Life takes us in many strange directions and wonderful discoveries. It never turns out the way we thought it would.
Saturday, August 31, 2024
Friday, August 30, 2024
Thursday, August 29, 2024
What I Have Learned With Solar Panels On My Roof For Three Years
Elena and I have passed a milestone today. The solar power system on the roof of our house has been operational for three years. The system has produced 19.4 megawatts of power. It has kept 30,071.4 pounds of CO2 gas out of the atmosphere. In an operational sense, it has been an unqualified success.
Economically it has been a huge challenge requiring a learning curve to get it right. Elena was skeptical of the whole project. She had one question as follows:
"How long will it take to recover our investment?"
I started an Excel spreadsheet with the old monthly PG &E bill and the new lower bill with solar power online. It would take 4-5 years to recover our initial investment. Our reader Dan Miller of BAY CPA came to our rescue. He carefully researched the IRS Solar Tax Credit. We recovered our whole investment in two years with the tax credit. The monthly electric bill savings was "a cherry on top of the cake."
I got a rude shock economically. I assumed that with solar power I could relax all the careful things I had done to conserve energy. I got a shock electric bill. You must continue all your good habits in power conservation.
I learned something else surprising. When the electric power fails, the solar panels stop producing power. Our generator is a lifesaver that keeps the power on. With solar batteries, you would probably get the same electricity in the house without interruption.
Wednesday, August 28, 2024
Tuesday, August 27, 2024
Monday, August 26, 2024
Telegram Platform-A Failure Of Mederation Letting Criminals Thrive
A Failure of Moderation
France
French authorities detained Telegram founder and CEO Pavel Durov Saturday over his app’s lack of moderation, an arrest that comes as countries and governments are grappling with how to regulate social media and messaging platforms, Newsweek reported.
Durov was traveling from Azerbaijan in his private jet when police arrested him at Le Bourget Airport outside Paris. His arrest follows a French probe into Telegram’s moderation policies and potential legal infractions.
Specifically, the investigation is looking into the app’s alleged lack of content moderation that has allowed criminal activities, including fraud, drug trafficking, cyberbullying, and organized crime, to flourish via the app.
Founded in 2013, Telegram boasts more than 900 million active users and is influential in Russia and Ukraine. The platform is known for its strong encryption features and user privacy which have appealed to many users seeking secure communication channels, such as activists, journalists and government dissidents.
But these features have come under criticism by national governments and law enforcement agencies, who complain that the platform has been exploited by criminal and other malicious actors.
Durov, originally from Russia, gained prominence as the founder of VK, the “Russian Facebook.” He left Russia in 2014 after refusing to comply with government demands to shut down opposition communities on VK and turn over data to the authorities.
He has previously claimed that both the United States and Russia have demanded he compromise Telegram’s privacy features, including attempts by US authorities to introduce a “backdoor” into the app to spy on its users.
Following the US Capitol riots on Jan. 6, 2021, Telegram received conflicting requests from US legislators regarding user data, which Durov ignored due to their complexity.
Despite fleeing Russia, his arrest prompted criticism from Russian officials. The Russian embassy in France demanded consular access and urged France to ensure Durov’s rights were protected. Russian officials and bloggers have criticized France’s actions, with some labeling the country as moving toward a totalitarian society, Al Jazeera noted.
Durov’s detention also came amid broader global concerns about regulating social media and messaging platforms. The European Union’s Digital Services Act, for instance, requires tech companies to better police illegal content, including hate speech.
France has been proactive in holding tech companies accountable for the content on their platforms.
Meanwhile, many Telegram users are watching closely how the case unfolds, with some noting that the situation could influence the app’s operations and how other countries approach the regulation of similar platforms.
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Sunday, August 25, 2024
Saturday, August 24, 2024
The Economist Magazine COver For 08/24/2024
The Economist
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August 24th 2024
How we chose this week’s image
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Cover Story
How we chose this week’s image
The Economist
Robert Guest
Deputy editor
In the week of their convention America’s Democrats are in a celebratory mood. They have ditched a candidate who, for all his admirable qualities, was visibly and audibly too frail to have much chance of re-election, or to govern for another four years. Instead of President Joe Biden they have Kamala Harris, a younger, fresher nominee who has quickly wiped out Donald Trump’s poll lead and wrong-footed him so badly that he is reduced to insisting he is better looking than she is.
Yet the race is still close, and there are worrying gaps in what we know about Ms Harris. What, exactly, does she believe? How would she approach the economy, the climate or foreign policy? Her record as vice-president only tells you so much. She was not calling the shots in the Biden White House, so it is hard to know how much she agreed with her boss’s policies. She has changed her mind on quite a few issues—from single-payer health care to decriminalising illicit border-crossing—since she ran for the 2020 Democratic nomination. And some of her recent proposals, such as a big handout for homebuyers and a rule against non-existent “price-gouging” by grocery firms, are economically unsound. Is she simply pandering to voters or does she actually think these are good policies? We have tried to figure out what her studiously vague platform portends.
One idea to convey how little the world knows about Ms Harris was to have a photo that is recognisably her, but so blurry that it’s hard to make out any details. Another was to have her profile made up of letters spelling out our central question: who is she, really? This was good, but it would be more vivid to show her face.
We picked a characteristically exuberant photograph and laid some big white letters over it. This nicely captured the energy she is showing on the campaign trail, and hinted at her now-famous laugh. Another approach was to show lots of Kamalas wearing different outfits, as if to ask, which of the many political guises she has worn is the real one?
Our journalists have been minutely scrutinising Ms Harris’s record for clues as to how she might govern. Perhaps the cover art could allude to this? On the left is a spotlight view of the vice-president, suggesting that we will bring readers closer to understanding her. Unfortunately, this image could also bring to mind the scope on a rifle: a jarring idea, especially so soon after a gunman nearly killed Donald Trump. A magnifying glass is better, and this one reveals the nominee showing off what Bill Clinton calls her “thousand-watt smile”.
This old-fashioned portrait hints at the artifice of an election campaign—Team Kamala are doing all they can to construct a wholesome image for their candidate. Ms Harris is enigmatic and beams a lot; her pose in this frame faintly evokes the Mona Lisa, another enigmatic smiler. We also considered taking her image and chopping it up into squares.
Better than the squares, a partially completed jigsaw puzzle suggests the idea of trying to piece together an account of her worldview from the contradictory scraps of her record. This captured the essence of our reporting package very clearly, so we worked it up into an intriguing cover.
As the week progressed, however, the enormous global interest in the news from Chicago, from Joe Biden’s valedictory speech to Tim Walz’s barnstormer, made us think we should use a photograph taken at the Democratic convention itself. Awkwardly, our deadline was before Ms Harris’s acceptance speech on Thursday night. So we looked at pictures taken earlier in the week. The one on the left, with a stars-and-stripes background, was suitably upbeat, conveying the optimism the Democrats currently feel. But we preferred the one on the right, which included the crowd.
The only thing left was to come up with a punchy headline. Some of us liked the simplicity of “Would she be good?” Others thought it too vague, and that readers wouldn’t be sure whether we were referring to her ability to campaign, to be president, or to her moral character—not irrelevant in a race against Mr Trump. So we opted for “How would she govern?” We’ve done our best to answer that question—and will return to the subject often in the coming weeks.
Cover image
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View large image (“How would she govern?”)
Backing stories
→ Kamala Harris can beat Donald Trump. But how would she govern? (Leader)
→ She has revealed only the vaguest of policy platforms (Briefing)
→ Her cost-of-living plan will end in failure (Finance & economics)
Friday, August 23, 2024
The 2024 U.S. Presidential Election-How It Plays Out From Here
Good Morning Friends And Relatives:
There was a technical glitch. The New York Times was not delivered to me electronically. I am going to take this opportunity to discuss politics with certain readers. I would not do this with all readers.
Kamala Harris gave a brilliant speech last night. When Barack Obama made his 2008 acceptance speech to 70,000 people in a football stadium in Denver, journalists who were present said that Kamala's speech did not rise to that level.
Now the key question is: "How does this all end?" Chris Cuomo comes from a family that is literally political royalty in New York state. His father and brother both served multiple terms as governor of New York. He graduated from law school. He did not follow other family members into politics. He became a television journalist. He is on the News Nation network.
