom who was an important proponent of the Ivory Item simulations. (Photograph from William Odom Papers, Library of Congress)
Cobra Dane phased-array radar deployed at Shemya Island, Alaska
Photo from June 1977 of the Cobra Dane phased-array radar deployed at Shemya Island, Alaska, used for monitoring missile launches from the Kamchatka Peninsula. President Carter received a briefing on missile launch warning systems, including Cobra Dane, as background for the Ivory Item simulations. (Photo from National Archives catalog)
The National Military Command Center
The National Military Command Center. Lieutenant Colonel T.C. Benjamin Russell, U.S. Army, and Major J. William Stubbs, U.S. Army, shown operating the Conference Management Table (CMT) in the Emergency Conference Room (ECR) of the National Military Command Center (NMCC), 23 July 1976 (Photo from National Archives)
Washington, D.C., May 31, 2024 - On 6 October 1977, President Jimmy Carter and top U.S. national security officials dialed into a secret “Missile Attack Conference” (MAC) to coordinate a response to a simulated surprise nuclear strike on the United States. Organized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the mock war scenario was the first to involve the U.S. President and may have prompted Carter to authorize a retaliatory nuclear missile launch, according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive.
Using the code name Ivory Item, the JCS developed the simulation to familiarize the President with the procedures of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the ultra-secret list of U.S. strategic nuclear targeting options. Today’s posting consists of declassified archival records that document President Carter’s personal interest in strategic war plans and the conduct of nuclear war in “short warning” situations.
Carter was uniquely positioned to become the first president to participate in a nuclear war simulation. As the only president with an advanced physics education and firsthand experience with nuclear submarines, the threat of nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and nuclear proliferation deeply concerned Carter, who favored deep cuts in strategic forces by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, as commander-in-chief, President Carter felt that he had a responsibility to familiarize himself with emergency procedures for worst-case situations.
Carter’s interest in nuclear command procedures led Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the top secret Ivory Item program to give decisionmakers practical experience in addressing surprise attack and other nuclear-use scenarios through the simulation of “a Missile Attack Conference procedure.” After some practice runs, President Carter was invited to participate in the 6 October 1977 exercise.
While many of the details surrounding Ivory Item remain classified, declassified documents and the recollections of a former official indicate that Carter provided useful feedback about MAC procedures and targeting alternatives that led to changes in the SIOP Execution Handbook, strict limitations on the number of people who could participate, and instructions to destroy any records of the President’s participation in the mock nuclear war scenario.
When Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and his aides at the National Security Council (NSC) looked into the problem of nuclear surprise attack, they found that they had “inherited” crisis management procedures that were “neglected, rusty, and out of date.” Concerning “White House Emergency Procedures” (WHEP), the NSC Crisis Management Staff told Brzezinski that “there was concern in the JCS that the NCA [National Command Authority] might not be able to respond effectively in the event of a surprise attack.” They had started to stage Operation Alert (OPAL) drills involving helicopter evacuations, and the 9 July OPAL III drill “went off with precision and speed.” The “first goal” for U.S. “crisis management doctrine,” according to the NSC, “was to put the WHEP in good order,” while “the second goal was to help the President become familiar with the U.S. doctrine for nuclear ‘crisis management’ as it relates to the WHEP and the National Command Authority.”[1] [See Document 24]
As part of the process to support the President’s nuclear education, on 31 March 1977, Brzezinski sent Secretary of Defense Brown a memorandum asking, among other things, for a “brief statement of the procedures for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial phase.” The statement would include information on the “command procedures for the conduct of such a war, including such operational aspects as the location and procedures for effective exercise of control.” Brzezinski asked that JCS Chairman General George S. Brown play a role in providing information to the extent appropriate.[2] [See Document 2]
In response to White House interest, during the following weeks and months, Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs developed the top secret Ivory Item program to give decision makers practical experience in addressing surprise attack and other nuclear-use scenarios. During earlier years of Cold War nuclear competition, national security planners had devised organizational frameworks for making decisions in a military emergency, notably the “Missile Attack Conference,” which would be initiated by the Commander-in-Chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), presumably when there was unmistakable evidence of incoming missiles. The most “senior conferee” participant would decide whether the situation required presidential involvement. The purpose of the Ivory Item exercises was to “simulate a Missile Attack Conference procedure” conceived of as occurring on a “no-notice” basis.
Before they were ready to bring in the President, the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Brown developed and staged Ivory Item exercises beginning in May 1977. The preparations involved drafting presentations on early warning systems and the SIOP that could be shown to the Secretary of Defense and the President. [See Documents 5 and 6] Much of that material is heavily excised, but the SIOP material indicated that there were three possible responses to a surprise intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. At least two involved “Major Attack Options,” probably incuding hundreds, possibly well over a thousand nuclear warheads delivered by bombers and missiles. One was the “minimum execution” of Major Attack Option (MAO) 1; another was the “complete execution” of MAO 1. The purpose of the “minimum” MAO 1 option was to “minimize economic damage and fatalities” and to avoid attacks on the Soviet Government structure so as to permit negotiations. Implicitly, the second option involved even more massive attacks, including Soviet Government installations. Details on the third option are unavailable but possibly involved retaliation by Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers and ICBMs on “day to day” alert along with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).
According to the briefing documents, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (the SIOP designers) used the Comprehensive Blast and Radiation Assessment (COBRA) computer program to estimate fatalities for the surprise attack alternative responses. Apparently developed during the 1960s, COBRA was used to predict “the expected fatalities from both prompt effects (blast and initial radiation) and delayed effects (fallout for a six-month period) for the specific attack option executed.” Pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests may shed light on the origins and development of the COBRA program.
By late September 1977, the Pentagon was ready to involve the President directly in a nuclear crisis simulation. Aside from President Carter, other participants in the 6 October 1977 Ivory Item exercise included Secretary of Defense Brown, JCS Chairman Gen. Brown (and other JCS members), Vice President Walter Mondale, and Brzezinski, along with his deputy, David Aaron.
