Tuesday, May 4, 2010
The Incredible Health Care Provider Where My Wife Works-Kaiser Permanente
The success of Kaiser Permanente, an integrated American health-care firm, offers lessons for insurers and hospitals at home and abroad
Apr 29th 2010 | OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA | From The Economist print edition
ON A recent trip to America, Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, could not resist the temptation to needle his hosts. Just before the visit his American counterpart, Barack Obama, had secured Congressional approval of a plan for a dramatic expansion of the country’s health-insurance market. Observing that America is the only wealthy country to lack universal health coverage, Mr Sarkozy sniffed: “Welcome to the club of states who don’t turn their back on the sick and the poor.”
Europeans have long thumbed their noses at America’s bloated health-care system. It is true that parts of it are convoluted, cruel and much too costly. But Sir Richard Feachem, a health expert and the former boss of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, argues that such a view ignores “nuggets of good practice”. The best such nugget, he reckons, is Kaiser Permanente (KP), a not-for-profit health insurer and hospital chain which last year took in $2 billion more than the $40 billion it spent.
For the most part, the American health system is dominated by cream-skimming health insurers and the myriad “fee for service” providers they do business with, which drive up costs by charging high prices for piece work. KP’s business model integrates fixed-price health insurance with treatment at its own hospitals and clinics. This has led to big efficiency gains, making KP one of the cheapest health-care providers in most of the regional markets in which it competes. Thanks to Mr Obama’s reforms, over 30m Americans will enter the health-insurance market over the next few years—and KP’s low prices should make it a big beneficiary.
Moreover, KP’s medical results are as good as its financial ones. By many clinical measurements, it is the best-performing health-care outfit in the regions it covers. The firm’s success obviously holds lessons for its American rivals, but given that KP serves some 8.6m patients—more than the population of Austria—and has come up with some world-beating innovations, Sir Richard believes that there is “much that Europe can learn too.”
At KP’s Oakland Medical Centre in northern California, Christina Ahlstrand, a lifelong customer, has come to see her doctor, Jennifer Slovis. Ms Ahlstrand had been feeling “very low energy”, so she e-mailed to see if she should get any blood tests done. After reviewing her electronic medical records (which include all her lab tests, prescriptions, e-mail exchanges and notes from visits to all specialists), Dr Slovis e-mailed her back saying she needed to see her in person.
Many health systems, including Britain’s National Health Service (NHS), have tried unsuccessfully to implement comprehensive computer systems; patients and doctors often hate them. But studies published in the journal Health Affairs and elsewhere show that KP’s embrace of technology (its doctors conducted nearly 9m electronic consultations last year) has resulted in fewer frivolous visits, better medical outcomes and soaring patient satisfaction. Patients can even send doctors photos of worrisome moles or slow-healing wounds by e-mail for remote diagnosis.
Ms Ahlstrand, like many KP patients, loves this system. She also likes KP’s personal-health website, which gives her tips and points her to classes on healthy living, or “wellness”. Dr Slovis, for her part, is pleased that her work is “nearly paperless” and that she can easily track the specialists treating her patients, “so I know exactly what’s going on.”
The ease with which Dr Slovis tracks Ms Ahlstrand’s interactions with specialists and any resultant test results is indicative of the sort of integration that is missing in most health systems. George Halvorson, KP’s boss, argues that such co-ordination is all the more essential because of the dramatic rise of such lasting and expensive afflictions as metabolic syndrome, diabetes and heart disease.
Kaiser also aligns incentives both to promote parsimony and to improve the quality, rather than merely the quantity, of the care it gives. Patients like Ms Ahlstrand use e-mail because it is free and convenient, whereas a personal visit can involve hassle and an out-of-pocket payment. Dr Slovis and other KP doctors are on fixed salaries, unlike America’s many self-employed physicians, so they have every incentive to share information with other specialists and no financial motive to order unnecessary procedures.