After Kamala finished her speech, Chris was thoughtful. He made a profound statement that we could (and I emphasize could) see a revolt of women voters on a grand scale. This would not just be the result of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on abortion. It would be a realization among women that they have been treated like second-class citizens for too long. My instincts tell me that this revolt is coming. I am not sure how strong this revolt will be.
Right after U.S. Labor Day, Professor Allan Lichtman will make his prediction on who will win the election based on the 13 keys. I suspect that he will predict that Kamala will win.
Kamala has huge problems from voters very upset about the economy. Those of us reading this email are in pretty good shape economically. It is hard to imagine that 60% of the people in the U.S. are in bad economic shape. These 60% could not come up with $1,000 in an emergency like a major car repair or medical emergency. Right now, they see Donald Trump as their salvation.
Kamala needs to point out that Trump is not a master musician of the economy. He has had 6 major corporate vehicles go bankrupt. He borrowed more money than any other president in history and literally flooded the US economy with dollars to create a false sense of prosperity. Kamala must present a solid and practical program that is easily understandable. This includes a plan to reduce housing costs, prescription drug costs, and keep fuel prices down. For grocery prices, I do not advocate attacks on grocery stores that are price gougers. What I see working is a website where people can go and get accurate information on grocery prices to see where the best bargains are in their area.
The other major grievance is the crisis on our Southern border with a massive influx of immigrants. She must come up with a comprehensive plan that is easy to understand. It would be a system where massive increases in budgets for immigration enforcement (the Border Patrol, etc.) and immigration staff for courts and personnel to process applications more quickly.
Please keep an eye on Erie County, Pennsylvania as this election unfolds. This county could predict the election.
There is a further "wild card" here. It is the physical and mental health of Donald Trump from now until election day. We could see a heart attack or stroke that is either fatal or leaves Trump so disabled that he cannot continue to run for president. We could also see dementia or some other mental disability that would preclude his participation in the election.
This health failure could create pandemonium with the election. You could not just write in a new name in the place of Trump. The Republican National Committee would have to designate who would be the new presidential and vice-presidential candidate. Then 50 states with different election laws would have to make up new ballots. There would be a serious delay in the date of the election by several months.
Get ready for a wild wide!
Thursday, August 22, 2024
Wednesday, August 21, 2024
Tuesday, August 20, 2024
Monday, August 19, 2024
Sunday, August 18, 2024
Saturday, August 17, 2024
The Economist Magazine COver For 08/17/2024
The Economist
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August 17th 2024
How we chose this week’s image
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Cover Story
How we chose this week’s image
Insert a clear and simple description of the image
Zanny Minton Beddoes
Editor-in-chief
We have two covers this week. In most regions our cover considers how countries compete for highly skilled migrants, from scientists and doctors to bankers and entrepreneurs. Our cover in Asia looks at new nuclear rivalries. America must reassure its allies that it can still protect them and, unfortunately, it will have to build more weapons.
We had thought of calling the first cover the “war for talent”, so our designers came up with some martial images. One idea was bombs made of money, suggesting a battle fought with lucrative job offers. Another was of soldiers raising a $100-bill flag, in a pastiche of the famous photograph of US marines during the battle of Iwo Jima. Both images were arresting, but neither visual metaphor quite worked. Delivering money on a bomb would have obvious practical drawbacks. And countries that win a “war for talent” do not end up standing on ruins. Also, our other cover package is about nuclear deterrence, and we didn’t want two war-themed cover images.
Rather than an image of battle, how about one suggesting ways of enticing the excellent? A fish hook baited with money looked striking—though unlike talented migrants, fish do not benefit from being hooked. A mortarboard with a carrot tassel was lovely—the orange stood out pleasingly from the black and the overall effect was upbeat.
But we wanted more of a sense of action. High-flyers tend to arrive in the way their name implies, so we played around with pictures of airports. On the left, an emphatically huge welcome mat in the middle of the runway. On the right, a plane landing on a red carpet. Both ideas captured nicely the idea of countries doing their utmost to attract top talent. We decided not to allude to the other side of the story—that many governments sabotage their own talent-recruitment efforts with pointless red tape and an overbearing security apparatus. A cover image needs to be simple.
And it is good to have a human being in the picture. We liked this image of a new hire receiving a red-carpet welcome. The mortarboard hints at his brains. The clear path ahead of him suggests a host country that has tried to make work visas quick and hassle-free to obtain, at least for the migrants it most wants. We worked this up into a cover, removing the crowd in the background to sharpen the focus on our talented traveller, now a woman. We tried some straightforward headlines before settling on a playful pun.
Our other cover story was much grimmer. After the cold war, nuclear arsenals shrank dramatically, but now they are growing again. And the bipolar US-Soviet rivalry has been replaced by something more complicated and potentially unstable. More states have the bomb or are close to building one. Rogues such as Russia, North Korea and Iran all share military technology. Meanwhile, America’s allies are less confident in the reliability of its nuclear umbrella. A new nuclear arms race is afoot.
To convey the notion that one country’s actions affect another—if Iran gets the bomb, Saudi Arabia may want one, too—we tried an image of missiles as dominoes. The effect was slick but perhaps too scary, hinting at a chain reaction leading to armageddon. An alternative was to show missiles in their siloes, pointing upwards. This was neat but not grabby enough.
We experimented with images with more tension. This house-of-cards design on the left evokes the complexity of nuclear geopolitics, the precariousness of deterrence and the possibility of disaster. The design on the right was intended to suggest that nuclear weapons are a last resort, but this felt wrong. One does not reach for nukes in an emergency. One brandishes them to deter others from starting a war in the first place.
It was a tricky balance to strike: we wanted a cover that was alarming but not alarmist. A hedgehog-like cluster of missiles was too apocalyptic—we are not predicting a nuclear war, but a troubling increase in nuclear tensions. An artful display of open silo hatches could be read as apocalyptic, too: some readers might think the missiles have all been fired. And there was a completely different objection to this image: the silo hatches look a bit too much like toilets.
So we opted for an umbrella. An early design turned the handle into a question mark, hinting at the known unknowns of nuclear geopolitics, such as “what is the other side thinking?” But the best one simply depicted the American nuclear umbrella fraying a little. It still protects allies, but many fear that America may be less capable and less willing to extend that protection in the future. Our final cover warns of the new threats; inside, our defence editor and others suggest how to confront them.
Cover image
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View large image (“Footloose and fancy degree”)
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View large image (“The new nuclear threats”)
Friday, August 16, 2024
Thursday, August 15, 2024
Wednesday, August 14, 2024
U.S. Law Enforcement Scores Big Victories Against Cyber Criminals!
I have an uplifting and positive story for today. I am going to praise U.S. law enforcement. We have all heard about criminal hackers. Here are some scenarios on how these villains can personally impact you as follows:
1) You come home from work one evening. You find a letter from your health insurance provider. It gives you the bad news that there has been a data breach of millions of policyholders. Your personal details including your name, date of birth, Social Security number or national identity document, and your medical record details have been compromised. You are now at risk of an identity fraud attack. You also might be subject to blackmail based on confidential data in your medical record.
2) You go to your bank to draw funds from the savings account that you have held there for 15 years. You present your withdrawal slip to the teller. You get the shocking news that your account has been emptied. All funds have been wire-transferred to a bank account in China, Russia, or Iran.
3) You are hosting a dinner for friends and family members at an upscale restaurant. The waiter brings you the bill. You hand up your Visa card. You get the shocking news that your credit card has been declined. You pick up your mobile phone. You log into the credit card account. Your card has been "maxed out." Some hacker got hold of your credit card data and spent all the money half a world away.
4) You are seriously ill. You go to the emergency room at your local hospital. You see staff members using pens and paper to record data. You get the shocking news that the hospital's computer system has been taken over by ransomware. A ransom of millions of dollars is demanded to release the hospital's computer system.
The people committing these crimes most often hide out in countries like Russia, China, Belarus, North Korea, Venezuela, or Cuba. U.S. law enforcement agencies do their due diligence. They identify the foreign actors responsible. Grand jury indictments are returned. Interpol Red Notices are put in place. Then nothing happens. The villains are hiding in a sanctuary where U.S. law enforcement cannot penetrate.