Most of the details surrounding Carter’s participation in Ivory Item remain shrouded in secrecy, but it is clear that the mock scenario involved an ICBM attack on the United States. Some details have also emerged about the President’s reaction, including his belief that too many people were on the line during the exercise. “[E]verybody’s ex[ecutive]/asst[assistant]” was there, according to Brzezinski’s military aide, William Odom. In an e-mail message to the National Security Archive, Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron recently described some of his recollections about the simulation:
[W]hen the President got on the phone there were over 20 people on the line. He had no idea who most of them were. The SecDef, Chairman and Joint Chiefs, CIA Chief, yes, but almost all the rest he had never met. I remember that it was a cacophony of voices and Carter saying how can I take advice from these people, if I don't even know who they are?[3]
Not long after Ivory Item, Brzezinski instructed the Secretary of Defense to keep the number of participants to a minimum in future exercises. Moreover, JCS Chairman Brown instructed the other Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief who had participated in Ivory Item to destroy any tapes or transcripts of the exercise.[4] “All personnel having access to the discussions during that conference must be briefed that presidential participation in the exercise is highly sensitive and the president’s Comments are even more so.”
The 6 October 1977 Ivory Item scenario involved a Soviet ICBM attack on the U.S., as indicated in Deputy Secretary Duncan’s memorandum to President Carter on 14 October. [See Document 14] The ICBM attack had been posited because it “would give time for dialogue,” according to Duncan, unlike an SLBM attack, which would leave decision makers with only minutes of warning time. While Duncan explained some of the technological issues involved in an ICBM launch decision, such as launch time and the “implementing message,” left unsaid is what Carter had decided during the exercise. Although it is likely that he made a retaliatory decision, it is possible that he only informed Secretary of Defense Brown, the other duly constituted member of the National Command Authority, and possibly JCS Chairman Brown, who would have transmitted SIOP execution orders.[5]
That President Carter approved retaliatory ICBM launches during the Ivory Item exercise is likely, but at what point did he order them? Did he decide to “ride out” the attack, or did he authorize launch-on-warning? “Riding out” would mean ordering a retaliatory strike only after receiving confirmation that Soviet ICBMs had detonated on U.S. soil. If that was the President’s initial inclination, the Joint Chiefs might have advised him against it, since command-and-control sites, ICBM silos, and bomber bases were highly vulnerable, and the initial blow could disrupt the U.S. ability to respond. If the Ivory Item scenario posited high confidence in NORAD’s indications of a Soviet ICBM attack, they might have advised a launch-on-warning, in which the President would order a retaliatory attack even before the Soviet missiles had hit their targets. The perils of launch-on-warning notwithstanding, SAC had already adopted it as a modus operandi and trained Minuteman launch officers to implement it. If President Carter agreed, he may have authorized immediate launch, possibly approving one of the MAO alternatives. Future declassification decisions on Ivory Item documents already under appeal may shed light on this point.[6]
It would also be worth knowing more details about the scenario developed for Ivory Item. The available documentation suggests that the exercise posited a mock crisis so far gone that the Soviet leadership had already made the terrible error of ordering ICBM attacks against the United States, apparently precipitating a U.S. decision to retaliate. Whether President Carter wrote a personal diary entry about Ivory Item is unknown, but it would be interesting to know how he reflected on it, not least the enormous responsibility of making decisions, even if simulated, that would produce millions of casualties on both sides.
In addition to the number of participants, President Carter also commented on the SIOP “Decision Handbook” that is among the contents included in the nuclear “Football,” the special case that travels with the President and enables him to make nuclear command decisions during a military crisis. Preferring a “more succinct checklist,” Carter apparently saw the presentation of the attack and retaliatory options as too complicated. According to a National Security Council (NSC) staff document recently published in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series, Carter’s participation “triggered revisions and changes in the SIOP based on Presidential guidance for the first time” ever. Before the simulation, “SIOP designers have had to imagine what the President would want to see and know in an emergency” [italics in original]. “Without a single clue from the President,” they had produced a “thick ‘Decision Handbook’” that was “the product of years of speculating in J–3 about the President’s needs.” That would begin to change. [See Document 24]
The NSC Staff’s somewhat overwrought statement listed several “monumental” implications for strategic planning doctrine derived from Ivory Item, including the “refinement” of SIOP options, greater presidential awareness of the limitations of the escalation control concept, and an additional point that remains classified. Some of the “refinements” may have been a “revised Surprise Attack Response procedure” depicting “key elements” of U.S. decision-making, including “decision time” against “strategic forces launched.” A “less complex presentation of the three alternative responses” to surprise attack had also been developed. [See Document 16]
Some details about the process by which the SIOP “Decision Handbook” was modified to suit President Carter show up in primary sources. The SIOP, emergency procedures, and problems with the “decision handbook” were discussed at a 17 November 1977 meeting involving Carter, Mondale, Brzezinski, JCS Chairman Brown, and Secretary of Defense Brown. [See Document 22] President Carter’s personal diary entry for 28 November suggests that the meeting had resolved the problems, noting that they “went through the SIOP procedures, walking through several drills.” “We’ve tried to simplify the process greatly since I’ve been in office,” he added, without mentioning that it was his own participation in Ivory Item that had led to the changes in the SIOP presentation.[7] While Carter raised questions about the presentation of SIOP options, so far as can be told, he did not question the targeting arrangements themselves or the high damage expectancies built into the SIOP.