KP’s third big advantage is that its integrated approach and incentive structure encourage investment in forms of long-term care such as the wellness classes that Ms Ahlstrand enjoys. The firm is in the midst of a ten-year, $30 billion capital-investment plan. In March it completed the rollout of its computer system—the biggest one in the world for private health care.
Many other insurers and health systems avoid making such investments because of “churn”: patients switch insurers frequently, so any spending on preventive medicine, aimed in particular at avoiding expensive hospital visits in future, ends up benefiting a rival company. KP says its churn rate is well below that of its rivals, so it can invest for the long haul. It funds an innovation centre that perfected the telemedicine systems its doctors are now using for remote dermatology consultations, for example.
Clayton Christensen of Harvard Business School applauds the firm’s culture of innovation. He notes that KP’s dentists routinely apply a coating to children’s teeth that helps prevent cavities, a procedure that many other American dentists tend not to use. Why not? In an integrated system with incentives aligned properly, he argues, preventing future cavities saves the company money. In contrast, in a fee-for-service system, “future cavities represent future revenue.”
If KP’s approach is so successful, why is it not more widely copied? A number of health systems from around the world, including Britain’s NHS, have sent emissaries to California to study KP’s approach, but efforts to replicate it have met only with limited success. Within America, a handful of outfits—such as the Mayo Clinic—independently evolved into integrated systems, but the rest of the industry remains a fragmented mess.
The prevailing culture of health care in the country is difficult to overcome. Some American patients, used to having all the scans and consultations with exotic specialists they want, costs be damned, do not like KP’s frugal ways. By the same token, some freewheeling American doctors do not like KP’s rigid systems or fixed (albeit generous) salaries. Much the same applies in other countries: whether in politicised state-run systems or profiteering private ones, the incentives for doctors and patients are seldom as soundly aligned as they are at KP. “Most of its success is explained by culture,” says Alain Enthoven, a health economist at Stanford University, “and that is simply not easy to replicate.”
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Friday, March 26, 2010
A Nice Health Care Provider Gets Some Bad Publicity
Heather Galeotti: Kaiser Permanente Pulled Plug On Woman's Insurance While She Was In A Coma
By Danielle Ivory
Huffington Post Investigative Fund
With her heart set on a career as a chef, Heather Galeotti enrolled in a San Francisco culinary school. One winter night, her life took a near-fatal turn when she was hit by a car. The 22-year-old lay in a coma for nearly six months.
Galeotti's shaken family told the hospital that she was covered by her father's health care plan with Kaiser Permanente. The hospital confirmed her status with Kaiser and proceeded to treat her. Medical bills piled up to more than $4 million.
Then in July 2007, five months into Galeotti's treatment, Kaiser stunned the family with a letter. The Galeottis would have to find another way to pay the bills. Based on informationreceived from her father's employer, Kaiser said that the young woman's coverage had not been in effect when she was hit.
"We were just blindsided," said her mother, Maureen Galeotti. "There was no way we could afford it." The case was shifted to Medicaid, where Galeotti's bills would have to be covered by taxpayers.
Ten months later, California insurance regulators ordered Kaiser to cover Galeotti's care, saying that Kaiser had no basis for denying payment "other than to achieve a significant financial windfall" at the expense of her family, the hospital and the state's Medicaid program.
Like many insurance disputes, the Galeotti case has its share of miscommunication, bureaucratic wrangling and missing documents. But it remains a stark example of a murky practice by some insurance companies and employers - cutting off coverage retroactively for some patients with expensive medical claims.

The new health care reform bill bans retroactive decisions by insurers in policies sold to individuals, except in cases of fraud. However, as it stands the ban would not apply to group policies, such as the one held by the Galeotti family, which cover some 150 million Americans.
Heather Galeotti's story, reported here for the first time, came to the Huffington Post Investigative Fund through its citizen journalism project, which seeks to shed light on the inner workings of the insurance industry. Former and current employees at Kaiser responded to the Fund's online requests for help from insiders. Their tips led the Investigative Fund to identify the Galeotti family and obtain records of the case, including internal Kaiser e-mails.