This has changed recently. Maksim Silnakau aged 38 and a citizen of Belarus was arrested in Poland. He has been ordered extradited to the U.S. He will appear in court in New Jersey today. He is a giant operator in ransomware hacking. malicious advertising, etc. In the world of criminal justice, he would be described as "a big fish."
The FBI's Cleveland office has taken down a major ransomware gang with details as follows:
The FBI said Monday it seized the servers of a ransomware and extortion gang called Radar (aka Dispossessor). At the time of writing, Radar’s website features a message from law enforcement, reading: “This website has been seized.” It’s a rare win for the FBI, which along with global law enforcement agencies has struggled to contain and curtail the rising threat from ransomware.
In a statement from the FBI’s Cleveland, Ohio, field office, the feds said they seized the gang’s domains and servers located in the United Kingdom and Germany. Radar/Dispossessor had at least 43 victim companies since the gang started in August 2023, the agency said.
The FBI said the Radar/Dispossessor group, led by a ringleader named “Brain,” would exploit security flaws in a victim company’s systems, steal vast amounts of data, and scramble the company’s data with encryption. The gang would hold the data hostage in exchange for a ransom, and threaten to publish the data if the ransom wasn’t paid, a common tactic used by extortion gangs known as “double extortion.”
Tuesday, August 13, 2024
Monday, August 12, 2024
Sunday, August 11, 2024
Saturday, August 10, 2024
The Economist Magazine Cover For 08/10/2024
The Economist
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August 10th 2024
How we chose this week’s image
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Cover Story
How we chose this week’s image
The Economist
Zanny Minton Beddoes
Editor-in-chief
We came into this week with one cover, but by the time we went to press, we had split the issue three ways. Early Monday morning, as share prices crashed in Tokyo, the markets were on our mind. Later that day, Sheikh Hasina, the prime minister of Bangladesh, fled her country, ending 15 years of increasingly autocratic rule. And by Tuesday, Britain was gripped by what seemed to us to have become its worst race riots since the second world war. All the while we were watching out for a catastrophic escalation of the fighting in the Middle East. Hardly the dog days of August.
Traders say that buying and selling in a crashing market is like catching a falling knife. It’s the same with market covers: you never know whether a plunge like the one we saw on Monday is just the beginning of the red ink or a passing scare. Fortunately, if there was no crash, we had a theme there in front of us, because the fundamental cause of the sell-off was anxiety about an American recession.
A stick of dynamite with a stockmarket index for a fuse gets across the excitement of the moment. However, it is hostage to the drama continuing. Imagine if, by the time we published, the fuse had simply gone out.
Better to have the two parties turning on a dime. With a coin-toss election just three months away, the state of the American economy could not be more political. An outright recession would probably spell doom for Kamala Harris. But even if the economy is only cooling, as is likely, it could harm her and help Donald Trump.
This is clever—we have two traces outlining the two candidates. On the face of it, Ms Harris should be able to campaign on the Biden administration’s record. In the second quarter the economy grew at an annualised pace of 2.8%, above its long-term trend. Workers’ median real earnings are 9.4% higher than when Americans went to the polls in 2016. However, Republicans’ perceptions of the economy are warped by their politics—as are Democrats’ in the other direction. And voters as a whole give the Democrats’ economic management a worse rating than Mr Trump’s, perhaps because price levels are higher even if inflation has slowed. Every time they go shopping, they suffer sticker-shock.
This design has two problems. One is that today’s bout of stockmarket wobbles are almost certainly too far removed from everyday life and too transient to have an effect on their own. The other is that Ms Harris and Mr Trump look as if they are lying side by side.
This is much stronger. The quarter has become a wrecking-ball—though in the final cover we wanted it to be more battered and hanging from a heavy-duty chain.
The threat to Democrats is not the markets, but the underlying slowdown that helped unnerve them. At the start of the year, real incomes were rising at an annualised quarterly pace of about 1%. As the economy has cooled, this has fallen by roughly half. In a tight race, many factors could be the difference between victory and defeat. But if Ms Harris wins, it will not be because she was helped by the economy.
Ever since three little girls were slain in Southport, in Merseyside, on July 29th, indefensible anti-immigration protests have flared across towns and cities in England and Northern Ireland. Mosques and police officers have been attacked. In Rotherham criminals tried to set fire to a hotel they thought was housing asylum-seekers. Thugs in the streets have been egged on by hatemongers online.
Our cover needed to set out what to make of the riots incited by the far right and how to respond to the fact that immigration has become the running sore of British politics.
We thought about a conceptual cover. A distinctive, Britain-shaped hole in a smashed window is powerful, but misleading. To their credit, Scotland and Wales have not succumbed to violence. The puppeteer is more accurate: influencers have indeed exploited online networks to foment hatred and incite protest from their keyboards. But it is not the whole story. Many of the troublemakers over the past few days have been youngsters drawn by the thrill of mindless violence.
Given how raw the riots felt, we favoured a photograph. Unfortunately, we had a lot to choose from. Shades, bricks and a hoodie are all you need to spread mayhem. We also had burning cars and confrontations between lines of police and protesters. In the end we chose an image with the flag of St George and the Union Jack. For the far-right to display them on the streets of England and Northern Ireland this week was an act of defilement.
On August 5th Sheikh Hasina, the prime minister of Bangladesh, fled the country she has ruled with an increasingly harsh grip since 2009. She was driven out by days of demonstrations in the streets of Dhaka, the capital, to be replaced by a caretaker government, backed by the army and led by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel peace laureate.
More than 450 people have died in Bangladesh’s riots, but another photograph of protesters on the streets would sit oddly next to our cover in Britain. Instead, we wanted to celebrate Bangladesh’s people power.
The flag-waving men have an aircraft behind them—as if it was actually carrying the departing Sheikh Hasina. Too bad that they looked as if they were themselves calling out to be rescued.
We found another picture of a crowd on top of a roof that was altogether more impressive. Mr Yunus has won the task of cleaning up a rotten political system. Bangladesh’s economy is resilient and its civil society robust; but its politics is venal and its institutions weak. Like Mr Yunus, many Bangladeshis are calling this a “second liberation”, half a century after independence. They have only a short time to set their country on a democratic path.
Cover image
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View large image (“Will the economy swing the election?”)
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View large image (“How to respond”)
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View large image (“Bangladesh begins again”)
Backing stories
→ Will America’s economy swing the election?
→ How to respond to the riots in Britain
→ Bangladesh has ousted an autocrat. Now for the hard part
Friday, August 9, 2024
Early History Of The Atomic Bomb
Manhattan Project Director’s Files Illuminate Early History of Atomic Bomb
Grove's bage
Photograph of General Leslie R. Groves used on his Manhattan Project identification badge (Photo from Los Alamos National Laboratory)
Leslie Groves Papers Include Oppenheimer’s “Personnel List” for Staffing New Weapons Laboratory
Groves “Unwilling to Accept … Setback” on Construction Schedule for Secret Plutonium Plant
Post-War Development of Nuclear Reactors Needed to “Maintain the Country in a Supreme Military Position”
Published: Aug 8, 2024
Briefing Book #
869
Edited by William Burr
For more information, contact:
202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu
Subjects
Nuclear Strategy and Weapons
Secrecy and FOIA
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Project
Nuclear Vault
Executive Committee during its meeting
Robert Oppenheimer at a social event held by the S-1 Committee’s Executive Committee on 14 September 1942 during its meeting at Bohemian Grove, a month before Gen. Groves chose him to direct the Manhattan Project’s weapons lab. From left: Major Thomas T. Crenshaw, Robert Oppenheimer, Harold C. Urey, Ernest O. Lawrence, James B,. Conant, Lyman J. Briggs, Eger V. Murphree, Arthur H. Compton, Robert Thornton, and Colonel Kenneth Nichols. To conceal from outsiders the Army’s presence, the two officers attended wearing civilian garb. [Morgue 1958-8 (P-71)] [Photographer: Donald Cooksey] [Photo from NARA]
Colonel Franklin T. Matthias
Colonel Franklin T. Matthias. As District Engineer, Matthias supervised the creation of the Hanford Engineer Works at all stages, beginning with the selection of the land. (Photo from Wikipedia)
Map of the Hanford Engineer Works
Map of the Hanford Engineer Works. In Area A, below the Columbia River, are the reactors (100 category) and south of Gable Mountain, the reprocessing plants (200 category). The B reactor is on the west side on the way to the Riverland railroad yard, while the T plant is also on the west side. The fuel fabrication facility (300 category) is in Area D, north of Richland. (Map from Vincent Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb).