President Carter’s participation in the Ivory Item exercise on 6 October 1977 is clear enough, but it is difficult to document his involvement in subsequent exercises, although he is on record discussing scenarios with the Joint Chiefs. [See Document 24] Declassified documents further indicate that Secretary of Defense Brown proposed an Ivory Item scenario involving an SLBM attack and the “loss of sensors.” The Joint Staff developed another scenario called “Ivory Item Hotel” in which the Soviets had disabled the Defense Support Program’s (DSP) ground links with sabotage attacks on Buckley Air Force Base and on the site of a then-important AT&T facility in Lamar, Colorado.
There are so many excisions in these documents that references to President Carter’s participation may have been withheld from release. It is also possible and even likely that because of edicts concerning “the privacy requirement for Ivory Item [that] has been imposed by highest authority” that the information was not preserved in the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, the circumstances remained in the memory of observers and participants, such as General Robert Rosenberg, a former NSC staffer, who recalled the scenario of one exercise where the “Red planners” destroyed U.S. command and control and intelligence “nodes,” and “the exercise ground to a halt.”[8]
The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library maintains many classified files and records that will one day shed additional light on the President’s role in these exercises, such as the Ivory Item file in the records of Hugh Carter’s Office of Administration. That file has been requested, but the huge backlog of pending requests for presidential records at the National Archives means that declassification is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Whether President Carter wrote observations about the Ivory Item exercises for unpublished portions of his private diaries also remains to be learned.
President Carter’s advisers saw the Ivory Item missile attack simulations as important for nuclear planning but also as a challenging complication. According to Odom, their impact was “far-reaching” in that they forced “the CINCs at SAC and NORAD to take a very close look at the short warning situation, C3, and Soviet doctrine.” For example, SAC generals had “new concerns” over C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) vulnerabilities but were “nervous about how far to go because of the enormous doctrinal, forces structure, and budget implications.” They wanted the lead to come from the NSC and the Secretary of Defense. Odom wanted the Ivory Item scenarios to extend to limited nuclear conflicts because they “can teach the President, you, Brown, and the Joint Chiefs a great deal about our present predicament.”[9] Whether that ever happened remains unclear.
What the Joint Chiefs pioneered in the late 1970s had predecessors in far more elaborate war games that the Pentagon and U.S. government consultants such as Thomas Schelling had organized beginning in the early 1960s, if not earlier. Such games involved detailed simulations of politico-military crisis scenarios and the steps taken by Blue and Red Team participants to play them out one step at a time.[10] Whether war games prior to Ivory Item focused on approximations of specific missile attack scenarios is an interesting question, as is whether any U.S. presidents after Jimmy Carter ever participated in Ivory Item-type simulations. To bring such an intense and high-pressure experience out into the wider world, two researchers, Sharon K. Weiner (American University) and Moritz Kütt (University of Hamburg), have created a virtual reality simulation of missile attack decision-making called “The Nuclear Biscuit.” Requiring participants to “make decisions in situations of high stress and uncertainty,” their project analyzes the “retaliatory options [that] people consider valid, plus the information, advice, and other variables” involved. The final study that Kütt and Weiner are preparing should be a stimulating contribution to the study of crisis decision-making.
Note: Thanks to John Tobin Fratis for research assistance, and, for last minute aid, to Stephen Schwartz, and Scott F. Thompson, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
IVORY ITEM DOCUMENTS
I. Background
Document 1 William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Chat with Lt. General Sitton, Director of the Joint Staff
Document 1
William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Chat with Lt. General Sitton, Director of the Joint Staff,” 8 March 1977, Secret
Mar 8, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28
During a conversation with Joint Staff Director General Ray Sitton, Odom found corroboration for his “assessment of the vulnerability of the NCA in a short warning situation.” Sitton further observed that “NEACP is good for command and control but not really where the President wants to be” [in a crisis]. Sitton said that he was “delighted that President Carter has shown interest in the SIOP and related command matters.” While Henry Kissinger had shown “great interest” in SIOP issues, “Nixon avoided them and Ford was hardly enthusiastic.”
Document 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Our Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options and Regio
Document 2
Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Our Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options and Regional Nuclear Options,” 31 March 1977, Top Secret, attached to William Odom memo to Brzezinski, 24 March 1977, Top Secret [Document 9 in FRUS national security policy compilation]
Mar 31, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material –Subject Files, box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine - Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO), 3/77-1/80
Brzezinski reported that the NSC’s “investigation of the White House Emergency Procedures for short warning nuclear attack has thrown up the question of our nuclear war doctrine.” Discussing problems relating to the SIOP, NSDM 242, policy guidance for preparing Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs), “war fighting procedures,” and the “vulnerability of the National Command Authority,” he recommended asking Secretary of Defense Brown and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for an explanation of such matters as current “nuclear war doctrine” and the “procedures they envisage for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial attack phase.” Carter approved the recommendation, and that same day Brzezinski wrote to Brown about several requests, one of which was for a “brief statement of the procedures for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial phase.” That would include information on “command procedures for the conduct of such a war, including such operational aspects as the location and procedures for effective exercise of control.”
II. Invention of Ivory Item
Document 3 Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al.,
Document 3
Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM-1431-77, 6 May 1977, Top Secret, with messages and memos attached
May 6, 1977
Source
U.S. National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [RG 218], Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
With the White House’s interest in strategic decision-making, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman were encouraged to develop a program for providing the President with practical training in the mechanisms of nuclear war. JCS Chair Brown informed the Chiefs about the plan for Ivory Item, a “no-notice SIOP execution exercise to test Missile Attack conference procedures” using “secure telephone circuits.” Brown explained that the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the JCS Chair could initiate an Ivory Item exercise, first by using non-secure lines to provide notice and to conduct a roll call, which would be followed by the use of secure lines and another roll call. After explaining to the participants that the call’s purpose was to “simulate a missile attack conference procedure,” the Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center would “talk through the response procedures contained in the [SIOP] Decision Handbook.” Brown noted that at a later stage Ivory Item “may be expanded to include a threat scenario and discussion of possible recommendations to the President.”
