Early History Of The Atomic Bomb

Manhattan Project Director’s Files Illuminate Early History of Atomic Bomb Grove's bage Photograph of General Leslie R. Groves used on his Manhattan Project identification badge (Photo from Los Alamos National Laboratory) Leslie Groves Papers Include Oppenheimer’s “Personnel List” for Staffing New Weapons Laboratory Groves “Unwilling to Accept … Setback” on Construction Schedule for Secret Plutonium Plant Post-War Development of Nuclear Reactors Needed to “Maintain the Country in a Supreme Military Position” Published: Aug 8, 2024 Briefing Book # 869 Edited by William Burr For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu Subjects Nuclear Strategy and Weapons Secrecy and FOIA Weapons of Mass Destruction Project Nuclear Vault Executive Committee during its meeting Robert Oppenheimer at a social event held by the S-1 Committee’s Executive Committee on 14 September 1942 during its meeting at Bohemian Grove, a month before Gen. Groves chose him to direct the Manhattan Project’s weapons lab. From left: Major Thomas T. Crenshaw, Robert Oppenheimer, Harold C. Urey, Ernest O. Lawrence, James B,. Conant, Lyman J. Briggs, Eger V. Murphree, Arthur H. Compton, Robert Thornton, and Colonel Kenneth Nichols. To conceal from outsiders the Army’s presence, the two officers attended wearing civilian garb. [Morgue 1958-8 (P-71)] [Photographer: Donald Cooksey] [Photo from NARA] Colonel Franklin T. Matthias Colonel Franklin T. Matthias. As District Engineer, Matthias supervised the creation of the Hanford Engineer Works at all stages, beginning with the selection of the land. (Photo from Wikipedia) Map of the Hanford Engineer Works Map of the Hanford Engineer Works. In Area A, below the Columbia River, are the reactors (100 category) and south of Gable Mountain, the reprocessing plants (200 category). The B reactor is on the west side on the way to the Riverland railroad yard, while the T plant is also on the west side. The fuel fabrication facility (300 category) is in Area D, north of Richland. (Map from Vincent Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb). Hanford's B Reactor in operation, January 1945 The B reactor at Hanford, January 1945. The Manhattan Project reserved the reactor’s spent fuel for plutonium production at the T plant. (Photo from National Park Service) The B reactor at Hanford Front face of the B reactor during construction. (Photo from Wikipedia) The T plant at Hanford The T plant at Hanford where spent reactor fuel was turned into plutonium. Reprocessing took place inside a “canyon,” which characterized the scale of the operation. Remote control devices enabled plant workers to keep their distance from the dangerous radioactive process. (Photo from National Park Service) Button distributed to workers at Hanford Engineer Works as part of a campaign to build morale and reinforce commitment to the project Button distributed to workers at Hanford Engineer Works as part of a campaign to build morale and reinforce commitment to the project. Franklin Matthias signed the pledge that he sent with the button to General Groves. (Groves files, box 1, 600.12 Hanford) Arthur Compton's ID badge from the Hanford Site. For security reasons he used a pseudonym Identification badge (with a pseudonym for security reasons) used by Nobel Prize-winning scientist Arthur H. Compton when visiting Hanford Engineer Works. As director of the Metallurgical Laboratory, which became part of the Manhattan Project, Compton oversaw the creation of the first controlled nuclear chain reaction and played a central role in policy developments relating to nuclear reactors and plutonium production. (Image from Wikipedia) Washington, D.C., August 8, 2024 – On the week of the 79th commemoration of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, the National Security Archive today publishes a fascinating new collection of papers from the office files of Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. effort during World War II to develop and produce the world’s first nuclear weapons. Among the newly available records are candid memos and other correspondence from inside the Manhattan Project on the role of nuclear technologies in the post-war environment and the importance of being the preeminent atomic power. In one revealing document from 1943, Arthur Compton, director of the Manhattan Project’s “Metallurgical Laboratory” at the University of Chicago, considered the post-World War II role of heavy water nuclear reactors. Assuming that production of plutonium-239 would be relevant to the “balance of military power” after the war, Compton wrote that “the post-war situation will still be greatly confused and it will remain of prime importance to maintain the country in a supreme military position.” Keeping the U.S. in its leading role was important to Compton, who was “sure that all of the major powers will be extending themselves to develop the tube-alloy [atomic bomb] program as far as possible.” To help the U.S. maintain its lead and seeing “inherent advantages” in using heavy water in nuclear reactors, Compton believed that their “development will certainly play an important part in this post-war effort.” Compton’s letter and the other records published today were found in a long-overlooked collection of office files of the Manhattan Project. The two cartons of “Leslie Groves Papers Concerning the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946” were found in Record Group 77, pertaining to the Army Corps of Engineers. When it reviewed the collection, the Department of Energy classified at least half of it, but what is available sheds interesting new light on the first two years of the Manhattan Project, including on Groves’ day-to-day decisions and his demanding management style. The U.S. National Archives made the Groves collection available in response to an indexing-on-demand request by the National Security Archive. The collection includes a letter to General Groves from J. Robert Oppenheimer, the recently appointed director of the Manhattan Project’s new weapons laboratory. Oppenheimer’s 9 November 1942 letter included the “personnel list” for the prospective laboratory that he had promised Groves. Oppenheimer listed cadres of experimental and theoretical physicists “who were now working for us” and a wish list of physicists that he hoped to sign on. The names included such prominent scientists as Edward Teller, Hans Bethe, Robert Bacher, Richard Feynman, Enrico Fermi, Robert