Hanford's B Reactor in operation, January 1945
The B reactor at Hanford, January 1945. The Manhattan Project reserved the reactor’s spent fuel for plutonium production at the T plant. (Photo from National Park Service)
The B reactor at Hanford
Front face of the B reactor during construction. (Photo from Wikipedia)
The T plant at Hanford
The T plant at Hanford where spent reactor fuel was turned into plutonium. Reprocessing took place inside a “canyon,” which characterized the scale of the operation. Remote control devices enabled plant workers to keep their distance from the dangerous radioactive process. (Photo from National Park Service)
Button distributed to workers at Hanford Engineer Works as part of a campaign to build morale and reinforce commitment to the project
Button distributed to workers at Hanford Engineer Works as part of a campaign to build morale and reinforce commitment to the project. Franklin Matthias signed the pledge that he sent with the button to General Groves. (Groves files, box 1, 600.12 Hanford)
Arthur Compton's ID badge from the Hanford Site. For security reasons he used a pseudonym
Identification badge (with a pseudonym for security reasons) used by Nobel Prize-winning scientist Arthur H. Compton when visiting Hanford Engineer Works. As director of the Metallurgical Laboratory, which became part of the Manhattan Project, Compton oversaw the creation of the first controlled nuclear chain reaction and played a central role in policy developments relating to nuclear reactors and plutonium production. (Image from Wikipedia)
Washington, D.C., August 8, 2024 – On the week of the 79th commemoration of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, the National Security Archive today publishes a fascinating new collection of papers from the office files of Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. effort during World War II to develop and produce the world’s first nuclear weapons. Among the newly available records are candid memos and other correspondence from inside the Manhattan Project on the role of nuclear technologies in the post-war environment and the importance of being the preeminent atomic power.
In one revealing document from 1943, Arthur Compton, director of the Manhattan Project’s “Metallurgical Laboratory” at the University of Chicago, considered the post-World War II role of heavy water nuclear reactors. Assuming that production of plutonium-239 would be relevant to the “balance of military power” after the war, Compton wrote that “the post-war situation will still be greatly confused and it will remain of prime importance to maintain the country in a supreme military position.” Keeping the U.S. in its leading role was important to Compton, who was “sure that all of the major powers will be extending themselves to develop the tube-alloy [atomic bomb] program as far as possible.” To help the U.S. maintain its lead and seeing “inherent advantages” in using heavy water in nuclear reactors, Compton believed that their “development will certainly play an important part in this post-war effort.”
Compton’s letter and the other records published today were found in a long-overlooked collection of office files of the Manhattan Project. The two cartons of “Leslie Groves Papers Concerning the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946” were found in Record Group 77, pertaining to the Army Corps of Engineers. When it reviewed the collection, the Department of Energy classified at least half of it, but what is available sheds interesting new light on the first two years of the Manhattan Project, including on Groves’ day-to-day decisions and his demanding management style. The U.S. National Archives made the Groves collection available in response to an indexing-on-demand request by the National Security Archive.
The collection includes a letter to General Groves from J. Robert Oppenheimer, the recently appointed director of the Manhattan Project’s new weapons laboratory. Oppenheimer’s 9 November 1942 letter included the “personnel list” for the prospective laboratory that he had promised Groves. Oppenheimer listed cadres of experimental and theoretical physicists “who were now working for us” and a wish list of physicists that he hoped to sign on. The names included such prominent scientists as Edward Teller, Hans Bethe, Robert Bacher, Richard Feynman, Enrico Fermi, Robert F. Christy, and Luis Alvarez, all of whom worked at Los Alamos.
With so much on the Manhattan Project already declassified and the subject of numerous books and articles, the documents in the Groves files are unlikely to change the big picture of the weapons design/production work at Los Alamos, the uranium enrichment project at Oak Ridge, or the plutonium production effort at Hanford, WA, all if which were under Groves’ supervision and general direction. Nothing in the new materials sheds any light on plans for the military use of atomic weapons, for example. Nevertheless, the documents provide interesting and useful nuance to important elements of the story, especially on developments at the secret Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) in Washington state, which produced the plutonium used for the Trinity Test and the bomb that exploded over Nagasaki.
The Groves collection contains a variety of documents on HEW and its operations. Colonel Franklin Matthias, HEW’s director, played a key role in its development, including choosing the land that Hanford would occupy.[1] Several items demonstrate the precondition for acquiring these 600,000 acres: the dispossession of farmers and other landowners in the area. Legal challenges to government valuations of these properties also had interesting implications for official secrecy.
Other material documents the challenge of developing and maintaining a huge labor force to construct reactors and reprocessing plants at HEW and how managers tried to improve labor morale, as it was difficult to retain workers workers in a remote area during a wartime situation when the demand for labor was high.
Some of the Groves documents illustrate the task of creating a “government town” and a “company town” in Richland, WA, where managers and scientific workers would be living. One example was the dispute between HEW leaders and the Du Pont Corporation, the contractor for Hanford, over how many bedrooms were appropriate for the new houses. Another challenge for the HEW was ensuring that Richland would have the stores and shops needed to support a growing population.[2]
The new documents also include estimates of the costs of the Hanford facilities and schedules for the production of plutonium and the completion of the work at Hanford. The estimates for Hanford, produced in February 1944, have detailed breakdowns, including the costs of the reactors and the reprocessing plant. In one chart, the estimated price for the three reactors was over $101 million dollars, which in 2024 dollars is in the range of $2 billion. The cost for the reprocessing plants was over $47 million. In 2024 dollars, this is in the range of $960 million. The spending on Hanford was substantial, but 63 percent of the Manhattan Project’s outlays were for the uranium enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge, which cost over $1 billion in 1945 dollars.
Historians have observed that what made General Groves an ideal candidate for directing the Manhattan Project and accomplishing its goals was that he was a “blunt, impatient, and energetic officer with a well-deserved reputation for getting things done.” Moreover, he was skilled in delegating authority to close associates with whom he had worked on earlier projects. Before taking on this task, Groves had helped build the munitions industry and then played a key role in the construction of the Pentagon.[3]
One document in particular sheds light on his management style. In November 1943, the Du Pont Corporation was having trouble finding enough workers to construct the highly secret facilities at HEW. Groves was displeased with the “super-cautious” tone of one of the Du Pont executives, who informed him about a schedule setback for construction at Hanford. But Groves was “unwilling” to accept any delays. His tough response produced a letter from a Du Pont executive who assured the General that the job will be done “at the earliest date possible.” That is what Groves wanted to hear.
It is worth noting that the Du Pont Corporation had been reluctant to get involved in projects like Hanford in the first place, but pressure from Groves and the U.S. Army was unrelenting, and its executives acquiesced. Having little choice in the matter, the Du Pont leadership put up with Groves but not for monetary reward. Having been tagged during the 1930s as “merchants of death” for its World War I munitions sales, Du Pont had become skittish about profiting from war production. To build the facilities at Hanford, Du Pont waived all profits and asked only for reimbursement of expenses on a cost-plus-fixed fee basis. The fixed fee was one dollar. During the war, corporate executives routinely worked for the government on a “dollar-a-year” basis. Such was the political climate of the time.[4]
The Groves files also include records capturing early discussions about the role of heavy water nuclear reactors in the Manhattan Project and in post-war development. While top officials such as Arthur Compton thought that heavy water reactors could fill the gap in the event that HEW’s graphite-moderated reactors did not pan out, that did not ultimately prove to be necessary. Heavy water reactors had low priority during World War II, but Groves approved the deployment of one at Argonne, IL, in part to support work at HEW. Compton also developed suggestions for information exchanges with British and Canadian scientists (who were already producing heavy water and had plans for a reactor).