Document 4 Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., “
Document 4
Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM-1438-77, 21 May 1977, Top Secret, with messages and memo by Colonel [Alan B.] Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, attached
May 21, 1977
Source
RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
The first Ivory Item exercise took place on 12 May at the initiative of Secretary of Defense Brown. JCS Chairman Brown proposed ways to streamline the next one and cautioned the Chiefs about avoiding the use of speakers or extension phones, which can “degrade the quality of the secure conference.” The exercise could involve “a brief threat scenario” introduced by the Commander-in-Chief NORAD/Air Defense Command. A memorandum by one of Brown’s aides proposed a scenario involving an “attack of over 250 simulated ICBMs en route against U.S. targets including the Washington area.” The DDO “would read the major SIOP alternative responses and senior conferee[s] would terminate the scenario portion of the conference.”
Document 5 Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 14
Document 5
Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 14 June 1977, with note by Assistant to the Chairman General William Y. Smith, “After Action Report” and papers on SIOP, Non-Time Constrained Nuclear Response,” and warning systems attached, Top Secret, excised copy
Jun 14, 1977
Source
RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
“Problems” experienced during an Ivory Item exercise on 1 June 1977 led the Joint Staff to recommend that Secretary of Defense Brown and other principals receive briefings on warning systems and SIOP and “decision handbook procedures.” During the exercise, the NMCC’s Deputy Director for Operations was to be “conference manager” and lead a discussion of SIOP execution procedures from a “bolt out of the blue” perspective. There was confidence that the DDO could do that well, but it was less clear whether “they can answer questions on the ‘consequences of execution details’” or about the SIOP’s nuances. Smith reported that he had spoken with Admiral Staser Holcomb about Harold Brown’s thoughts on “exercises involving the President.”
According to the attached material, the SIOP included three alternatives in the event of a surprise attack situation. To estimate fatalities for the surprise attack alternative responses, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff used the Comprehensive Blast and Radiation Assessment (COBRA) computer program that “predicts the expected fatalities from both prompt effects (blast and initial radiation) and delayed effects (fallout for a six-month period) for the specific attack option executed.”
Other scenarios concerned “non-time constrained” situations involving a developing international crisis where nuclear employment options could be considered. On the latter, Harold Brown commented that “it would be useful for the President and the VP to spend a morning (at NMCC or ANCC) going through such a scenario.”
On page three of this document, a 16 June handwritten note by Lieutenant General William Y. Smith, Chairman Brown’s assistant, relayed “some thoughts Sec Def has about exercises involving the President.” Using another term for the “Decision Handbook,” Smith wrote, “It boils down to Sec Def, you, Dep Sec Def, Brzezinski getting together to discuss various Soviet attack options and possible US responses, how the ‘Black Book’ helps and is used, etc.” (Note: After his retirement from the military, General Smith became a member of the National Security Archive’s original advisory board.)
Document 6 Memorandum from JCS Chair Brown to Secretary of Defense Brown, “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM 1514-77
Document 6
Memorandum from JCS Chair Brown to Secretary of Defense Brown, “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM 1514-77, 5 July 1977. Top Secret, Excised Copy
Jul 7, 1977
Source
RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Brown sent the Secretary of Defense detailed briefing charts on warning systems and “SIOP Execution Considerations.” Apparently, the charts would be made available to President Carter, who had seen some of them during his meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 12 January 1977.[11]
Several systems for warning of missile launches were mentioned, but not discussed. They were PARCS (Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System), the satellite-based Defense Support Program (DSP) and the Cobra Dane radar system at Shemya in the Aleutian Islands.
According to the SIOP material, of the three possible responses to an ICBM-only surprise attack, one was a “minimum execution” of Major Attack Option [MAO] 1, while another was a “complete execution” of MAO 1. The “minimum” MAO 1 option was designed to “minimize economic damage and fatalities” and to avoid attacks on the Soviet Government structure, which would make negotiations possible. Thus, for the maximum MAO 1 response, there were no Soviet targets slated for withholds. For a “non-time constrained” situation, where there had been intimations of crisis, the two MAO options would have involved the SAC bomber/ICBM alert force as well as any specially generated additional forces, along with SLBMs. According to the briefing material, the “minimum” option had two “major disadvantages,” neither of which is described. The implication was a preference for the larger attack option, perhaps because MAO 1’s emphasis on minimizing casualties meant excluding some military installations and government control structures that were co-located with population centers.
The third undescribed surprise attack response, likely for a “bolt out of the blue” situation, would have involved the bomber/ICBM forces on alert at the time, although SLBMs would have played a role in any retaliatory action.[12] In the event of a “mounting crisis,” Selected Attack Options (SAO), for which there were five, would be possible.
Document 7 Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman’s Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 19
Document 7
Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman’s Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 19 July 1977, with memoranda attached, including scenario for “Exercise Ivory Item Alfa,” 19 July 1977, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Jul 19, 1977
Source
RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Renshaw informed Brown that a new Ivory Item scenario had been prepared and that J-3 had proposed coordination with the White House Communications Agency if “Presidential participation” was anticipated. In comments on the scenario, Air Force Chief of Staff Jones mentioned the “need [for] more alternatives” or “sub options” within the alternatives and the lack of discussion about China.
Document 8 Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Luncheon with Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Document 8
Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Luncheon with Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Friday August 5, 1977, 12:30 P.M. (60 minutes),” Top Secret, with Brown memorandum, “Luncheon with the JCS on 5 August,” 3 August 1977
Aug 5, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material, Office Files, box 101, Meetings, 77-12/77
Brzezinski cited South Korea, PRM-10, the B-1 bomber and cruise missiles, and SALT as major issues for discussion in this meeting. Brown’s memo included “command and control exercises” as a topic for discussion, which was a reference to “missile attack conferencing” and Ivory Item. The Chiefs may well have briefed Carter and Brzezinski on the developing Ivory Item arrangements.