F. Christy, and Luis Alvarez, all of whom worked at Los Alamos. With so much on the Manhattan Project already declassified and the subject of numerous books and articles, the documents in the Groves files are unlikely to change the big picture of the weapons design/production work at Los Alamos, the uranium enrichment project at Oak Ridge, or the plutonium production effort at Hanford, WA, all if which were under Groves’ supervision and general direction. Nothing in the new materials sheds any light on plans for the military use of atomic weapons, for example. Nevertheless, the documents provide interesting and useful nuance to important elements of the story, especially on developments at the secret Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) in Washington state, which produced the plutonium used for the Trinity Test and the bomb that exploded over Nagasaki. The Groves collection contains a variety of documents on HEW and its operations. Colonel Franklin Matthias, HEW’s director, played a key role in its development, including choosing the land that Hanford would occupy.[1] Several items demonstrate the precondition for acquiring these 600,000 acres: the dispossession of farmers and other landowners in the area. Legal challenges to government valuations of these properties also had interesting implications for official secrecy. Other material documents the challenge of developing and maintaining a huge labor force to construct reactors and reprocessing plants at HEW and how managers tried to improve labor morale, as it was difficult to retain workers workers in a remote area during a wartime situation when the demand for labor was high. Some of the Groves documents illustrate the task of creating a “government town” and a “company town” in Richland, WA, where managers and scientific workers would be living. One example was the dispute between HEW leaders and the Du Pont Corporation, the contractor for Hanford, over how many bedrooms were appropriate for the new houses. Another challenge for the HEW was ensuring that Richland would have the stores and shops needed to support a growing population.[2] The new documents also include estimates of the costs of the Hanford facilities and schedules for the production of plutonium and the completion of the work at Hanford. The estimates for Hanford, produced in February 1944, have detailed breakdowns, including the costs of the reactors and the reprocessing plant. In one chart, the estimated price for the three reactors was over $101 million dollars, which in 2024 dollars is in the range of $2 billion. The cost for the reprocessing plants was over $47 million. In 2024 dollars, this is in the range of $960 million. The spending on Hanford was substantial, but 63 percent of the Manhattan Project’s outlays were for the uranium enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge, which cost over $1 billion in 1945 dollars. Historians have observed that what made General Groves an ideal candidate for directing the Manhattan Project and accomplishing its goals was that he was a “blunt, impatient, and energetic officer with a well-deserved reputation for getting things done.” Moreover, he was skilled in delegating authority to close associates with whom he had worked on earlier projects. Before taking on this task, Groves had helped build the munitions industry and then played a key role in the construction of the Pentagon.[3] One document in particular sheds light on his management style. In November 1943, the Du Pont Corporation was having trouble finding enough workers to construct the highly secret facilities at HEW. Groves was displeased with the “super-cautious” tone of one of the Du Pont executives, who informed him about a schedule setback for construction at Hanford. But Groves was “unwilling” to accept any delays. His tough response produced a letter from a Du Pont executive who assured the General that the job will be done “at the earliest date possible.” That is what Groves wanted to hear. It is worth noting that the Du Pont Corporation had been reluctant to get involved in projects like Hanford in the first place, but pressure from Groves and the U.S. Army was unrelenting, and its executives acquiesced. Having little choice in the matter, the Du Pont leadership put up with Groves but not for monetary reward. Having been tagged during the 1930s as “merchants of death” for its World War I munitions sales, Du Pont had become skittish about profiting from war production. To build the facilities at Hanford, Du Pont waived all profits and asked only for reimbursement of expenses on a cost-plus-fixed fee basis. The fixed fee was one dollar. During the war, corporate executives routinely worked for the government on a “dollar-a-year” basis. Such was the political climate of the time.[4] The Groves files also include records capturing early discussions about the role of heavy water nuclear reactors in the Manhattan Project and in post-war development. While top officials such as Arthur Compton thought that heavy water reactors could fill the gap in the event that HEW’s graphite-moderated reactors did not pan out, that did not ultimately prove to be necessary. Heavy water reactors had low priority during World War II, but Groves approved the deployment of one at Argonne, IL, in part to support work at HEW. Compton also developed suggestions for information exchanges with British and Canadian scientists (who were already producing heavy water and had plans for a reactor). The Department of Energy classified close to 2,800 pages of the Groves files, presumably on restricted data grounds. The National Security Archive has filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the withheld documents. Most of the withdrawals consist of entire files, sometimes running to hundreds of pages, with exempted folders on topics such as “University of California,” “Hanford: Threshold of an Era,” and “Proposed Program for Metallurgical Project 1945-46.” The files on the University of California may provide some detail on its institutional relationship with Los Alamos, for which it was the official manager and supplier. The university’s leaders knew nothing about Los Alamos, although they would have to learn enough to buy insurance for the laboratory. If any of the classified files relate to military use of the bomb issues, it will likely take years to find out, given DOE’s underfunded FOIA system. Note: Thanks to Stephen Schwartz (“Atomic Analyst”) for invaluable guidance on adjusting the