The Department of Energy classified close to 2,800 pages of the Groves files, presumably on restricted data grounds. The National Security Archive has filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the withheld documents. Most of the withdrawals consist of entire files, sometimes running to hundreds of pages, with exempted folders on topics such as “University of California,” “Hanford: Threshold of an Era,” and “Proposed Program for Metallurgical Project 1945-46.”
The files on the University of California may provide some detail on its institutional relationship with Los Alamos, for which it was the official manager and supplier. The university’s leaders knew nothing about Los Alamos, although they would have to learn enough to buy insurance for the laboratory. If any of the classified files relate to military use of the bomb issues, it will likely take years to find out, given DOE’s underfunded FOIA system.
Note: Thanks to Stephen Schwartz (“Atomic Analyst”) for invaluable guidance on adjusting the cost estimates of facilities at HEW into current dollars, and to Alex Wellerstein for his insights.
The Documents
I. Oppenheimer Letters
ebb 869 doc 1
Document 1
Robert Oppenheimer to James Conant, Chair, National Defense Research Committee, 2 November 1942, Secret
Nov 2, 1942
Source
RG 77, National Archives, Leslie Groves Papers Concerning the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946 (Groves), box 1, 231.001
Appointed by General Groves to direct a weapons laboratory in mid-October 1942, Oppenheimer began an active effort to recruit top scientists. He wrote to Harvard University President James Conant about his interest in acquiring Robert Bacher, then with M.I.T.’s Radiation Laboratory; Franz Kurie at the U.S. Navy’s Radio and Sound Laboratory; and Raymond G. Herb, University of Wisconsin, who was also working at M.I.T.’s Radiation Laboratory. Apparently, neither Herb nor Kurie was interested or recruitable, but Oppenheimer went to great lengths during the months that followed to persuade Bacher to join and was eventually successful. This carbon copy was part of the package that Oppenheimer sent to Groves on 9 November (see Document 2).[5]
ebb 869 doc 2
Document 2
Robert Oppenheimer to General Groves, 9 November 1942, Secret
Nov 9, 1942
Source
Groves, box 1, 231.001
The first page of J. Robert Oppenheimer’s letter to General Groves can be found on the Department of Energy’s OpenNet, but the signed original in the Groves office files may be the only available version with the “personnel list” attached. In the letter, Oppenheimer demonstrated that, by early November 1942, he had been busily recruiting top physicists to staff the new laboratory for “our program” even before there was an agreed site. The “personnel list” that he sent to Groves included a core group of experimental and theoretical physicists “now working for us” and a wish list of others whom he saw as essential. Oppenheimer included a separate page with an “explanatory note” for the lists, with various initials noting who had approved them (either Oppenheimer, Edwin McMillan or Ernest Lawrence). The list also included coding indicating who was “essential” (or just “good”), whether they were “aliens,” and whether they were married or not, among other characteristics. As Oppenheimer noted, the list did not include the “very large” number of graduate and undergraduate students “who are working with these men.”
The list of those “men now working for us” included a few who never worked at Los Alamos, but it included many who played important roles there, including Edwin M. McMillan, John H. Manley, Joseph L. McKibben, Charles P. Baker, Emilio Segre, Robert Serber, Edward Teller and Hans Bethe. The list of “Men Whose Prompt Release We Desire” included some who later joined the project, such as Robert Bacher, Richard Feynman, Enrico Fermi, Robert F. Christy, Herbert L. Anderson and Luis Alvarez. Others proved unobtainable, such as Raymond Herb, Franz Kurie, Percy Bridgman and James L. Lawson. Oppenheimer wrote in gendered terms about those who would staff the new lab; he may have used the word “man,” as was typical then, to describe people in general, but he listed only males for these positions. A few female scientists would work at Los Alamos.
In his letter to Groves, Oppenheimer mentioned several documents that he had enclosed, one concerning a “major equipment problem,” the other about a “young man who is now in the army and whom we would like to have assigned to us.” Neither show up in the file, but they may be in the classified papers in this collection or in some other group of records altogether.
At the close of the letter, Oppenheimer wrote that he hoped to see Groves in New Mexico. Six days later, on 16 November 1942, when Oppenheimer was traveling in the state with Edwin McMillan and Major John H. Dudley to select a site for the laboratory, Groves joined the group. After visiting Jemez, which they ruled out, they inspected the site of a prep school in Los Alamos, which Groves readily accepted for what became known as “site Y.”[6]
II. Building the Hanford Engineering Works
ebb 869 doc 3a
Document 3A
H.E. Daniel, Du Pont, Design Division, to General Groves, “Project 9536 - Hanford Engineer Works 1100 Area - Town Site,” 24 April 1943, unclassified
Apr 28, 1943
Source
Groves, box 2, Hanford 620
ebb 869 doc 3b
Document 3B
Telegram from Groves to Mr. Yancey, 27 April 1943, unclassified
Apr 27, 1943
Source
Groves, box 2, Hanford 620
Constructing the HEW plutonium production complex required thousands of skilled and semi-skilled workers (the peak number of construction workers neared 45,000), housing arrangements, and amenities to encourage them to stay on the job (See Document 14). It also required managers to oversee construction along with technicians and scientists to operate the reactors, reprocessing plants and related facilities. They also needed suitable housing, especially if they brought their families. To make that possible, the Manhattan Project paid for new housing in Richland, WA, paying for everything, including lightbulbs and furniture. This was not an easy process because Groves and Du Pont did not agree completely on housing requirements or their costs, among other issues concerning the development of Richland. While Du Pont wanted to support the housing needs of managers and scientists, Groves and Matthias wanted to keep costs down.
In what amounted to a directive to E.B. Yancey, the General Manager of Du Pont’s explosives department, HEW “area engineer” Colonel Franklin Matthias noted that the company wanted to construct the remaining unbuilt houses in three- or four-bedroom units. He cited the company’s “reluctance to build one or two bedroom units for … for remainder of program.” Matthias instructed Du Pont to “fit housing to actual estimated family sizes.” According to Matthias, “peace time experience as to needs for space does not apply now when it is of the utmost importance to conserve manpower and materials.”
In his response, Yancey made the point, among others, that the remainder of the unbuilt houses should have mainly three bedrooms, which he saw as “minimum requirements.”
Backing up Matthias, Groves sent a telegram to Yancey saying that he saw “no reason for not complying” with the request, although he was willing to discuss the matter further.
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Document 4
Assistant Attorney General Norman M. Littell to Members of Congress from Washington State, 26 April 1943, with memo to General Groves and Letter from Littell to Senator M[onrad] Wallgren attached, 26 April 1943
Apr 26, 1943
Source
Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford
When the Manhattan Project designated land in Washington state as the site for the Hanford Engineer Works, it began proceedings to acquire large swathes of land, over 400,000 acres—some 600 square miles—so that the secret plants could be built and operated safely and far from the view of unwanted observers. In implementing federal policy to acquire the land and compensate private landholders, Assistant U.S. Attorney General Norman M. Littell played an important role. With political ambitions in Washington state, Littell was concerned about the slow procedures for compensation and wrote that “residents being dispossessed from this big area of our State ... will suffer very considerable hardships from delay in payment.” However, did not take secrecy all that seriously, as he made clear in this comment to Senator Wallgren [D-WA]: “The War Department considers this project to be ‘secret’ and asks for no publicity on it, although I do not quite see how so great an event in the State of Washington, inevitably attended by considerable comment and the conducting of public proceedings in the courts, can in any way be maintained as ‘secret.’”
Littell’s concerns about compensation and his skepticism about secrecy presaged run-ins that he had with Groves and that contributed to a White House decision to fire Littell in 1944.[7] In any event, Littell greatly underestimated the determination of War Department officials to maintain the secrecy of Hanford operations. For example, HEW project director Franklin Matthias successfully appealed to the patriotism of local newspaper editors by asking them to stay clear of stories of government land acquisition, dispossession of farmers, and subsequent construction activities at Hanford. The HEW’s existence remained secret until after the atomic bombings of Japan.[8]
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Document 5
Office of the Chief of Engineers, Washington, D.C., “Basic Data on Hanford Engineer Works, Pasco Washington,” 19 May 1943
May 19, 1943
Source
Groves, box 2, 601 (Hanford)
Prepared by some unknown compiler for the use of General Groves and other top officials, this report provided a full picture of the land in Washington state that the War Department acquired for HEW operations. The compendium provided detail on land ownership, population, agriculture, irrigation districts, transportation, schools, and land acquisition procedures. At the end of the compilation is a set of photographs. If the maps mentioned in the report are in the Groves files, the Archive’s FOIA request may ultimately open them up.
