The German 6th Army was the second most powerful army in Germany after the German 9th Army and was easily the most decorated army in the German theater of operations. It was considered an elite and professional force and by any measure was capable of achieving almost any operation. It’s leader, General Walther von Reichenau was killed in a plane crash and Friedrich von Paulus, his chief of staff, was promoted in his place. Initially, the 6th Army thrived under Paulus. He knew the army and what it could do and in a brilliant move, he captured Kharkov. However, Paulus had many deficiencies in his personality and suffered from bouts of depression and nervousness and often doubted his abilities. He was paired with a Chief of Staff named General Arthur Schmidt, who was a hardcore Nazi, a thorough believer in Hitler and a “victory or death” proponent. He was there to shove an iron rod up Paulus’ ass when he became unable to perform to expectations.
Paulus believed from the beginning that attacking Stalingrad was not a sound strategic action and sent off many missives complaining of lack of resources and quality of resources and so on. He did not want to invade Stalingrad. He knew that urban fighting would negate almost all of the advantages of the German 6th Army. However, this was his mission and he doggedly did what he could. The Germans, faced by the Russian 62nd Army, should have easily prevailed on paper but all over the things Paulus complained about came to pass. The urban combat negated German mobility; the mounds of rubble created excellent defensive positions for the Russians; the attrition the Germans were suffering were not being made good by the replacement system; the supply lines were stretched too thin to bring up all of what was needed in a timely fashion. Strategic mistakes were made bringing armor into the city where it was destroyed piecemeal.
When the Russians attacked in an operation called “Operation Uranus” it was part of a theaterwide “Constellation” strategy by Stalin where the Germans outside Moscow were also attacked at the same time. Because of this, troops from Stalingrad could not be sent to help the ones in Moscow and the ones in Moscow could not be sent to Stalingrad. A titanic series of battles ensued, probably unheard of in any previous war. In the run-up to the Russian attack, a Romanian General warned the Manstein and Paulus and Hoth that the Russians were preparing for a large scale attack that could, in theory, pinch off Stalingrad and surround it. He knew that the Romanian armies in position were no match for the equivalent Russian forces, even with the two German panzer divisions assigned to stiffen them up. The Italian 8th Army had always been ill-equipped and did not have the ability to be there, or the equipment. The entire Italian 8th Army had a total of 62 operational planes versus well over 1000 by the Germans. The Italian 8th Army was suffering from inadequate clothing, food and gear even before the Russians attacked.
Paulus had been offered a plum position in Berlin if he succeeded in taking Stalingrad and so he was motivated to succeed. He wanted to get out. von Seydlitz, who later turned on the Germans while in Russian captivity, had been promised the 6th Army when Paulus left for Berlin. When the Russians attacked, the high command knew immediately that it was a catastrophe. The average German soldier did not. He took it in stride. Being kessel-bound was something that happened, and this was the 6th Army. Everyone inside knew that an entire army would never be allowed to die. It was unthinkable. The Germans had confidence in victory, or at the worsts, breaking out and retreating to a more defensive posture. They did not realize that the loss of four allied armies, the Italian 8th, the Romanian 2nd and 4th and the Hungarian 1st, were a catastrophe that could not be made right, no matter how poor those armies were.
Manstein, in his memoirs, recalls the meeting where Hitler is being briefed on the situation. He is told by his entire staff that the only hope is for the 6th Army to break out right this minute because every passing minute means it gets weaker and weaker and less capable of making German lines. Manstein figures out on the back of an envelope that the army would need 1000 tons of supplies every single day, with a rock bottom minimum of 600 tons. von Richtofen, in charge of Luftflotte 4 had been stocking up aircraft for some time but even he didn’t have enough aircraft to drop 1000 tons a day. That would require 350 planes making 3 trips a day minimum in all kinds of weather against Russian attacks and so on. It was simply a logistical impossibility. And if a day was missed because of bad weather, then the next day they would have to deliver 2000 tons and so on. It was not possible.
However, Herman Goering, who was on Hitler’s shit list for losing the Battle of Britain and other failures, saw an opportunity to redeem himself. He ordered an analysis based on the relief of Demyansk earlier that year where a surrounded garrison of German troops had been supplied from the air for many months until it could be relieved. Based on this success, or ordered his man Jeshonnek to tell Hitler it could be done. Jeshonnek was a policy wonk and numbers man and he told Goring twice, while trembling in fear, that it was impossible. But Goring ordered him to tell Hitler it was possible and he did, and Hitler, took the bait and told the Luftwaffe to do its thing.
Manstein was in constant touch with Paulus and both knew that the possibility of supplying Stalingrad from the air was impossible. Manstein had already gone to Hitler to appeal for a breakout but Hitler refused. It cannot be forgotten that at this time, the Germans under Model outside Moscow were fighting for their lives (and beating the ever-living snot out of the Russians in a lopsided victory the Russians never talk about now) and if the 6th Army pulled out of Stalingrad, the Russian armies there would be sent north and the balance of power could have crushed the entire German defensive system and the war would have been over by summer. Hitler truly had no choice but to force the 6th Army to fight on simply to tie down 2 million Russian troops.