cost estimates of facilities at HEW into current dollars, and to Alex Wellerstein for his insights. The Documents I. Oppenheimer Letters ebb 869 doc 1 Document 1 Robert Oppenheimer to James Conant, Chair, National Defense Research Committee, 2 November 1942, Secret Nov 2, 1942 Source RG 77, National Archives, Leslie Groves Papers Concerning the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946 (Groves), box 1, 231.001 Appointed by General Groves to direct a weapons laboratory in mid-October 1942, Oppenheimer began an active effort to recruit top scientists. He wrote to Harvard University President James Conant about his interest in acquiring Robert Bacher, then with M.I.T.’s Radiation Laboratory; Franz Kurie at the U.S. Navy’s Radio and Sound Laboratory; and Raymond G. Herb, University of Wisconsin, who was also working at M.I.T.’s Radiation Laboratory. Apparently, neither Herb nor Kurie was interested or recruitable, but Oppenheimer went to great lengths during the months that followed to persuade Bacher to join and was eventually successful. This carbon copy was part of the package that Oppenheimer sent to Groves on 9 November (see Document 2).[5] ebb 869 doc 2 Document 2 Robert Oppenheimer to General Groves, 9 November 1942, Secret Nov 9, 1942 Source Groves, box 1, 231.001 The first page of J. Robert Oppenheimer’s letter to General Groves can be found on the Department of Energy’s OpenNet, but the signed original in the Groves office files may be the only available version with the “personnel list” attached. In the letter, Oppenheimer demonstrated that, by early November 1942, he had been busily recruiting top physicists to staff the new laboratory for “our program” even before there was an agreed site. The “personnel list” that he sent to Groves included a core group of experimental and theoretical physicists “now working for us” and a wish list of others whom he saw as essential. Oppenheimer included a separate page with an “explanatory note” for the lists, with various initials noting who had approved them (either Oppenheimer, Edwin McMillan or Ernest Lawrence). The list also included coding indicating who was “essential” (or just “good”), whether they were “aliens,” and whether they were married or not, among other characteristics. As Oppenheimer noted, the list did not include the “very large” number of graduate and undergraduate students “who are working with these men.” The list of those “men now working for us” included a few who never worked at Los Alamos, but it included many who played important roles there, including Edwin M. McMillan, John H. Manley, Joseph L. McKibben, Charles P. Baker, Emilio Segre, Robert Serber, Edward Teller and Hans Bethe. The list of “Men Whose Prompt Release We Desire” included some who later joined the project, such as Robert Bacher, Richard Feynman, Enrico Fermi, Robert F. Christy, Herbert L. Anderson and Luis Alvarez. Others proved unobtainable, such as Raymond Herb, Franz Kurie, Percy Bridgman and James L. Lawson. Oppenheimer wrote in gendered terms about those who would staff the new lab; he may have used the word “man,” as was typical then, to describe people in general, but he listed only males for these positions. A few female scientists would work at Los Alamos. In his letter to Groves, Oppenheimer mentioned several documents that he had enclosed, one concerning a “major equipment problem,” the other about a “young man who is now in the army and whom we would like to have assigned to us.” Neither show up in the file, but they may be in the classified papers in this collection or in some other group of records altogether. At the close of the letter, Oppenheimer wrote that he hoped to see Groves in New Mexico. Six days later, on 16 November 1942, when Oppenheimer was traveling in the state with Edwin McMillan and Major John H. Dudley to select a site for the laboratory, Groves joined the group. After visiting Jemez, which they ruled out, they inspected the site of a prep school in Los Alamos, which Groves readily accepted for what became known as “site Y.”[6] II. Building the Hanford Engineering Works ebb 869 doc 3a Document 3A H.E. Daniel, Du Pont, Design Division, to General Groves, “Project 9536 - Hanford Engineer Works 1100 Area - Town Site,” 24 April 1943, unclassified Apr 28, 1943 Source Groves, box 2, Hanford 620 ebb 869 doc 3b Document 3B Telegram from Groves to Mr. Yancey, 27 April 1943, unclassified Apr 27, 1943 Source Groves, box 2, Hanford 620 Constructing the HEW plutonium production complex required thousands of skilled and semi-skilled workers (the peak number of construction workers neared 45,000), housing arrangements, and amenities to encourage them to stay on the job (See Document 14). It also required managers to oversee construction along with technicians and scientists to operate the reactors, reprocessing plants and related facilities. They also needed suitable housing, especially if they brought their families. To make that possible, the Manhattan Project paid for new housing in Richland, WA, paying for everything, including lightbulbs and furniture. This was not an easy process because Groves and Du Pont did not agree completely on housing requirements or their costs, among other issues concerning the development of Richland. While Du Pont wanted to support the housing needs of managers and scientists, Groves and Matthias wanted to keep costs down. In what amounted to a directive to E.B. Yancey, the General Manager of Du Pont’s explosives department, HEW “area engineer” Colonel Franklin Matthias noted that the company wanted to construct the remaining unbuilt houses in three- or four-bedroom units. He cited the company’s “reluctance to build one or two bedroom units for … for remainder of program.” Matthias instructed Du Pont to “fit housing to actual estimated family sizes.” According to Matthias, “peace time experience as to needs for space does not apply now when it is of the utmost importance to conserve manpower and materials.” In his response, Yancey made the point, among others, that the remainder of the unbuilt houses should have mainly three bedrooms, which he saw as “minimum requirements.” Backing up Matthias, Groves sent a telegram to Yancey saying that he saw “no reason for not complying” with the request, although he was willing to discuss the matter further. ebb 869 doc 4 Document 4 Assistant Attorney General Norman M. Littell to Members of Congress from Washington State, 26 April 1943, with memo to General Groves and Letter from