The compendium gave an overview of the history, noting the 1942 laws that authorized the Secretary of War to acquire by “purchase, donation, transfer, or condemnation” real property required for military purposes, and citing a 9 February Secretary of War directive to acquire the land. According to the report, “Area A,” consisting of over 193,000 acres, was “situated in the center of the project.” Thus, a few weeks later, on 23 February, the War Department took the first step by filing a petition of condemnation with the U.S. District Court for “immediate possession” and occupation of Area A. The estimated cost to acquire that area was $3.2 million, while the estimated cost for all of the land—areas A, B, C, D, and E—was over $5.1 million. As it turned out, by December 1946, litigation brought by claimants would bring land acquisition costs to over $5 million. Not mentioned in the report was the Native American tribal group, the Wanapum, which had fished in the Columbia River for centuries.[9]
Included in the photos—numbers 11 through 14—is Gable Mountain, the area south of which would become the site of the plutonium separation plant. Other photos depict orchards, some destroyed or abandoned, irrigation ditches, a dam, the village of White Bluffs, and power lines.
ebb 869 doc 6
Document 6
General Groves to E.G. Ackart, Chief Engineer, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company [Du Pont], 24 November 1943, with letters from Ackart and Groves attached, Secret
Nov 24, 1943
Source
Groves, box 1, 600 Hanford
Getting enough workers to build the reactors, reprocessing facilities and other sites at Hanford was a huge task, and General Groves was doubtful that Du Pont executives were handling it with the right attitude. A letter from Walter O. Simon, a Du Pont manager at HEW, irritated Groves because of its “super-cautious” tone and a statement about a schedule “set back” for the construction of Areas 100 (reactor) and 200 (reprocessing plant). Groves refused to accept any delays, and his response produced a somewhat aggrieved letter from Ackart, who blamed “stringent” government controls over labor but assured the General that the job will be done “at the earliest date possible.” The last point is what Groves wanted to hear because, in his view, “it is mandatory on all of us to handle the job in such a way that the important areas will be completed at the earlies possible dates regardless of any previously suggested schedules or any difficulties which may be thrown in our respective ways.”
ebb 869 doc 7
Document 7
Colonel K[enneth] D. Nichols to General Groves, enclosing memoranda on Hanford construction/production schedule and on “P-9 Program,” 24 January 1944, Secret
Jan 24, 1944
Source
Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford
Prepared by top Groves’ aide Colonel Kenneth Nichols months before any of the reactors or the reprocessing plant were operating, the first memorandum provided estimates for the labor force needed to build “three operating units”—presumably two reactors and one reprocessing plant—and requisite supplies of plutonium at various time intervals. The quickest completion time for the three units, in two-month intervals—would require 48,000 workers. (As it turned out, the peak workforce was around 43,000). The basis for the labor force estimates was a production schedule for 12- or 18-kilogram units of plutonium based on the time intervals. For example, one 12-kilogram “unit” would be produced 13 months after the reactors (pile) started operating, assuming a two-month interval for the completion of reprocessing plants.
Nichols recommended trying to “complete all three units at two-month intervals.” While there was little difference in estimated plutonium output between the 2-4 and the 2-6 schedules compared to 2-2, he favored the “faster schedule” to “provide for contingencies.” By the point where HEW could produce 12 or 18 kilograms of plutonium-239, it would have been close to operating at full capacity because it would already have been producing small amounts.
The minimum critical mass of a sphere of plutonium-239 is around 10 kilograms, so that may have made a capacity to produce 12 kilograms a desired goal. When Nichols prepared his report, weapons designers at Los Alamos were assuming that they could use the plutonium to produce a usable gun-assembly weapon. That proved technically impossible, and Los Alamos found an alternative design based on implosion technology.[10]
Plutonium production later moved beyond Nichols’ estimate. By September 1944, the “B” reactor had reached criticality, and in late December 1944, spent fuel arrived at the “T” reprocessing plant. Soon, Hanford was producing plutonium, making its first delivery to Los Alamos on 4 February 1945. Production grew fairly rapidly, especially after Groves and HEW leaders found ways to accelerate it to provide enough plutonium for a test device and a weapon.. [11] According to a recent estimate, by August 1945, eight months after the reprocessing plant was operating, Hanford had already produced 17.5 kilograms of plutonium, more than enough for the Trinity Test and the bomb that exploded over Nagasaki.
The second memorandum concerned recommendations for the possible suspension of heavy water (P-9) production as a cost-saving measure. That such a significant heavy water production capacity had been built speaks to the huge resources that the Manhattan Project had its disposal but also to the ability of its managers to put on the back burner investments whose importance had lessened. This was implicit in the decisions that Groves made in October 1943 to give low priority to work on a heavy water reactor for producing plutonium. (See Document 17)
Two of the plants recommended for closure, Alabama and Wabash River, had higher production costs compared to the Morgantown plant. The report included contractual data for the Consolidated Mining and Smelting plant at Trail in British Columbia. Operated by the Manhattan Project, the plant’s entire output would be designated for the heavy water research reactor at Argonne, Illinois.[12]
ebb 869 doc 8
Document 8
G[ranville] M. Read, Assistant Chief Engineer, Du Pont, to General Groves, “Hanford Engineer Works,” 12 February 1944, with letter from Groves to Read attached, 23 March 1944, Secret
Feb 12, 1944
Source
Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford
Building a hitherto unknown, complex, and hazardous technology made Du Pont executives “apprehensive” about safety, which had been important to their corporate culture.[13] They wanted to be sure that, if the world’s first nuclear production reactor failed, that nearby workers would be safe. Granville Read sent Groves two sets of maps “indicating the number of people associated with our construction organization and the distance they will be working from the operating units.” According to Read, when the ‘B’ [reactor] unit began operations there would be “approximately 50,000 people within a 12-mile radius of the operating unit.” Read wanted Groves’ assurances that, “under conditions in which the performance of the operating unit did not proceed in a controllable manner and that all of the safety control mechanisms fail to function, the distances given on our maps are adequate protection for the health and safety of the employees involved.” If Groves was confident that the maps were correct, Read asked him to sign one of the sets of maps and return them.
In his reply, Groves wrote that, after consulting scientists, it was their and his opinion that “the distances on the maps ensure proper protection for the health and safety of the employees involved.” Accordingly, he signed the maps, copies of which remain classified in the Groves collection.
