One of the greatest Allied errors of World War II was made when the USA, faced with a British intelligence report warning of forthcoming Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, chose to sanctimoniously ‘shoot the messenger’ instead of acting on the insightful information.
“The successful British naval attack on the Taranto Italian fleet sinking half all ships in harbour using aircraft carrier launched torpedo planes (a world first in both battle tactics and doctrine) so impressed the Japanese, Admiral Yamamoto decided to emulate the tactic against the USA at Pearl Harbour.
Britain however, had intercepted Japanese dispatches concerning torpedo designs for the shallow waters of Pearl Harbour and accordingly, Britain’s most senior Double Cross spy, agent Popov (codenamed Tricycle for his penchant for threesomes), flew to USA in August 1941 for a meeting with J Edgar Hoover (then head of the FBI) with evidence of when, where, how and by whom USA would first be attacked by Japan. In the meeting, the puritanical Hoover made it pompously clear he disapproved of Popov’s louche lifestyle (Ian Fleming’s womanising James Bond character is understood to have been based upon him) and, having never seen a microdot, was childishly more interested in how the information was displayed than the substance within. Popov was curtly dismissed and, four months later in December, Pearl Harbour was attacked.
Had Britain’s valuable intelligence been heeded, the Japanese 6 carrier strong Pearl Harbour task force could have been decimated in ambush (as was the case with similar foresight and code–breaking later at Midway) with the American Pacific Theatre of World War II effectively ending the day it started thus saving millions of lives. It will take many decades for USA to counter the understanding that, in military terms, ‘US intel’ might just have been an oxymoron.” *
Hoover, with all guns blazing and brashly American, was consistently of the opinion ‘Spies were only good for shooting’ whereas the more nuanced British approach recognised the value in turning German agents under its very own Double Cross system (XX). Of all the German spies sent by the Abwehr to Britain between 1939 and 1945, 14 were successfully turned and worked for the Allied cause, 16 were executed and one committed suicide —none operated successfully. As a result Britain had the war’s most effective intelligence service, as it does to this day.
To compound America’s lack of ability to spy, its early war code–breaking ability was equally limited. America’s ‘Black Chamber’ (also known as the ‘Cipher Bureau’) was established in 1919 by Herbert Yardley and succeeded in breaking the Japanese diplomatic code which provided useful information used to great effect when negotiating the Naval Treaty of 1929. Masterfully, and in America’s only between the wars James Bond moment, a US agent secretly photographed the contents of a Japanese embassy attache’s flight baggage containing code books in a customs check. However, when Secretary Stimson (of the Hoover Administration) later learned of the department he shut it down because “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.” Accordingly America was on the back foot until Midway.
Furthermore, and to make matters of diligence worse, the American radar operators at Pearl Harbour detected a large echo on the SCR 270 radar oscilloscope (also supplied by the British) at 7:02am on the day of the Pearl attack. The operators did nothing. USA had a mistrust of radar technology at the time (possibly because it was British technology) and turned off its Pearl radar defence between the hours of 9.30am and 5pm so its personnel requirements did not negatively impact upon army resources. Political power struggling over navy and army budgets was rife.
The Japanese attack occured half an hour after the Pearl radar operators had detected the incoming planes and, had these more local warnings been heeded, the attackers could have been intercepted at sea thus minimising damage to the US fleet.
Only a year previously, radar had successfully saved a nation during the Battle of Britain (via Chain Home radar and the British Dowding System). At the same time US military strategists had highlighted Pearl as exposed, had noted British success with Taranto, had war–gamed a similar attack scenario at Pearl and had predicted results not dissimilar to those to later transpire.
With regards to US national defence, if one wrote of such events in fiction, it would be unbelievable. The high–level US dismissive attitude towards Radar may have permeated to the lower ranks of its operators, it is likely nobody will ever know. One surety however is that America’s equally under parr and partisan Admiral of the Atlantic Fleet, King, had trained with British Radar for a number of years before the war as an officer exchange. It is not without irony that the very reason the British operated such exchanges was to disseminate sound tactics and strategy across the pond for mutual defence.
Admiral King, remembered only for his hatred of the British, was an extraordinary character —on the one hand he had his naval suits re–tailored to mimic that of the out of date uniform of Britain’s popular hero Admiral Jelicho whilst, on the other hand, he refused to adopt the British advised convoy tactic or the adoption of B24 Liberator to plug the mid Atlantic gap thus nearly losing The Battle of the Atlantic. It was his extraordinarily obnoxious trait to resent the shoulders of giants upon which he stood. It is possible this resentment of the Royal Navy, the British or both ran deeper in US naval circles.
All the Allies, without exception, made mistakes during the war but it is doubtful avoiding any of these would have enabled the sidelining of an Axis power in a single morning. It is perhaps interesting to note Russia also ignored British intelligence warning of the Barbarossa attack in June 1941. They soon learnt the value of early warning and were more appreciative when Britain gave them the German attack plans for the Battle of Moscow and then once again prior warning of Kursk.
It is doubtful Russia’s similar dismissal of MI6 warning of Barbarossa was an error of equal gravity to that of Pearl —improved Russian preparedness for German invasion would not have resulted in the same day nullification of an Axis power.
Had America’s sanctimonious*, arrogant* and naive* error been avoided the war would likely have ended years earlier with the Allies’ majority military capacity focused on Germany rather than split between two theatres of war on opposite sides of the globe. Many hundreds of thousands of Allied lives could have been saved and no nuclear arms need have been deployed. Furthermore, the Allies would have reached Berlin (and beyond) earlier than the Russians thus restricting, minimising and turning down the subsequent heat of the Cold War.
*This answer has been reported to Quora (presumably for breaking ‘be nice’ policy) and I must justify my words lest some sensitive soul be offended:
- ‘Sanctimonious’ —because America judged a professional spy for his private bedroom antics
- ‘Arrogant’ —because America thought its primitive policy of shooting spies better than Britain’s sophisticated and effective Double Cross system
- ‘Naive’ —because America thought MI6, the war’s most credible intelligence organisation, to be ineffective
I retract not a word and would suggest, if you do not like your national history, you do not read it. However, if you wish to engage in adult discussion concerning your history, that you take the rough with the smooth. Some nations have more of the former.
With a little more command of the English language it is apparent no one has claimed ‘Americans’ were naiive —merely ‘America’ was so. When the actions of a senior state official (in this case Hoover) represent the nation for which he works (in this case America), said nation is the third party to which the answer refers —mere criticism of a body without reference to its public.
For those without acumen for English I will paint in colour —it is acceptable to state ‘McDonalds is disgusting’ but not so ‘those behind McDonalds are disgusting’. A marked difference. Either way, the world feels better having gone for a dump after a Big Mac.
By jingo I think the answer is still live after moderation. How apt.