Littell to Senator M[onrad] Wallgren attached, 26 April 1943 Apr 26, 1943 Source Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford When the Manhattan Project designated land in Washington state as the site for the Hanford Engineer Works, it began proceedings to acquire large swathes of land, over 400,000 acres—some 600 square miles—so that the secret plants could be built and operated safely and far from the view of unwanted observers. In implementing federal policy to acquire the land and compensate private landholders, Assistant U.S. Attorney General Norman M. Littell played an important role. With political ambitions in Washington state, Littell was concerned about the slow procedures for compensation and wrote that “residents being dispossessed from this big area of our State ... will suffer very considerable hardships from delay in payment.” However, did not take secrecy all that seriously, as he made clear in this comment to Senator Wallgren [D-WA]: “The War Department considers this project to be ‘secret’ and asks for no publicity on it, although I do not quite see how so great an event in the State of Washington, inevitably attended by considerable comment and the conducting of public proceedings in the courts, can in any way be maintained as ‘secret.’” Littell’s concerns about compensation and his skepticism about secrecy presaged run-ins that he had with Groves and that contributed to a White House decision to fire Littell in 1944.[7] In any event, Littell greatly underestimated the determination of War Department officials to maintain the secrecy of Hanford operations. For example, HEW project director Franklin Matthias successfully appealed to the patriotism of local newspaper editors by asking them to stay clear of stories of government land acquisition, dispossession of farmers, and subsequent construction activities at Hanford. The HEW’s existence remained secret until after the atomic bombings of Japan.[8] ebb 869 doc 5 Document 5 Office of the Chief of Engineers, Washington, D.C., “Basic Data on Hanford Engineer Works, Pasco Washington,” 19 May 1943 May 19, 1943 Source Groves, box 2, 601 (Hanford) Prepared by some unknown compiler for the use of General Groves and other top officials, this report provided a full picture of the land in Washington state that the War Department acquired for HEW operations. The compendium provided detail on land ownership, population, agriculture, irrigation districts, transportation, schools, and land acquisition procedures. At the end of the compilation is a set of photographs. If the maps mentioned in the report are in the Groves files, the Archive’s FOIA request may ultimately open them up. The compendium gave an overview of the history, noting the 1942 laws that authorized the Secretary of War to acquire by “purchase, donation, transfer, or condemnation” real property required for military purposes, and citing a 9 February Secretary of War directive to acquire the land. According to the report, “Area A,” consisting of over 193,000 acres, was “situated in the center of the project.” Thus, a few weeks later, on 23 February, the War Department took the first step by filing a petition of condemnation with the U.S. District Court for “immediate possession” and occupation of Area A. The estimated cost to acquire that area was $3.2 million, while the estimated cost for all of the land—areas A, B, C, D, and E—was over $5.1 million. As it turned out, by December 1946, litigation brought by claimants would bring land acquisition costs to over $5 million. Not mentioned in the report was the Native American tribal group, the Wanapum, which had fished in the Columbia River for centuries.[9] Included in the photos—numbers 11 through 14—is Gable Mountain, the area south of which would become the site of the plutonium separation plant. Other photos depict orchards, some destroyed or abandoned, irrigation ditches, a dam, the village of White Bluffs, and power lines. ebb 869 doc 6 Document 6 General Groves to E.G. Ackart, Chief Engineer, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company [Du Pont], 24 November 1943, with letters from Ackart and Groves attached, Secret Nov 24, 1943 Source Groves, box 1, 600 Hanford Getting enough workers to build the reactors, reprocessing facilities and other sites at Hanford was a huge task, and General Groves was doubtful that Du Pont executives were handling it with the right attitude. A letter from Walter O. Simon, a Du Pont manager at HEW, irritated Groves because of its “super-cautious” tone and a statement about a schedule “set back” for the construction of Areas 100 (reactor) and 200 (reprocessing plant). Groves refused to accept any delays, and his response produced a somewhat aggrieved letter from Ackart, who blamed “stringent” government controls over labor but assured the General that the job will be done “at the earliest date possible.” The last point is what Groves wanted to hear because, in his view, “it is mandatory on all of us to handle the job in such a way that the important areas will be completed at the earlies possible dates regardless of any previously suggested schedules or any difficulties which may be thrown in our respective ways.” ebb 869 doc 7 Document 7 Colonel K[enneth] D. Nichols to General Groves, enclosing memoranda on Hanford construction/production schedule and on “P-9 Program,” 24 January 1944, Secret Jan 24, 1944 Source Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford Prepared by top Groves’ aide Colonel Kenneth Nichols months before any of the reactors or the reprocessing plant were operating, the first memorandum provided estimates for the labor force needed to build “three operating units”—presumably two reactors and one reprocessing plant—and requisite supplies of plutonium at various time intervals. The quickest completion time for the three units, in two-month intervals—would require 48,000 workers. (As it turned out, the peak workforce was around 43,000). The basis for the labor force estimates was a production schedule for 12- or 18-kilogram units of plutonium based on the time intervals. For example, one 12-kilogram “unit” would be produced 13 months after the reactors (pile) started operating, assuming a two-month interval for the completion of reprocessing plants. Nichols recommended trying to “complete all three units at two-month intervals.” While there was little difference in estimated plutonium output between the 2-4 and the 2-6 schedules compared to 2-2, he favored the “faster schedule” to “provide for contingencies.” By the point where HEW could produce 12 or 18 kilograms of plutonium-239, it would have been close to operating at full capacity because it would already have been producing small amounts. The minimum critical mass of a sphere of plutonium-239 is around 10 kilograms, so that may have made a capacity to produce 12 kilograms a desired goal. When Nichols prepared his report, weapons designers at Los Alamos were assuming that they could use the plutonium to produce a usable gun-assembly weapon. That proved technically impossible, and Los Alamos found an alternative design based on implosion technology.