ebb 869 doc 9
Document 9
Major Dewey M. Stowers, Deputy Area Engineer, to Office of Chief of Engineers, “Estimated Construction Costs at HEW,” 22 February 1944, Secret
Feb 22, 1944
Source
Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford
Responding to a request from Colonel Nichols, Stowers sent estimates of construction costs at the HEW, including costs for the reactors and reprocessing facilities. The estimates include the costs for each category of installation: $100 for reactors, $200 for reprocessing plants, $300 for fuel fabrication, and $700 for administrative and other offices. One important problem that managers would have to grapple with, if far from systematically, was storing nuclear waste, including the poisonous chemical byproducts from the reprocessing plant. Some of the items in this document may relate to waste management, such as items 282 (reservoir & pump house), 611 (waste settling basin) and 612 (open storage ditch), although their purposes are far from clear. In any event, by 1944, HEW had begun the infamous “tank farm” for storing waste from the T plant.[14]
The numbers used in the chart are in 1944 dollars, but it is possible to take into account price level changes since then to get an approximation of the costs in 2024 dollars. This can be done by using Department of Defense deflators. Unfortunately, the earliest military construction deflator provided by Defense is for 1945, but that is reasonably close. In the chart, the estimated cost for the three reactors (“100 area”) was over $101 million dollars. Using the deflators, the estimate in 2024 dollars is in the range of $2 billion. According to the chart, the cost for the reprocessing plants (“SP Process Area”) was some $47 million dollars. Using the deflators, the adjusted cost in 2024 dollars is in the range of $960 million. For the fuel fabrication facility (300), the estimated cost was over $2.1 million. Adjusted for 2024 dollars using Defense Department deflators, the cost for that facility is over $42 million. [15]
ebb 869 doc 10
Document 10
Major General Leslie R. Groves to Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General Army Service Force, “Hanford Engineer Works, Washington,” 23 March 1944, unclassified
Mar 23, 1944
Source
Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford
By March 1944, Groves was greatly concerned about the slow pace of the settlements with property holders in Washington state who had gone to court to seek better compensation for their land. Over 1200 cases remained unsettled, procedures were slow, and Groves was aggrieved by jury decisions to award values “greatly in excess of the Government appraisals.” To protect the HEW’s “essential secrecy,” Groves wanted the cases closed, payments made expeditiously, and juries kept away from the properties at issue. Specifically, he wanted the Justice Department to make arrangements with the Courts to “eliminate the practice of the jury viewing the land” before they made a decision on compensation. Groves did not have his way on this point until March 1945.[16]
Groves sent this memo to General Brehon Somervell, chief of U.S. Army logistics, whose organization was an important source of secret funding for the Manhattan Project and whose role gave him a voice in overall policy, including land settlements.[17]
ebb 869 doc 11
Document 11
Lt. Colonel Franklin T. Matthias, Area Engineer, Hanford Engineer Works, memorandum to General Groves, “Livability of Prefabricated Houses,” with survey results attached, 26 July 1944, unclassified
Jul 26, 1944
Source
Groves, box 2, 620 Hanford
To accelerate the availability of housing for managers, scientists and others in the HEW’s more permanent staff, Matthias arranged to have 2,300 prefabricated houses built in Oregon and shipped to Richland.[18] To see how the “general living conditions” were compared to other housing, Groves asked Matthias to arrange a survey. The results showed that there were few complaints, but an important difference was that “the prefabricated houses show a considerable higher temperature both inside and outside.” Nevertheless, the prefabricated houses were “more comfortable than the average houses in this area excluding the new houses built.”
ebb 869 doc 12
Document 12
G[ranville] M. Read, Assistant Chief Engineer, Du Pont, to General Groves, “Project 9356 – Hanford Engineer Works,” with chart attached, 30 September 1944, Secret
Sep 30, 1944
Source
Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford
Read sent Groves a chart with a schedule for the completion of major facilities at Hanford. On the most critical goals, both the B reactor (100 category) and the T reprocessing plant (200 category) were already or nearly completed. The T plant would start operations at the close of September. More reactors and reprocessing plants were to be completed and begin operations during the months after September 1944. Other categories scheduled for completion were offices for maintenance, operations, and administration (700 category) and housing (1100). Also included in the chart was a “force reduction curve” indicating a steady decrease in the HEW labor force in the following months.
The labor force curve is broken down into two parts: with most of the work done on a “fixed fee” basis: the $1 fixed fee and reimbursables. Some work was done on a “lump sum” basis, apparently a specific payment for agreed work, including costs only.
ebb 869 doc 13
Document 13
Colonel E.E. Kirkpatrick to General Groves, “Report of Inspection of Concessions at Hanford Engineer Works,” 1 November 1944, enclosures not included, Confidential
Nov 1, 1944
Source
Box 1, Groves, 319.1 Inspection of Records
For the towns of Hanford and Richland, the HEW leased concessions to private operators so that they could supply food and other necessities to workers, managers, scientists, and others. In Richland, HEW also made arrangements for a hotel, cafeterias, a coffee shop and a news stand. For concessions, including the hotel, the U.S. government shared in the gross receipts on a percentage basis, while the cafeterias and coffee shop paid monthly rent. The coffee shop operated at a loss but was a necessity for hotel guests and others.
With the Office of Price Administration (OPA) regulating and monitoring prices, Kirkpatrick found that “prices charged in stores at Richland have been in line with OPA ceiling regulations” and had “been competitive with those charged in the general territory.” An exception was the drug store, whose prices were a “little high,” while Safeway prices were “the minimum that can be charged in the area.”
Kirkpatrick recommended reviews of each concession contract with the amount of profit to be determined and earnings carefully watched, but also to ensure that the concessions stayed in place until the HEW’s work ended. Groves approved the recommendations instructing Kirkpatrick to carry them out “insofar as practical.”
ebb 869 doc 14
Document 14
Colonel D. E. Antes to General Groves, “Report of Investigation, Hanford Engineer Works Employees’ Association, Incorporated,” 25 October 1944 with cover note, Attachments not included, Confidential
Oct 25, 1944
Source
Box 1, Groves, 319.1 Inspection of Records
Poor bookkeeping and excessive profits to a contractor operating games of skill led to an investigation of the Hanford Employees’ Association that HEW managers had established in December 1943. With labor turnover high during the construction phase, managers decided that the creation of an employees’ association was a “must” to improve morale. According to the reports, workers were “leaving their jobs simply because there was no welfare or athletic program to provide entertainment in their leisure hours.” While Du Pont had set up a recreation building with pool tables, bowling alleys and games of skill, among other features, for HEW managers, that was not enough.[19]
The Hanford Employees Association published a newspaper and sponsored nationally known dance bands, baseball games, baseball leagues, football games, concerts and lectures. Apparently, some in HEW management saw bringing in dance bands and professional sports teams as “unwise,” probably for security reasons, but nevertheless necessary for morale purposes.
With construction winding down, Matthias wanted to scale back the Employees’ Association but not eliminate it yet. Du Pont had been involved in managing the association but did not “favor” it, probably because it wanted employees to have responsibility for organizing their social activities. Du Pont was more interested in meeting the needs of the operations personnel who were settling down in Richland. In contrast to “building craftsmen” who were “accustomed to short employment [and] high wages, operations employees were supposedly “older, usually married and possibly with a family of two or three children.” Their “primary interests” were a “home and its maintenance,” which they wanted to look “as nice as possible.” In that context, it “is the Du Pont policy to lend encouragement to and foster the formation of civil groups in the village and the formation of recreation groups by the inhabitants themselves.”
Colonel Antes recommended a “detailed audit of funds and fiscal procedure,” the recovery of excess profits from a contractor, and the termination of the Association when construction ended. Groves signed off on the findings and recommendations.
III. Nuclear Reactors
ebb 869 doc 15
Document 15
Arthur Compton, Director of [Metallurgical] Laboratory, to Col. K[enneth] D. Nichols, 22 September 1943, with attached Compton memo to S[amuel] K[ing] Allison, H[enry] D[e Wolf] Smyth, “P-9 Program,” 22 September 1943,
Sep 22, 1943
Source
Groves, Box 1, Polymer
The “Met Lab,” directed by Arthur Compton, had demonstrated that a nuclear pile could produce a chain reaction and then be used to produce plutonium. With the Du Pont Corporation secretly building huge piles and reprocessing facilities at Site “W” in Washington state, Compton found supporting roles that “Met Lab” scientists could play, for example, by developing the next generation of nuclear reactors fueled by heavy water (“P-9”). As Compton informed Colonel Nichols, Groves and the Military Policy Committee agreed that a heavy water reactor for producing plutonium would not be authorized “until serious troubles have been encountered with the present graphite plant,” referring to the plans for reactors at the HEW.
Compton relayed what he understood as General Groves’ requirements. They included the construction of a heavy water reactor at the Argonne Forest, outside of Chicago, partly as “a performing experiment designed to test aspects of the W pile at relatively high levels of gamma and neutron radiation.” By June 1944, the Argonne reactor was operational. Groves also requested preparation of a design for a heavy water plant that could produce plutonium. The only reason to build such a plant “during the present war following this design will be presumably in the case of failure of the W plant to give satisfactory results.” Compton observed that “it is hoped that the present war will be over before this investigation can lead to important practical results” that could “have a great effect ... on the post-war military position of the nation.”