Document 9 JCS Chairman Brown to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item Scenario,” 12 September 1977, w
Document 9
JCS Chairman Brown to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item Scenario,” 12 September 1977, with memoranda attached, Top Secret, excised copy
Sep 12, 1977
Source
RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Chairman Brown sent the Secretary of Defense a revised Ivory Item scenario that was shorter than the 1 June exercise with “less instruction,” making it more suitable for presidential or vice-presidential participation. According to Colonel Renshaw’s memorandum, the scenario involved an ICBM attack only, with succeeding scenarios involving SLBMs only and a mix of ICBM and SLBMs.
Document 10 Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The IVORY Item that Never Was,” 28 Sept
Document 10
Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The IVORY Item that Never Was,” 28 September 1977, Top Secret
Sep 28, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78
Odom recounted that an Ivory Item simulation was scheduled to occur that day but did not because Secretary of Defense Brown could not assemble all of the Joint Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief of various unified and specified commands (SAC, European Command, etc.) on a secure conference call. Odom said that the failure did not mean that the system would not work in a “real event,” because non-secure lines could be used, but it indicated the limitations of the secure call network and pointed to the necessity for Ivory Item to give the “NCA a sense of timing and communication realities.”
Document 11 Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ivory Item,” 30 September 1977, Top Sec
Document 11
Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ivory Item,” 30 September 1977, Top Secret
Sep 30, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78
Odom reported that the Department of Defense held another Ivory Item exercise that reportedly went “very well,” except that Brzezinski was not included because the NMCC duty officer did not call the White House Communications Agency switch at the beginning of the exercise. When the Secretary of Defense asked that Brzezinski be called, it was too late. They were going to try again the following Monday (3 October).
III. The First Presidential Ivory Item Exercise
Document 12 The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter, 6 October 1977, Thursday
Document 12
The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter, 6 October 1977, Thursday
Oct 6, 1977
Source
JCPL, Daily Diary Website
On this day, President Carter participated in the Ivory Item exercise. According to his personal diary, “This was a busy day, putting out fires,” although he did not mention Ivory Item in the published diary. The only reference to the Joint Chiefs was a meeting to discuss SALT II.[13] The White House daily diary showed periods of time when a conference call could have occurred, for example, when he was meeting with Brzezinski or with Vice President Mondale.
Document 13 Notes on Ivory Item, circa 6 October 1977
Document 13
Notes on Ivory Item, circa 6 October 1977
Oct 6, 1977
Source
William Odom Papers, Library of Congress, box 2:178, 1977 folder
In these rough notes on the Ivory Item conference—perhaps questions he had for Brzezinski—Odom wrote “who listens” and noted what the President said about the “choice of alternatives,” “evacuation,” and having “everybody’s ex/asst [on the] line.” The latter was a reference to the fact that so many people were listening in or trying to participate in the call that David Aaron remembered President Carter asking, “How can I take advice from these people if I don't even know who they are?”
Document 14 Colonel [Alan B.] Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, with Memorandum to
Document 14
Colonel [Alan B.] Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, with Memorandum to the President from Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan attached, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 14 October 1977, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Oct 14, 1977
Source
RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
The following week, Charles Duncan wrote to President Carter that he had heard that the President had been “generally pleased” with the Ivory Item exercise. Noting that the scenario had been devised to “give time for dialogue,” Duncan stressed that in an actual crisis “time may be quite short, particularly if SLBMs are involved.” Warning time for ICBMs was 17 minutes, while warning times for an SLBM launch was only five minutes plus. [See Document 23] Duncan mentioned some details, excised from the text, about ICBM launch times that would be taken into account in the “implementing message,” presumably of SIOP options.
At what point in the simulation President Carter chose to retaliate remains to be learned, for example, whether he launched “on warning” or chose to “ride out” the attack before retaliating. It is possible that he chose one of the Major Attack Options from the SIOP’s three choices for responding to surprise attacks.
Document 15 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Zbigniew Brezinski, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 18 Octob
Document 15
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Zbigniew Brezinski, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 18 October 1977, Top Secret
Dec 31, 1969
Source
President Carter’s dissatisfaction with the number of people on the line during the Ivory Item exercise is reflected in this directive from Brzezinski ordering that “unnecessary people” be excluded from the next simulation. He also asked that “standby communication” lines be made available with one being secure and the other open. Brzezinski also wanted to review with Brown the “new SIOP instructions format” before it went to the President.
Document 16 JCS Message to Commanders-in Chief, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 20 October 1977, with Joint Staff mem
Document 16
JCS Message to Commanders-in Chief, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 20 October 1977, with Joint Staff memos, draft message on Ivory Item “policies and procedures,” and draft of Secretary of Defense response to Brzezinski memo, 20 October 1977, Top Secret
Oct 20, 1977
Source
RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Brzezinski’s directive led quickly to a message for the CINCs of the unified and specified nuclear commands (SAC, European, Pacific, etc.) that they had to answer the phone personally during the Ivory Item exercises, that no speaker phones, extensions, or tape recorders were to be used, and that any transcripts or tapes of the 6 October conference were to be destroyed. “All personnel having access to the discussions during that conference must be briefed that presidential participation in the exercise is highly sensitive and the president’s comments are even more so.”
Attached was a draft instructions message on Ivory Item procedures, with provisions for a “Backup” conference telephone that would be monitored by a “knowledgeable individual with immediate access to the principal.”
A memorandum from George S. Brown to Harold Brown indicated actions taken in response to Brzezinski’s edict including a “revised Surprise Attack Response procedure” depicting “key elements” of U.S. decision-making including “decision time” against “strategic forces launched.” A less complex version of the “three alternative responses” to surprise attack would also be developed. [See Document 6 for some earlier information on those alternatives]
Document 17 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 21 October 1977, Top Secret
Document 17
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 21 October 1977, Top Secret
Oct 21, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material -Inderfurth and Gates Chron Files, box 4, Gates Chron
In his response, Brown mentioned the decisions to tighten up participation in Ivory Item to principals only and to create a backup circuit for future conferences, and his readiness to discuss “a proposed format for the condensed decision guide” when he flew with the President to Omaha for their visit to SAC headquarters.