[10] Plutonium production later moved beyond Nichols’ estimate. By September 1944, the “B” reactor had reached criticality, and in late December 1944, spent fuel arrived at the “T” reprocessing plant. Soon, Hanford was producing plutonium, making its first delivery to Los Alamos on 4 February 1945. Production grew fairly rapidly, especially after Groves and HEW leaders found ways to accelerate it to provide enough plutonium for a test device and a weapon.. [11] According to a recent estimate, by August 1945, eight months after the reprocessing plant was operating, Hanford had already produced 17.5 kilograms of plutonium, more than enough for the Trinity Test and the bomb that exploded over Nagasaki. The second memorandum concerned recommendations for the possible suspension of heavy water (P-9) production as a cost-saving measure. That such a significant heavy water production capacity had been built speaks to the huge resources that the Manhattan Project had its disposal but also to the ability of its managers to put on the back burner investments whose importance had lessened. This was implicit in the decisions that Groves made in October 1943 to give low priority to work on a heavy water reactor for producing plutonium. (See Document 17) Two of the plants recommended for closure, Alabama and Wabash River, had higher production costs compared to the Morgantown plant. The report included contractual data for the Consolidated Mining and Smelting plant at Trail in British Columbia. Operated by the Manhattan Project, the plant’s entire output would be designated for the heavy water research reactor at Argonne, Illinois.[12] ebb 869 doc 8 Document 8 G[ranville] M. Read, Assistant Chief Engineer, Du Pont, to General Groves, “Hanford Engineer Works,” 12 February 1944, with letter from Groves to Read attached, 23 March 1944, Secret Feb 12, 1944 Source Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford Building a hitherto unknown, complex, and hazardous technology made Du Pont executives “apprehensive” about safety, which had been important to their corporate culture.[13] They wanted to be sure that, if the world’s first nuclear production reactor failed, that nearby workers would be safe. Granville Read sent Groves two sets of maps “indicating the number of people associated with our construction organization and the distance they will be working from the operating units.” According to Read, when the ‘B’ [reactor] unit began operations there would be “approximately 50,000 people within a 12-mile radius of the operating unit.” Read wanted Groves’ assurances that, “under conditions in which the performance of the operating unit did not proceed in a controllable manner and that all of the safety control mechanisms fail to function, the distances given on our maps are adequate protection for the health and safety of the employees involved.” If Groves was confident that the maps were correct, Read asked him to sign one of the sets of maps and return them. In his reply, Groves wrote that, after consulting scientists, it was their and his opinion that “the distances on the maps ensure proper protection for the health and safety of the employees involved.” Accordingly, he signed the maps, copies of which remain classified in the Groves collection. ebb 869 doc 9 Document 9 Major Dewey M. Stowers, Deputy Area Engineer, to Office of Chief of Engineers, “Estimated Construction Costs at HEW,” 22 February 1944, Secret Feb 22, 1944 Source Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford Responding to a request from Colonel Nichols, Stowers sent estimates of construction costs at the HEW, including costs for the reactors and reprocessing facilities. The estimates include the costs for each category of installation: $100 for reactors, $200 for reprocessing plants, $300 for fuel fabrication, and $700 for administrative and other offices. One important problem that managers would have to grapple with, if far from systematically, was storing nuclear waste, including the poisonous chemical byproducts from the reprocessing plant. Some of the items in this document may relate to waste management, such as items 282 (reservoir & pump house), 611 (waste settling basin) and 612 (open storage ditch), although their purposes are far from clear. In any event, by 1944, HEW had begun the infamous “tank farm” for storing waste from the T plant.[14] The numbers used in the chart are in 1944 dollars, but it is possible to take into account price level changes since then to get an approximation of the costs in 2024 dollars. This can be done by using Department of Defense deflators. Unfortunately, the earliest military construction deflator provided by Defense is for 1945, but that is reasonably close. In the chart, the estimated cost for the three reactors (“100 area”) was over $101 million dollars. Using the deflators, the estimate in 2024 dollars is in the range of $2 billion. According to the chart, the cost for the reprocessing plants (“SP Process Area”) was some $47 million dollars. Using the deflators, the adjusted cost in 2024 dollars is in the range of $960 million. For the fuel fabrication facility (300), the estimated cost was over $2.1 million. Adjusted for 2024 dollars using Defense Department deflators, the cost for that facility is over $42 million. [15] ebb 869 doc 10 Document 10 Major General Leslie R. Groves to Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General Army Service Force, “Hanford Engineer Works, Washington,” 23 March 1944, unclassified Mar 23, 1944 Source Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford By March 1944, Groves was greatly concerned about the slow pace of the settlements with property holders in Washington state who had gone to court to seek better compensation for their land. Over 1200 cases remained unsettled, procedures were slow, and Groves was aggrieved by jury decisions to award values “greatly in excess of the Government appraisals.” To protect the HEW’s “essential secrecy,” Groves wanted the cases closed, payments made expeditiously, and juries kept away from the properties at issue. Specifically, he wanted the Justice Department to make arrangements with the Courts to “eliminate the practice of the jury viewing the land” before they made a decision on compensation. Groves did not have his way on this point until March 1945.