Major insurers in California, including Kaiser,agreed in 2008 to stop retroactively cancelling coverage - a practice known in the industry as rescission. At the time, Kaiser announced that it had not rescinded anyone's coverage since 2006. But the new agreements and increased regulatory scrutiny only applied to patients buying their own individual coverage, not to group policies.
Even so, Kaiser may have violated state law in the Galeotti matter. While declining to comment on an individual case, Lynne Randolph, spokeswoman for the Department of Managed Health Care in California, said that a retroactive cancellation of coverage through an employer is "permissible only when the coverage is cancelled for non-payment of premiums." The Galeottis continued to pay their premiums throughout their daughter's medical crisis.
Despite the state order, officials at Kaiser, the nation's largest nonprofit health plan, continue to maintain that the insurer's actions in the Galeotti case should not be considered a retroactive termination of coverage. That's because -- according to Kaiser officials -- a month before the car hit Galeotti, the employer's group plan notified the family that her coverage had lapsed on Dec. 31, 2006. Kaiser was never informed, so it initially agreed to pay the bills, Kaiser officials said. However, that account is strongly denied by the Galeotti family. The family's lawyer said they never received such a notice, and Kaiser said it does not have a copy in its records. Lawyers for the group plan declined repeated requests for interviews.
Kaiser acknowledged that it made an error by not paying Galeotti's bills, but blamed the mistake on the late notification from the group plan and "a lack of coordination" among departments inside the insurer. Spokesman Won Ha pointed out that Kaiser provides approximately 40 million patient services each year and he described the circumstances presented by the Galeotti matter as rare, with "no regular frequency over the long run."
But because insurance companies are rarely required to report to state or federal regulators how many times they have denied claims or canceled coverage -- let alone to justify why - only the industry knows the statistics.
Records and e-mails obtained by the Investigative Fund suggest that retroactive decisions might not be isolated incidents in group plans. A senior official in Kaiser's regulatory services, referencing the Galeotti matter, wrote in a May 2008 e-mail to senior-level staff: "This type of case comes to special services 3-5 times a month."
Peter Harbage, former assistant secretary for the California state health department, said retroactive cancellations or denials should be treated no differently in individual or group policies.
"Call it whatever you want. It's not different to the family," said Harbage, now a health policy consultant and analyst for the New America Foundation. "The family thought they had coverage. Their insurer told them they had coverage, but then suddenly it's like they never had that coverage, and they're left with the bill."
Harbage added: "If you're not safe in the group market with an insurer as well-respected as Kaiser, then you're not safe anywhere. There's no such thing as an isolated case."
California Enforcement
The practice of retroactively cancelling individual health policies garnered some national attention in 2008 when Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), then chair of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, held hearings that highlighted the consequences for patients and their families.
The hearings followed a 2006 series in the Los Angeles Times, which explored how insurance companies were looking for ways to cut costs under pressure from shareholders, policyholders and the government. In some cases, the newspaper reported, certain expensive illnesses could automatically trigger an insurer to investigate whether a patient should have been deemed eligible for insurance in the first place.
California health officials began investigating improper retroactive cancellations after the newspaper reports, but only for people with individual policies.
The state's managed health department recently declared that its 2008 agreements with insurers"to halt illegal rescissions have been comprehensive, swift and binding." Still, some consumer advocates and state lawmakers have questioned the strength of enforcement. A recent report by the Institute of Health Law Studies at the California Western School of Law found that fewer than 300 out of 6,000 people who had been retroactively dropped by their insurer had been reinstated under terms of the agreements.
The health care bill signed Tuesday by President Obama bans rescission in individual health insurance policies, except when insurers can prove fraud on the part of the policyholder.
Still, only about 14 million people hold individual health insurance policies. Experts have argued that patients are more protected in a group: There are usually no requirements for patients to fill out medical history surveys and insurers do not want to risk angering an employer and losing the entire group.
As the Galeotti case shows, however, even people with group policies can be vulnerable.