Document 18 JCS Chairman Brown to Chief of Staff U.S. Army et al., “Exercise IVORY ITEM,” 27 October 1977, C
Document 18
JCS Chairman Brown to Chief of Staff U.S. Army et al., “Exercise IVORY ITEM,” 27 October 1977, CM-1678-77, with memoranda attached, 27 October 1977, Top Secret
Oct 27, 1977
Source
RG 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Drawing on the draft text [See Document 16] Brown sent the chiefs the updated instructions for Ivory Item telephone conferences, including prohibitions on the use of “extension phones, speakers, recorders, or other external devices.”
IV. “Decision Handbook” Improvements and New Scenarios
Document 19 Colonel Renshaw Memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Ivory Item Scenario Comments,” 31 Octobe
Document 19
Colonel Renshaw Memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Ivory Item Scenario Comments,” 31 October 1977, with memorandum from Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Admiral Thor Hanson to JCS Chairman attached, 28 October 1977, Top Secret
Oct 31, 1977
Source
RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
This memorandum indicated that Secretary of Defense Brown proposed exercise scenarios “that introduce SLBM launch after a few minutes; and that involve loss of sensors,” presumably BMEWs radar or Defense Support System satellites.
Document 20 William Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Your Monday Meeting with Harold Brown,” 28 October 1977, T
Document 20
William Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Your Monday Meeting with Harold Brown,” 28 October 1977, Top Secret
Oct 28, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78
In a memo for Brzezinski on his upcoming meeting with Harold Brown, Odom said that Brown would bring the “Revised SIOP Format” that President Carter sought—something close to what Air Force Chief of Staff David Jones had shown to Brzezinski en route to SAC. Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs) would also be a topic for the meeting. Odom saw creating them as a “useful staff exercise” but did not see them as “products for actual presidential choice.” Odom said the “real issue, if the President wants a number of options short of the SIOP variants, is the speed with which lesser strikes (i.e. LNOs) could be staffed by JCS/SAC in a crisis and in response to the unique political guidance at that time.”
Document 21 JCS Chairman Brown to CINCSAC [Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command] Ellis, “Exercise Ivory It
Document 21
JCS Chairman Brown to CINCSAC [Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command] Ellis, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 3 November 1977, Top Secret
Nov 3, 1977
Source
RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
For future Ivory Item exercises, Brown granted CINCSAC Ellis’s request for the participation of the Vice CINCSAC in the Airborne Command Post as well as to use the speaker on the balcony of the Command Center during the conference. The restrictions concerning recorders and other speakers remain in place and CINCSAC should keep the number of officers on the balcony to a “minimum” during the exercise.
Document 22 Memorandum for the Vice President from John Matheny/Dennis Clift, “2:00 P.M. Meeting with the Pres
Document 22
Memorandum for the Vice President from John Matheny/Dennis Clift, “2:00 P.M. Meeting with the President and the Secretary of Defense,” 17 November 1977, Top Secret
Nov 17, 1977
Source
JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78
In keeping with his significant role in national security policy, which included having a nuclear “Football” assigned to his military aide, Vice President Mondale participated in the October Ivory Item exercise and met with President Carter and Secretary of Defense Brown to discuss emergency procedures and the SIOP. According to the White House diary, the President met with Mondale, JCS Chairman Brown, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Zbigniew Brzezinski on 17 November 1977.
The briefing memorandum for this meeting mentioned the President’s criticism of the SIOP “decision handbook” noting that he wanted a “more succinct checklist.” Besides discussing the role of attacks on Warsaw Pact forces during a strategic war, Matheny and Clift referred to the short time for decisions that Duncan had mentioned: 17 minutes for a Soviet ICBM attack and five-plus minutes for a Soviet SLBM strike.
Apparently, the meeting on 17 November resolved the complications involving the surprise attack procedures in the SIOP “decision handbook” that had concerned President Carter. On 28 November, he met again with the same senior officials and went through the SIOP step by step. Carter briefly described the meeting in his personal diary, where he wrote:
[We] went through the SIOP procedures, walking through several drills. This is the first time that any president has done this, which is unbelievable. We’ve tried to simplify the process greatly since I’ve been in office.
Carter did not mention Ivory Item or his participation in the simulation, which had led to the changes in the SIOP “decision handbook.” In his comments on the 28 November meeting, President Carter wrote that it had “taken eleven months to schedule this detailed drill procedure—which rehearsed our response to the use of nuclear weapons” and involved all of the principals, including the Vice President.[14]
Document 23 JCS Chairman Message 5272 to CINCSAC [et al.], “Ivory Item Exercises,” with memos attached, 14 D
Document 23
JCS Chairman Message 5272 to CINCSAC [et al.], “Ivory Item Exercises,” with memos attached, 14 December 1977, Top Secret
Dec 13, 1977
Source
NARA, Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown File, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
During a 28 November discussion with Harold Brown and the Chiefs about Ivory Item scenarios, the President raised questions about the use of the “real world missile attack conference procedure” to report “hostilities in your areas of interest” [e.g., Europe, Pacific]. As a result, Brown informed the CINCs that the “Missile Attack Conference procedure” was “being changed to affirm the desire for reports of this nature which bear on the decisionmaking process.” There will be no need for “negative reports on area hostilities.” As for future scenarios, “inputs regarding regional hostilities will be provided in scenario scripts.”