[16] Groves sent this memo to General Brehon Somervell, chief of U.S. Army logistics, whose organization was an important source of secret funding for the Manhattan Project and whose role gave him a voice in overall policy, including land settlements.[17] ebb 869 doc 11 Document 11 Lt. Colonel Franklin T. Matthias, Area Engineer, Hanford Engineer Works, memorandum to General Groves, “Livability of Prefabricated Houses,” with survey results attached, 26 July 1944, unclassified Jul 26, 1944 Source Groves, box 2, 620 Hanford To accelerate the availability of housing for managers, scientists and others in the HEW’s more permanent staff, Matthias arranged to have 2,300 prefabricated houses built in Oregon and shipped to Richland.[18] To see how the “general living conditions” were compared to other housing, Groves asked Matthias to arrange a survey. The results showed that there were few complaints, but an important difference was that “the prefabricated houses show a considerable higher temperature both inside and outside.” Nevertheless, the prefabricated houses were “more comfortable than the average houses in this area excluding the new houses built.” ebb 869 doc 12 Document 12 G[ranville] M. Read, Assistant Chief Engineer, Du Pont, to General Groves, “Project 9356 – Hanford Engineer Works,” with chart attached, 30 September 1944, Secret Sep 30, 1944 Source Groves, box 1, 600.1 Hanford Read sent Groves a chart with a schedule for the completion of major facilities at Hanford. On the most critical goals, both the B reactor (100 category) and the T reprocessing plant (200 category) were already or nearly completed. The T plant would start operations at the close of September. More reactors and reprocessing plants were to be completed and begin operations during the months after September 1944. Other categories scheduled for completion were offices for maintenance, operations, and administration (700 category) and housing (1100). Also included in the chart was a “force reduction curve” indicating a steady decrease in the HEW labor force in the following months. The labor force curve is broken down into two parts: with most of the work done on a “fixed fee” basis: the $1 fixed fee and reimbursables. Some work was done on a “lump sum” basis, apparently a specific payment for agreed work, including costs only. ebb 869 doc 13 Document 13 Colonel E.E. Kirkpatrick to General Groves, “Report of Inspection of Concessions at Hanford Engineer Works,” 1 November 1944, enclosures not included, Confidential Nov 1, 1944 Source Box 1, Groves, 319.1 Inspection of Records For the towns of Hanford and Richland, the HEW leased concessions to private operators so that they could supply food and other necessities to workers, managers, scientists, and others. In Richland, HEW also made arrangements for a hotel, cafeterias, a coffee shop and a news stand. For concessions, including the hotel, the U.S. government shared in the gross receipts on a percentage basis, while the cafeterias and coffee shop paid monthly rent. The coffee shop operated at a loss but was a necessity for hotel guests and others. With the Office of Price Administration (OPA) regulating and monitoring prices, Kirkpatrick found that “prices charged in stores at Richland have been in line with OPA ceiling regulations” and had “been competitive with those charged in the general territory.” An exception was the drug store, whose prices were a “little high,” while Safeway prices were “the minimum that can be charged in the area.” Kirkpatrick recommended reviews of each concession contract with the amount of profit to be determined and earnings carefully watched, but also to ensure that the concessions stayed in place until the HEW’s work ended. Groves approved the recommendations instructing Kirkpatrick to carry them out “insofar as practical.” ebb 869 doc 14 Document 14 Colonel D. E. Antes to General Groves, “Report of Investigation, Hanford Engineer Works Employees’ Association, Incorporated,” 25 October 1944 with cover note, Attachments not included, Confidential Oct 25, 1944 Source Box 1, Groves, 319.1 Inspection of Records Poor bookkeeping and excessive profits to a contractor operating games of skill led to an investigation of the Hanford Employees’ Association that HEW managers had established in December 1943. With labor turnover high during the construction phase, managers decided that the creation of an employees’ association was a “must” to improve morale. According to the reports, workers were “leaving their jobs simply because there was no welfare or athletic program to provide entertainment in their leisure hours.” While Du Pont had set up a recreation building with pool tables, bowling alleys and games of skill, among other features, for HEW managers, that was not enough.[19] The Hanford Employees Association published a newspaper and sponsored nationally known dance bands, baseball games, baseball leagues, football games, concerts and lectures. Apparently, some in HEW management saw bringing in dance bands and professional sports teams as “unwise,” probably for security reasons, but nevertheless necessary for morale purposes. With construction winding down, Matthias wanted to scale back the Employees’ Association but not eliminate it yet. Du Pont had been involved in managing the association but did not “favor” it, probably because it wanted employees to have responsibility for organizing their social activities. Du Pont was more interested in meeting the needs of the operations personnel who were settling down in Richland. In contrast to “building craftsmen” who were “accustomed to short employment [and] high wages, operations employees were supposedly “older, usually married and possibly with a family of two or three children.” Their “primary interests” were a “home and its maintenance,” which they wanted to look “as nice as possible.” In that context, it “is the Du Pont policy to lend encouragement to and foster the formation of civil groups in the village and the formation of recreation