The instructions also included what information could or could not be shared with the Canadians, who were already producing heavy water and had plans for developing a heavy water reactor.[20] Compton approved sharing technical data and calculations for developing such reactors and explaining instruments for investigating and constructing heavy water reactors. Not approved was sharing information, such as progress, plans, production capabilities, or technical aspects of the graphite reactor used for producing plutonium or the U.S.’s own plans to produce heavy water.
ebb 869 doc 16
Document 16
General Groves to Arthur Compton, 24 September 1943, Secret
Sep 24, 1943
Source
Groves, Box 1, Polymer
Groves informed Compton that the Manhattan Project’s Military Policy Committee had decided that the “scope of the heavy water work should not be determined” until after a meeting with the British and the Canadians in Montreal. According to Groves, “our effort should not exceed the construction of a lower-powered heavy water pile for use as a general experimental tool” and as preparation should “it become necessary to carry on rapid development” of such a reactor.
ebb 869 doc 17
Document 17
General Groves to the District Engineer, Knoxville, TN [Arthur V. Peterson], “Program of the Work Related to the Use of P-9,” 5 October 1943, Secret
Oct 5, 1943
Source
Groves, Box 1, Polymer
Writing to Major A.V. Peterson, the District Engineer for Oak Ridge, TN, also known as “Site X,” Groves made detailed comments on Compton’s 22 September memorandum (Document 15). For example, regarding the design of a heavy water reactor for producing plutonium, the “effort should be held to the barest minimum.” On Compton’s point five, concerning information exchanges with the Canadians, none “will be undertaken without my prior approval until such time as the definite producers for interchange are established.”
ebb 869 doc 18
Document 18
Colonel K.D. Nichols to General Groves, “Program of Work Related to the Use of P-9,” 11 October 1943, Secret
Oct 11, 1943
Source
Groves, Box 1, Polymer
Nichols informed Groves that Major A.V. Peterson had approved Compton’s 22 September memorandum before Groves had sent his comments. He informed Groves that his comments had been “called to the attention of Major Peterson and Dr. Compton with your instructions to modify the program” accordingly.
ebb 869 doc 19
Document 19
Major A.V. Peterson to General Groves, 14 October 1943, enclosing letter from Compton to Harld Urey, Columbia University, 7 October 1943, Secret
Oct 14, 1943
Source
Groves, Box 1, Polymer
In this letter to Harold Urey, Compton shared his thinking on the role of heavy water reactors for producing plutonium (49) during and after the war. He took it for granted that there would be a directive to prepare a “satisfactory design” for a heavy water reactor and that the design could be used if needed. He further believed that the 1944 design “will go into construction.”
Compton summarized the discussions that he, Groves, Eugene Wigner, Robert Tolman, and Smyth had with the British in Montreal to discuss “problems of mutual interest in connection with the 49 production program.” Concerning the British experiments on the use of heavy water, “it seemed evident that they were not expecting any results ... that would be used in the present war.” In general, the British “see 49 production as an important factor in determining the balance of military power in the post-war world.” They “are getting ready for full-scale activity ... as soon as immediate demands of the present war permit.”
Compton assumed that the U.S. should not supply the British with “larger quantities of our P-9 since this may be become of importance in our war program.” Believing that U.S. heavy water work “must now be organized around the possibility” that the U.S. will need a heavy water reactor to “pinch-hit in our 49 production program,” he was certain that “immediate post-war developments will call for use” of such plants.
Taking the British point about the relevance of plutonium production to the post-war “balance of military power,” Compton wrote that the “the post-war situation will still be greatly confused and it will remain of prime importance to maintain the country in a supreme military position.” Using the British code word for the nuclear weapons program, Compton was “sure that all of the major powers will be extending themselves to develop the tube-alloy program as far as possible.”
Plainly, he wanted the U.S. to maintain its lead. With the “inherent advantages” of using P-9 for nuclear reactors, “its development will certainly play an important part in this post-war effort.” Compton did not specify the advantages but probably had in mind the possibility that using uranium metal to help fuel the reactor would be less costly than using enriched uranium. In any event, Compton would not give “first place” to use of heavy water reactors to produce 49, “but it must be developed as rapidly as possible.”
ebb 869 doc 20
Document 20
Major A.V. Peterson to General Groves, “American and British Work with P-9 Piles,” 5 March 1944, enclosing memorandum from Compton to Peterson, “In re: American and British Work with P-9 Piles,” 1 March 1944, Secret
Mar 1, 1944
Source
Groves, Box 1, Polymer
Compton’s thinking about the heavy water and nuclear reactor requirements shifted since he had considered the issue during the fall. With plans for building reactors and a reprocessing plant at Hanford underway, he found “the present outlook … [to be] so encouraging that I see no value in introducing a P-9 pile at this time for the purpose of insurance.” Nevertheless, Compton assumed that, for the post-war period, the U.S. would need to develop reactors, some possibly using heavy water, for power production purposes, including powering U.S. Navy ships. To strengthen their post-war position, he believed that the British would take a similar course.
When, during the post-war period, the U.S. developed reactors for power production, plutonium (“49”) would be a “by-product” of nuclear reactor operations. Compton believed that it would be unwise “to complicate” the initial stages of a power development program to require “49 production as a part of the pile operation.” For example, a “power unit for propulsion of a ship should not need to consider whether the 49 that is produced can be recovered.”
Considering whether the United States should cooperate with the British on developing reactors, Compton opined that the U.S. would have to determine whether it was advantageous or not. For example, he observed that it “has frequently been found desirable for a strong industry to collaborate fully on a research level with a weaker industry in development of new products of common interest.” That, he believed, could apply to a U.S.-U.K. collaboration on “pile programs.”
A related issue was the exchange of information with the British. Compton supported exchanges on the “fundamental physics and chemistry of the pile process,” including the properties of plutonium and other products” as well as “the design and construction of power piles in successful operation, as long as the British are ... actively at work in these fields.” But he ruled out information exchanges on such matters as plutonium separation or decontamination, and the “design and construction of piles in the course of development,” perhaps referring to the developments of reactors for producing plutonium.
Notes
[1] . For Matthias’s assignment to the Hanford project and his early role, see Steve Olson, The Apocalypse Factory: Plutonium and the Making of the Atomic Age (New York: W.W. Norton, 2020), 1-2, 65-69.
[2] . For useful information on the development of Richland, see Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 107-109. Olson further observes that Richland was a “detention center”, which may be too strong, but certainly, the residents were under steady surveillance, as he demonstrates.
[3] . Quotation from J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 10-11; Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, The Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002), 5-6. See also Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R, Groves,” The Journal of Military History (2003): 883-920.
[4] . Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 212; Vincent Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 106; Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 60.
[5] . This letter, found in an Oppenheimer collection at Los Alamos National Laboratory archives, is cited by James Hershberg in James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima in the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Knopf, 1993), at page 807, note 48.
[6] . Jones, Manhattan, 83; Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Vintage, 2006), 205-207.
[7]. Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 218-221.
[8] . Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 65, 68.
[9] . Jones, Manhattan, 342; Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 69-70.
[10] . Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 361-363.
[11] . Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 111; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 368-376.
[12] . Stephen A. Andrews, Madison T. Andrews & Thomas E. Mason, “Canadian Contributions to the Manhattan Project and Early Nuclear Research,” Nuclear Technology 207 Supplement 1 (2021): S 141.
[13] . Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 53.
[14] . For early measures taken to store nuclear waste, see Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 104-106.
[15] . To make these approximations, the editor used the deflator for military construction in 1944 found in the 1986 edition of the Defense Department’s “National Defense Budget Estimates” (see page 50), generally known as the “Green Book”. Using the .1195 deflator made it possible to formulate numbers in 1986 dollars. To adjust those numbers in 2024 dollars, the current version of the “Green Book” includes a .4126 deflator for military construction as of 1986. It is also possible to develop numbers by using the Office of Management and Budget’s Historical Tables, especially table 10-1, but it is based on fiscal year 2017, so the resulting numbers do not reflect major changes in price levels since then.
[16] . Jones, Manhattan, 342.
[17] . Jones, Manhattan, 116, 338.
[18] . Carl Abbott, “Building the Atomic Cities: Richland, Los Alamos, and the
American Planning Language,” in Bruce Hevly and John M. Findlay, eds., The Atomic West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 96
[19] . For morale issues, see Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 223, including note 93 on page 621.
[20] . Stephen A. Andrews et al., “Canadian Contributions to the Manhattan Project,” S131-S146.
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