Document 24 Memorandum From Crisis Management Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
Document 24
Memorandum From Crisis Management Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), “NSC Annual Report, 10 December 1977, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Dec 10, 1977
Source
(FRUS Document 46)
This report by the NSC “Crisis Management Staff”—in which William Odom likely had a hand, given his responsibility for crisis management issues—provided an overview of the Carter White House’s efforts to enhance its capabilities to meet emergency situations. One such effort, following up on Brzezinski’s emphasis on familiarizing the President with “U.S. doctrine for nuclear ‘crisis management,’” was the October 1977 Ivory Item exercise. According to the report, presidential participation in a missile attack simulation “had never been done before, and the event triggered revisions and changes in the SIOP based on Presidential guidance for the first time in history. Before the drill “SIOP designers have had to imagine what the President would want to see and know in an emergency” [italics in original]. “Without a single clue from the President,” they had produced a “thick ‘Decision Handbook”—presumably, the compendium carried in the nuclear “Football,” which was “the product of years of speculating in J-3 about the President’s needs.” That would begin to change.
The NSC staff found that Ivory Item had “monumental” implications for strategic planning doctrine, including “refinement” of SIOP options, greater presidential awareness of the limitations of the escalation control concept, and an additional point that remains classified. Given what has been disclosed in other documents, perhaps that excised point concerned the need for presidential experience with exercise scenarios involving different amounts of warning time.
Document 25 JCS Chairman George S. Brown Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, “Presidential/Tasking Questio
Document 25
JCS Chairman George S. Brown Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, “Presidential/Tasking Questions,” with memos and draft replies to the President attached, 16 December 1977, Top Secret, Excised copy
Dec 16, 1977
Source
NARA, Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown File, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Brown sent the Secretary a draft reply to President Carter concerning their discussions on 28 November. This version of the reply is far more excised than the letter that Brown sent (see below), although one topic, “Reference Warsaw Pact Fatalities,” that may have been excised from Brown’s reply, survived declassification review. Apparently, President Carter wanted information on nuclear casualty levels in Eastern Europe.
Document 26 Secretary of Defense Brown memo to President Carter, “Ivory Item and Surprise Attack Procedures”
Document 26
Secretary of Defense Brown memo to President Carter, “Ivory Item and Surprise Attack Procedures” 19 December 1977, Top Secret, excised copy
Dec 18, 1977
Source
JCP, Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Material, box 21, Jimmy Carter Sensitive 1/77-9/78
Having met with President Carter on 28 November to discuss the SIOP and responses to surprise attack situations, Brown provided information to respond to questions and issues that had arisen. They concerned communications, hardening of command centers, and recalling bombers. Brown welcomed the suggestion that President Carter observe an Ivory Item exercise at the NMCC because it would “provide a useful insight into the procedures and processes that support SIOP decision-making and execution of our nuclear forces.”
Document 27 Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory It
Document 27
Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 6 March 1978, Top Secret
Mar 6, 1978
Source
NARA, Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown File, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
During his 28 January 1978 meeting with the Chiefs and Secretary Brown at the NMCC, President Carter raised questions about the vulnerability of the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites (apparently one question had to do with whether lasers could damage or “blind” the DSP). Secretary Brown tasked the Chiefs to prepare Ivory Item scenarios that were responsive to the concerns about DSP vulnerability. [See Document 20] The two scenarios that the Joint Staff developed were identical except for the way that the Soviets tried to “kill” the DSP. In one, “Ivory Item Hotel,” the Soviets disabled the DSP’s ground links with sabotage attacks at Buckley Air Force Base and Lamar, Colorado. In the other, “Ivory Item India,” the Soviets targeted the ground links with SLBMs launched from the Gulf of Mexico. Apparently, the Joint Staff found the “Hotel” scenario more plausible because a Soviet Yankee submarine in the Gulf of Mexico would not go undetected.
Document 28 Message from Acting JCS Chair General Rogers to CINCAD [Commander-in-Chief Aerospace Defense Command
Document 28
Message from Acting JCS Chair General Rogers to CINCAD [Commander-in-Chief Aerospace Defense Command] General Hill, with attachments, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 17 March 1978, Top Secret
Mar 17, 1978
Source
RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Rogers turned down General Hill’s request to use extension speakers during Ivory Item exercises. “Restriction of these sensitive exercise discussions is essential to their ultimate purpose.”
Document 29 JCS Acting Chairman David Jones to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with attachments
Document 29
JCS Acting Chairman David Jones to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with attachments including “Hotel” and “India” Ivory Item Scenarios, and memorandum from Assistant to the Chairman General William Y. Smith, 25 April 1978, Top Secret, Excised copy
Apr 28, 1978
Source
RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Acting Chairman Jones sent Secretary Brown the Ivory Item “Hotel” scenario along with a precis. One of the enclosed memoranda indicated that the Joint Staff preferred the “Hotel” over the “India” scenario. The scenarios for both are heavily excised, although Document 27, above, summarizes their premises. The Smith memorandum provided questions raised by the President and advisers during their visit to the NMCC with the responsive information included in a report sent to Brzezinski on 9 March.
Document 30 Colonel Wolcott memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 10 July 1978, with
Document 30
Colonel Wolcott memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 10 July 1978, with attachments, Top Secret
Jul 10, 1978
Source
RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
CINCAD General Hill repeated his request to use speaker phone extensions on the grounds that his “Ivory Item support team” could help him better assist NCA decision-making. JCS Chairman Jones wrote to General William Y. Smith about his concern that this would set a precedent with other CINCs “wanting more people on the line.” The proposed reply granted the request as long as the “privacy requirement for Ivory Item [that] has been imposed by highest authority” was observed, and the matter was handled in a separate message.
Document 31 Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory It
Document 31
Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with attachments, 19 July 1978, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Jul 19, 1978
Source
RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
The Chiefs discussed holding a military-only (Washington principals and the CINCs) Ivory Item exercise using the “Delta” scenario on 21 July1978. The simulation was delayed because of disagreements over the scenario.