groups by the inhabitants themselves.” Colonel Antes recommended a “detailed audit of funds and fiscal procedure,” the recovery of excess profits from a contractor, and the termination of the Association when construction ended. Groves signed off on the findings and recommendations. III. Nuclear Reactors ebb 869 doc 15 Document 15 Arthur Compton, Director of [Metallurgical] Laboratory, to Col. K[enneth] D. Nichols, 22 September 1943, with attached Compton memo to S[amuel] K[ing] Allison, H[enry] D[e Wolf] Smyth, “P-9 Program,” 22 September 1943, Sep 22, 1943 Source Groves, Box 1, Polymer The “Met Lab,” directed by Arthur Compton, had demonstrated that a nuclear pile could produce a chain reaction and then be used to produce plutonium. With the Du Pont Corporation secretly building huge piles and reprocessing facilities at Site “W” in Washington state, Compton found supporting roles that “Met Lab” scientists could play, for example, by developing the next generation of nuclear reactors fueled by heavy water (“P-9”). As Compton informed Colonel Nichols, Groves and the Military Policy Committee agreed that a heavy water reactor for producing plutonium would not be authorized “until serious troubles have been encountered with the present graphite plant,” referring to the plans for reactors at the HEW. Compton relayed what he understood as General Groves’ requirements. They included the construction of a heavy water reactor at the Argonne Forest, outside of Chicago, partly as “a performing experiment designed to test aspects of the W pile at relatively high levels of gamma and neutron radiation.” By June 1944, the Argonne reactor was operational. Groves also requested preparation of a design for a heavy water plant that could produce plutonium. The only reason to build such a plant “during the present war following this design will be presumably in the case of failure of the W plant to give satisfactory results.” Compton observed that “it is hoped that the present war will be over before this investigation can lead to important practical results” that could “have a great effect ... on the post-war military position of the nation.” The instructions also included what information could or could not be shared with the Canadians, who were already producing heavy water and had plans for developing a heavy water reactor.[20] Compton approved sharing technical data and calculations for developing such reactors and explaining instruments for investigating and constructing heavy water reactors. Not approved was sharing information, such as progress, plans, production capabilities, or technical aspects of the graphite reactor used for producing plutonium or the U.S.’s own plans to produce heavy water. ebb 869 doc 16 Document 16 General Groves to Arthur Compton, 24 September 1943, Secret Sep 24, 1943 Source Groves, Box 1, Polymer Groves informed Compton that the Manhattan Project’s Military Policy Committee had decided that the “scope of the heavy water work should not be determined” until after a meeting with the British and the Canadians in Montreal. According to Groves, “our effort should not exceed the construction of a lower-powered heavy water pile for use as a general experimental tool” and as preparation should “it become necessary to carry on rapid development” of such a reactor. ebb 869 doc 17 Document 17 General Groves to the District Engineer, Knoxville, TN [Arthur V. Peterson], “Program of the Work Related to the Use of P-9,” 5 October 1943, Secret Oct 5, 1943 Source Groves, Box 1, Polymer Writing to Major A.V. Peterson, the District Engineer for Oak Ridge, TN, also known as “Site X,” Groves made detailed comments on Compton’s 22 September memorandum (Document 15). For example, regarding the design of a heavy water reactor for producing plutonium, the “effort should be held to the barest minimum.” On Compton’s point five, concerning information exchanges with the Canadians, none “will be undertaken without my prior approval until such time as the definite producers for interchange are established.” ebb 869 doc 18 Document 18 Colonel K.D. Nichols to General Groves, “Program of Work Related to the Use of P-9,” 11 October 1943, Secret Oct 11, 1943 Source Groves, Box 1, Polymer Nichols informed Groves that Major A.V. Peterson had approved Compton’s 22 September memorandum before Groves had sent his comments. He informed Groves that his comments had been “called to the attention of Major Peterson and Dr. Compton with your instructions to modify the program” accordingly. ebb 869 doc 19 Document 19 Major A.V. Peterson to General Groves, 14 October 1943, enclosing letter from Compton to Harld Urey, Columbia University, 7 October 1943, Secret Oct 14, 1943 Source Groves, Box 1, Polymer In this letter to Harold Urey, Compton shared his thinking on the role of heavy water reactors for producing plutonium (49) during and after the war. He took it for granted that there would be a directive to prepare a “satisfactory design” for a heavy water reactor and that the design could be used if needed. He further believed that the 1944 design “will go into construction.” Compton summarized the discussions that he, Groves, Eugene Wigner, Robert Tolman, and Smyth had with the British in Montreal to discuss “problems of mutual interest in connection with the 49 production program.” Concerning the British experiments on the use of heavy water, “it seemed evident that they were not expecting any results ... that would be used in the present war.” In general, the British “see 49 production as an important factor in determining the balance of military power in the post-war world.” They “are getting ready for full-scale activity ... as soon as immediate demands of the present war permit.” Compton assumed that the U.S. should not supply the British with “larger quantities of our P-9 since this may be become of importance in our war program.” Believing that U.S. heavy water work “must now be organized around the possibility” that the U.S. will need a heavy water reactor to “pinch-hit in our 49 production program,” he was certain that “immediate post-war developments will call for use” of such plants. Taking the British point about the relevance of plutonium production to the post-war “balance of military power,” Compton wrote that the “the post-war situation will still be greatly confused and it will remain of prime importance to maintain the country in a supreme military position.” Using the British code word for the nuclear weapons program, Compton was “sure