However, Manstein and Paulus came to an agreement where, despite Hitler’s orders, the 6th Army would fight its way to the German 4th Panzer Army under Hoth (the only man in WW2 who had the potential to win the war twice and missed both opportunities). Hoth was a real soldier, a true fighting man and capable in all forces of arms but his force was splintered fighting the Russians on too many fronts to relieve Stalingrad. Meanwhile, the Russians were also seriously threatening the German 2nd Army outside Stalingrad and it was falling back in serious disrepair. A catastrophe of even larger proportions was brewing and the entire southern front was saved by one man, General Hermann Balck and his 11th Panzer Division which, in 30 days wiped out the entire Russian 5th Guards Tank Army, considered the greatest divisional combat action in the history of warfare. However, this did not take the pressure off the 6th Army which was now beginning to starve.
Manstein and Paulus agreed that upon the code word “Thunderclap” from Manstein, the 6th Army would begin the breakout towards Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army. The logistical effort to accomplish this task would be enormous. Since there was not enough fuel for transport, only tanks and SPCs would be fueled; troops would have to pull hand sledges or use horse-drawn wagons through heavy snow. The artillery would have to fire off all its rounds and be abandoned as there was no transport to tow it. The Luftwaffe would have to run interference from the sky. The breakout was expected to take one week at a minimum and man thousands, especially the wounded who were to be pulled out on sleds, would die horrible deaths.
Paulus was then attacked by his Chief of Staff, Arthur Schmidt, who told him he was a coward, that he was defying Hitler, that his duty was to fight to the last man and so on. Paulus suffered a nervous breakdown. He ordered the 6th Army to prepare for the breakout and all the needed men and supplies and equipment were brought to the breakout point. At the same time, other supplies that could not be taken were blown up or burned. The average German soldier was thrilled with this plan and the expectation of breaking out to safety.
But then a strange thing happened. Manstein never gave the code word. Paulus waited as long as he could; one day, three days, a week. And then it was too late. There was no longer enough fuel for the 393 tanks and hundreds of SPCs to go half the distance required. It was no longer possible to make the breakout, and Paulus had already destroyed all the supplies he needed to stay inside the cauldron. Paulus could have started the breakout on his own and forced Manstein’s hand but the constant haranguing from Gen Schmidt had wiped out any beliefs he had in his own abilities. As time went on, Paulus slipped further into depression and defeatism and Schmidt took over day-to-day operational command of the army, meeting with the generals in the cauldron and deciding strategy, often drastic and suicidal. By this time, many of the Generals had decided to try and break out on their own and one attempt by a few divisions was made and failed. As time went on, other Generals began negotiating surrender of their divisions to the Russians. Paulus stayed in his room in the cellar of the Gum department store asking over and over to either surrender or be relieved. He was refused. Schmidt reigned abuse on Paulus throughout.
Eventually the 6th Army was wiped out and surrendered. 90,000 men went into the bag and within 30 days, 45,000 of them would be dead. Only the fittest or luckiest or most cunning or most dangerous would survive to get home, about 2 percent of the entire force. 25,000 wounded had been flown out as had some politically connected Generals and their staffs and many technical experts who were needed. Paulus was found by the Russians lying in his bed, nearly delirious, surrounded by metal cans filled with piss and shit or moldy bread and half-smoked cigars and cigarettes. He went into captivity a completely broken man.
Arthur Schmidt was put into solitary because of his belligerence and constant verbal attacks on the Russians. At one point he was threatened with a firing squad for abusing his female valet, provided by the Russians. Paulus became bitter and attacked Hitler for allowing his entire army to be destroyed. Meanwhile, in the north, Model had wiped out something like 5 Russian armies who barely gained a meter of territory but suffered hundreds of thousands dead. It didn’t matter. They had won at Stalingrad.
Both the Germans and the Russians were exhausted by the effort. The Italians, Romanians and Hungarians would never recover, the Hungarians, who hated the Russians, were able to reconstitute enough of a committed fighting force to repeat Stalingrad in Budapest just two years later with the same results. Manstein was able to engineer an astonishing victory against the Russians at Kharkov and later at Kursk, a strategic defeat for the Germans, where Hoth could have achieved the objective but turned away at the last moment fearing a non-existent flank attack. The Luftwaffe lost 700 planes of all types at Stalingrad, including 4-engine Condors and experimental planes. The Germans even committed a squadron of obsolete biplanes to the relief effort. At Kharkov and Kursk, the Germans were astonished to find themselves fighting many of the captured 393 German tanks lost at Stalingrad, now sporting the Star of the USSR.
Paulus turned against Germany was always hated for the rest of his life as a traitor. Schmidt never waivered from his committment to Nazism and Hitler, event to his death in Germany years later. Manstein, the best General Hitler had, was sacked in 1944 over differences of opinion. He survived the war to write memoirs and work with other generals to re-write history as revisionists and apologists for the German Army. Balck went on to lead a German army at Budapest that was destroyed outside Vienna.
The 6th Army was reconstituted as Army Group Hollidt with the 25,000 wounded used to recreate the corps of the army. It was completely rebuilt and destroyed again outside Debrecen and then restored again and destroyed again outside Budapest. The 6th Army holds the distinction of being the only army to be destroyed three times.
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