There were big differences in submarines between the Germans and the Americans based on their missions and the capabilities of their manufacture and theater demands. As the war churned on, submarine technology changed as well.
America decided that submarines were most effective in the Pacific where they wreaked havoc on Japanese shipping. It would not be an overstatement to say that American submarines starved Japan into penury if not submission - but they would have eventually starved the island into submission as well. American subs were made at various shipyards, one of the most notable being Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on the Piscataqua River in Maine. As a side note, the shipyard is so incredibly valuable that Maine and New Hampshire have been fighting over it for decades. Many WW2 submarines came from Portsmouth and the drama of the Squalus played out here before the war. But Portsmouth is thousand and thousands of miles away from the Pacific Ocean and Pearl Harbor, let alone the battlefields off Japan. So American subs were much bigger and able to go much further than German submarines. Nevertheless, both American and German popular subs (Gato Class for the Americans, Type VIIB for the Germans) had roughly the same range (11K miles for the Americans; 10K miles for the Germans) but the American subs were twice the weight, twice the length, carried almost twice the number of torpedoes but had only about ten more crew. The result is that the American subs could stay on station much longer than German submarines and therefore be more available to do more damage to the enemy.
While 10K miles seems like a long distance one must remember that the maximum operational range is only half that - because you have to be capable of returning to base. And any evasive maneuvers, terrain, weather and so on uses up fuel faster so your range and time on station is greatly impacted. The ability of the American subs to stay on station longer was a major advantage of American subs versus German subs. As things got worse and worse in Germany elaborate plans were made to keep subs at sea longer, from “Milch Cow” supply subs to surface ships resupplying them at sea. But subs need downtime too, as do the crews and this was a temporary solution that eventually failed for the Germans.
Because the American subs are bigger the crew comforts are much better. I have been in both German and American submarines and the differences in crew comfort are stark. In German subs there is a single ward room for officers and it’s directly in the passage way. In American subs there are two ward rooms, located next to the crew passage and therefore not in the line of foot traffic. American subs had more room for provisions and even refrigeration. American subs had a small but capable machine shop in the engine room with a metal lathe, drill press and other tools for fabricating parts in an emergency or repairing the sub.
The Germans had far more advanced targeting computers. They could angle their torpedo tubes slightly to make up for direction. Their optics were Swiss-made in many cases and superior to the Allied optics, particularly at night. Both Americans and Germans suffered from torpedo defects early in the war. The Germans addressed theirs immediately - the Americans denied there was a problem causing many missed shots and loss of life until it was proven, at great personal risk, that the torpedo firing mechanism was poorly designed.
German subs were often outfit on the interior with plywood and wood fittings, giving the sub a craft-made or sometimes primitive appearance. American subs were far more finished using sturdier, more “modern” materials. Far more attention was paid to crew comfort on American subs, and they were far roomier inside than their German counterparts.
The Germans sank almost 15 million tons of shipping during the war but did not affect the outcome. The Americans sank about 6 million tons and changed the course of the war.
German strategy was different also. Doenitz, who commanded the submarine fleet, was a micro-manager who demanded frequent check-ins from submarines. This helped the Allies triangulate on the position of subs and when they had the code-breaking equipment, the frequent messages allowed them to more easily break the codes by the frequency of the messages themselves. Doenitz was the first one in the German hierarchy to recognize this problem and he beefed up the Enigma coding system which helped for awhile, but his unwitting demand for frequent reports hurt the Germans severely. The Germans would often mass for wolfpack attacks since submarines are slower than ships. Submarines would be radioed the position of a convoy then try to lie in wait as it passed. When the ships got closer to shore, the Luftwaffe would try to bomb them. One convoy, PQ17, was utterly destroyed before reaching Russia with critical supplies.
However the Allied convoy system saved shipping for the Allies and frustrated the Germans. The Japanese didn’t implement such a system and the results for them were catastrophic as it drove the Allied submarine strategy that did not need to rely on wolfpacks. A single sub could devastate shipping almost with impunity. American subs sank 55 percent of all Japanese ships sunk, devastating the Japanese economy which was dependent upon imports.
The stark facts are in the numbers - the Germans lost over 700 submarines out of a total strength of about 1200 subs and 30,000 dead while the Americans lost only 52 subs and 3500 men out of a strength of about 250 submarines. The Japanese naval war strategy also aided the Americans because the Japanese targeted primarily capital warships and ignored supply ships while the US practiced unrestricted submarine warfare against any target. Japanese anti-sub technology also lagged far behind that of the Allies against the Germans so American subs had an “easier” time of it than the Germans did.
It’s not relevant to talk of late-war German submarine developments such as the Type 21 or 23 subs since they arrived too late and made no difference at all to the war, and so those differences will not be outlined. Suffice it to say that German developments at the end of the war helped change submarine development worldwide and contributed to the design and success of the US nuclear submarine program.
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