Document 32 Message from JCS Chairman to Generals Ellis and Hill, with attachments, “Ivory Item Exercise Scena
Document 32
Message from JCS Chairman to Generals Ellis and Hill, with attachments, “Ivory Item Exercise Scenario Transmission Proposal,” 12 August 1978, Top Secret, excised copy
Aug 12, 1978
Source
RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Little comes through from these heavily excised messages and papers except that there was continuing discussion of the CINCAD’s request for permission to use speaker extensions during the Ivory Item exercises.
V. Whether Canadians Should Participate
Document 33 Colonel Wolcott to Chairman’s Assistants, “Ivory Item Exercise,” with attachments, 21 August 1
Document 33
Colonel Wolcott to Chairman’s Assistants, “Ivory Item Exercise,” with attachments, 21 August 1978, Top Secret, excised copy
Aug 21, 1978
Source
RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
These memos concerned the possibility of Canadian participation in the Ivory Item exercises with J-3 (operations) supporting and J-5 (strategy and plans) opposing their inclusion, although neither side was 100 percent behind their own position. The issue had been raised at the time of the first exercise in May 1977 because “NORAD Canadians might play key role in real-world surprise attack,” but the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman objected.
Document 34 Chairman’s Assistants Memorandum to Chairman, “CINCAD Quarterly Report 13 October 1978,” with
Document 34
Chairman’s Assistants Memorandum to Chairman, “CINCAD Quarterly Report 13 October 1978,” with attached memoranda and letters, 30 November 1978, Top Secret, Excised copy
Nov 30, 1978
Source
RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
Debate over Canadian participation in Ivory Item exercises continued. Apparently, one argument against the idea was the risk of exposure of SIOP information, as suggested by this statement: the “ability to accomplish purpose of Ivory item, i.e. test of [excised words, probably a reference to SIOP] surprise attack procedures, may be impaired.” On the other side of the issue was Chairman Jones, who said in a note to General William Y. Smith that the “big advantage of having them in is that we can use the displays & systems which would be used in a real crisis.” Jones proposed having two kinds of exercises: with and without the Canadians.
Document 35 JCS Message to CINCAD and CINCSAC, “Ivory Item,” 7 June 1979, with attachments, Top Secret, Exci
Document 35
JCS Message to CINCAD and CINCSAC, “Ivory Item,” 7 June 1979, with attachments, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Jun 7, 1979
Source
RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
According to one of the attachments, General Hill’s question about Canadian participation was still unanswered. Small portions of the scripts for Ivory Item Delta III, which would be a “free play” exercise, and for Prize Ring Delta have been declassified.
Document 36 Captain G. Flynn to Assistants to Chairman, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with routing slip and scenari
Document 36
Captain G. Flynn to Assistants to Chairman, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with routing slip and scenarios attached, 24 August 1979, Top Secret, excised copy
Aug 24, 1979
Source
RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item
These heavily excised documents concerned the latest Ivory Item exercise, “Kilo.” NORAD’s bi-national structure had been addressed because “Kilo” would allow participation by Canadian officers. “Kilo” was a missile warning assessment drill designed to “exercise JCS Emergency Conference Procedures” and provide training in the use of data from warning systems. Apparently, it would be a “no notice” exercise in order to “enhance realism” and let participants react to “real world situations” instead of a script.
NOTES
[1] . For the Carter administration’s early efforts to update emergency procedures, among other issues, see William E. Odom, “The Origins and Design of Presidential Decision-59: A Memoir,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).
[2] . Brzezinski to Brown, 31 March 1977, document 10 in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy [FRUS 1977-80 Vol. 4] (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2024).
[3] . Ambassador David Aaron, e-mail to editor, 2 April 2024.
[4] . In those days, the Commanders of various unified and specified commands were routinely known as Commanders-in-Chief or CINCs. That remained so until October 2002, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that they would be designated as Commanders. The Commander-in-Chief title would be “used to connote or indicate the President of the United States of America.” Apparently Rumsfeld told the Joint Chief’s general counsel, “There is only one CINC under the Constitution and law, and that is POTUS.”
[5] . According to a former Pentagon official, during nuclear exercises and simulations, President Carter was “careful.” He would “make a decision but not tell anyone what it was except, perhaps, Harold Brown.” Carter would say “I’ve made my decision.’ He didn’t want the whole system to be anticipating the President.” Daniel Ford, The Button – The Pentagon’s Command and Control System Does It Work? (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1985), 91-92.
[6] . Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1993) is the first detailed publicly available exposition and analysis of launch-on-warning. It is worth quoting a statement made by former NSC staffer Robert Rosenberg, who witnessed at least one SIOP practice: “I know of no other President who actually participated in SIOP exercises.” Carter “participated in in a series of what we call CPXs [command post exercises], communications, command and control exercises, where the Commander in Chief is in communication with the [commanders] responsible for executing the SIOP.” See Ford, The Button, at 27.
[7] . Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 141.
[8] . According to a history of Cold War war games, military officials have considered information on presidential participation in war games to be sacrosanct and never to be disclosed. See Thomas B. Allen, War Games: The Secret World of the Creators, Players, and Policy Maker Rehearsing World War III Today (New York: Berkley Books, 1989), 213. For the Rosenberg quote, see Ford, The Button, at 27.
[9] . See documents 65 and 82 in FRUS 1977-80 Vol. 4.
[10] . For war games and simulations during the Cold War, see Allen, War Games; Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s,” Social Studies of Science 30 (2000): 163-223; and Reid B.C. Pauley, “Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 43 (2018): 151-192.
[11] . Don Oberdorfer and Edward Walsh, “Carter to Press Liberalizing of Korea, Withdrawal of GIs,” Washington Post, 13 January 1977.
[12] . For details on SAC alert forces during the Cold War, see Strategic Air Command, Office of the Historian, Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991 (Offutt Air Force Base, 1991), 93 and 97.
[13] . Carter, White House Diary, 115.
[14] . Carter, White House Diary, 141.
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