that all of the major powers will be extending themselves to develop the tube-alloy program as far as possible.” Plainly, he wanted the U.S. to maintain its lead. With the “inherent advantages” of using P-9 for nuclear reactors, “its development will certainly play an important part in this post-war effort.” Compton did not specify the advantages but probably had in mind the possibility that using uranium metal to help fuel the reactor would be less costly than using enriched uranium. In any event, Compton would not give “first place” to use of heavy water reactors to produce 49, “but it must be developed as rapidly as possible.” ebb 869 doc 20 Document 20 Major A.V. Peterson to General Groves, “American and British Work with P-9 Piles,” 5 March 1944, enclosing memorandum from Compton to Peterson, “In re: American and British Work with P-9 Piles,” 1 March 1944, Secret Mar 1, 1944 Source Groves, Box 1, Polymer Compton’s thinking about the heavy water and nuclear reactor requirements shifted since he had considered the issue during the fall. With plans for building reactors and a reprocessing plant at Hanford underway, he found “the present outlook … [to be] so encouraging that I see no value in introducing a P-9 pile at this time for the purpose of insurance.” Nevertheless, Compton assumed that, for the post-war period, the U.S. would need to develop reactors, some possibly using heavy water, for power production purposes, including powering U.S. Navy ships. To strengthen their post-war position, he believed that the British would take a similar course. When, during the post-war period, the U.S. developed reactors for power production, plutonium (“49”) would be a “by-product” of nuclear reactor operations. Compton believed that it would be unwise “to complicate” the initial stages of a power development program to require “49 production as a part of the pile operation.” For example, a “power unit for propulsion of a ship should not need to consider whether the 49 that is produced can be recovered.” Considering whether the United States should cooperate with the British on developing reactors, Compton opined that the U.S. would have to determine whether it was advantageous or not. For example, he observed that it “has frequently been found desirable for a strong industry to collaborate fully on a research level with a weaker industry in development of new products of common interest.” That, he believed, could apply to a U.S.-U.K. collaboration on “pile programs.” A related issue was the exchange of information with the British. Compton supported exchanges on the “fundamental physics and chemistry of the pile process,” including the properties of plutonium and other products” as well as “the design and construction of power piles in successful operation, as long as the British are ... actively at work in these fields.” But he ruled out information exchanges on such matters as plutonium separation or decontamination, and the “design and construction of piles in the course of development,” perhaps referring to the developments of reactors for producing plutonium. Notes [1] . For Matthias’s assignment to the Hanford project and his early role, see Steve Olson, The Apocalypse Factory: Plutonium and the Making of the Atomic Age (New York: W.W. Norton, 2020), 1-2, 65-69. [2] . For useful information on the development of Richland, see Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 107-109. Olson further observes that Richland was a “detention center”, which may be too strong, but certainly, the residents were under steady surveillance, as he demonstrates. [3] . Quotation from J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 10-11; Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, The Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002), 5-6. See also Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the ‘Atomic General’: Leslie R, Groves,” The Journal of Military History (2003): 883-920. [4] . Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 212; Vincent Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 106; Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 60. [5] . This letter, found in an Oppenheimer collection at Los Alamos National Laboratory archives, is cited by James Hershberg in James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima in the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Knopf, 1993), at page 807, note 48. [6] . Jones, Manhattan, 83; Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Vintage, 2006), 205-207. [7]. Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 218-221. [8] . Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 65, 68. [9] . Jones, Manhattan, 342; Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 69-70. [10] . Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 361-363. [11] . Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 111; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 368-376. [12] . Stephen A. Andrews, Madison T. Andrews & Thomas E. Mason, “Canadian Contributions to the Manhattan Project and Early Nuclear Research,” Nuclear Technology 207 Supplement 1 (2021): S 141. [13] . Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 53. [14] . For early measures taken to store nuclear waste, see Olson, The Apocalypse Factory, 104-106. [15] . To make these approximations, the editor used the deflator for military construction in 1944 found in the 1986 edition of the Defense Department’s “National Defense Budget Estimates” (see page 50), generally known as the “Green Book”. Using the .1195 deflator made it possible to formulate numbers in 1986 dollars. To adjust those numbers in 2024 dollars, the current version of the “Green Book” includes a .4126 deflator for military construction as of 1986. It is also possible to develop numbers by using the Office of Management and Budget’s Historical Tables, especially table 10-1, but it is based on fiscal year 2017, so the resulting numbers do not reflect major changes in price levels since then. [16] . Jones, Manhattan, 342. [17] . Jones, Manhattan, 116, 338. [18] . Carl Abbott, “Building the Atomic Cities: Richland, Los Alamos, and the American Planning Language,” in Bruce Hevly and John M. Findlay, eds., The Atomic West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 96 [19] . For morale issues, see Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 223, including note 93 on page 621. [20] . Stephen A. Andrews et al., “Canadian Contributions to the Manhattan Project,” S131-S146.