A Question of Eligibility
San Francisco General Hospital admitted Galeotti on Feb. 27, 2007. She had been run over by a large sport utility vehicle in an incident that police described as a fight between two romantic rivals. "I was conscious enough to hear my friend saying 'Don't die on me, hon, don't die on me,'" Galeotti said in a recent interview.
At first, Kaiser informed the hospital that Galeotti was covered. Its case managers closely monitored her progress and the cost of her treatment. As a student, she came under the policy her father, a custodian, held through the General Employees Trust Fund in Daly City, Calif. Since the young woman was hospitalized she could not attend classes at the California Culinary Academy, meaning that her coverage would eventually lapse without an extension under the policy's incapacitated child clause. The hospital encouraged the family to contact the Trust Fund.
That is when the problems began.
In June 2007 the Trust Fund sent the Galeotti family a letter denying the application, saying inaccurately that their daughter had already graduated from school and was no longer eligible. The family appealed the denial, saying that the graduation date had been pushed back because she had taken medical leave -- a fact confirmed to the Investigative Fund by school officials.
The Trust Fund did not reverse its decision. According to Kaiser, a hospital social worker then mentioned to a Kaiser representative that Galeotti's eligibility was in question. Kaiser contacted the Trust Fund, which on July 23 sent the insurer a one-line fax stating that Galeotti was "last eligible Dec. 31, 2006" under her father's plan. Kaiser officials said that the Trust Fund told the insurer that it had sent the family a letter in January alerting them that their daughter was no longer covered and offering to let her buy continuing coverage, but the family's lawyer said no such letter arrived.
Two days after receiving the one-line fax, Kaiser informed the Galeottis that it had been directed to terminate the young woman's health coverage, effective Jan. 1, 2007 -- almost two months before she had been admitted to the hospital. Kaiser told the family that if Galeotti wanted to restore her coverage retroactively, she could buy into a new plan.
In interviews and in a written statement, Kaiser's Ha said it was not up to the insurer to verify whether Galeotti should be covered. "The group employer -- not Kaiser Permanente -- makes all decisions about canceling or starting coverage for its plan participants based on its eligibility determinations," he said.
The Trust Fund's lawyers declined comment on the Galeotti matter.
The Hospital's Complaint
The case would have stayed off the regulators' radar if not for officials at San Francisco General.
Under Medi-Cal, the state's Medicaid program, the hospital was not getting paid the full amount of its charges for Galeotti's care. So hospital officials began exploring the reasons she was dropped by Kaiser. They filed a complaint with state regulators.
For months, records show, the insurer debated Galeotti's coverage with the state Department of Managed Health Care. In May 2008, after she had been on Medicaid for nearly a year and was re-learning how to walk, the regulators faxed a stern letter to Kaiser, documenting her "improper termination." The letter said, "Given the Plan's significant financial obligation to SF General, and the fact that the Plan continued to receive premium on the Family Account, Kaiser's motives... are suspect."
In September 2008, the insurer paid the hospital. The regulators did not issue a fine.
Even with the payments from Kaiser and some coverage from Medicaid, the Galeotti family said it still owes about $1 million for rehab, medications and other fees.
For Galeotti herself, the recovery has been difficult. She has been living with her parents and undergoing physical therapy since September 2007, re-learning how to walk and talk. "There are good days and bad days," she said. "I still don't walk normally and I'll be in and out of a wheelchair for the rest of my life. I'm frustrated. But I'm here."
Kaiser said it has made "minor adjustments" in its procedures to avoid similar problems with processing claims. Spokesman Ha emphasized that the Galeotti case involved an "unusual and complex sequence of events."
Still, he said, "Kaiser should have handled the processing of this claim better."
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Wednesday, December 3, 2008
Kaiser Permanente HMO Makes Positive Moves To Use Technology To Increase Efficiency ANd Lower Medical COsts
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Huffington Post Investigative Fund | Danielle Ivory First Posted: 03-26-10 11:59 AM | Updated: 03-26-10 12:14 PM