The White House Has Its First Nuclear Drill

Ivory Item: Carter First U.S. President to Participate in Nuclear Drill President Jimmy Carter with the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown meeting for breakfast, 20 November 1977 President’s Role in War Exercise “Highly Sensitive” JCS Chief Ordered Military to Destroy Records Carter Likely Authorized Retaliatory ICBM Launch During Mock Scenario White House Interest in Crisis Operations Led JCS to Develop Nuclear Attack Simulation Published: May 31, 2024 Briefing Book # 861 Edited by William Burr For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu Subjects Cold War – General Nuclear Strategy and Weapons Project Nuclear Vault President Jimmy Carter with the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown meeting for breakfast, 20 November 1977 President Jimmy Carter with the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown meeting for breakfast, 20 November 1977. From left to right, clockwise: Army Chief of Staff General Bernard Rogers, Secretary of Defense Brown, President Carter, JCS Chairman General George S. Brown, Marine Corp Commandant General Louis Wilson, Air Force Chief of Staff General David Jones, Vice President Walter Mondale, National Security Adviser Brzezinski (Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Holloway behind Brzezinski) (Photo from Jimmy Carter Presidential Library) National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, his deputy David Aaron, and JCS Chairman David Jones, 20 December 1978 National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, his deputy David Aaron, and JCS Chairman David Jones, 20 December 1978. Jones succeeded George Brown as chairman earlier that year. On 6 October 1977, Aaron listened in on the first Ivory Item simulation in which President Carter participated. (Photo from National Archives catalog) President Carter with NSC military assistant William Odom President Carter with NSC military assistant William Odom who was an important proponent of the Ivory Item simulations. (Photograph from William Odom Papers, Library of Congress) Cobra Dane phased-array radar deployed at Shemya Island, Alaska Photo from June 1977 of the Cobra Dane phased-array radar deployed at Shemya Island, Alaska, used for monitoring missile launches from the Kamchatka Peninsula. President Carter received a briefing on missile launch warning systems, including Cobra Dane, as background for the Ivory Item simulations. (Photo from National Archives catalog) The National Military Command Center The National Military Command Center. Lieutenant Colonel T.C. Benjamin Russell, U.S. Army, and Major J. William Stubbs, U.S. Army, shown operating the Conference Management Table (CMT) in the Emergency Conference Room (ECR) of the National Military Command Center (NMCC), 23 July 1976 (Photo from National Archives) Washington, D.C., May 31, 2024 - On 6 October 1977, President Jimmy Carter and top U.S. national security officials dialed into a secret “Missile Attack Conference” (MAC) to coordinate a response to a simulated surprise nuclear strike on the United States. Organized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the mock war scenario was the first to involve the U.S. President and may have prompted Carter to authorize a retaliatory nuclear missile launch, according to documents posted today by the National Security Archive. Using the code name Ivory Item, the JCS developed the simulation to familiarize the President with the procedures of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the ultra-secret list of U.S. strategic nuclear targeting options. Today’s posting consists of declassified archival records that document President Carter’s personal interest in strategic war plans and the conduct of nuclear war in “short warning” situations. Carter was uniquely positioned to become the first president to participate in a nuclear war simulation. As the only president with an advanced physics education and firsthand experience with nuclear submarines, the threat of nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and nuclear proliferation deeply concerned Carter, who favored deep cuts in strategic forces by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, as commander-in-chief, President Carter felt that he had a responsibility to familiarize himself with emergency procedures for worst-case situations. Carter’s interest in nuclear command procedures led Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the top secret Ivory Item program to give decisionmakers practical experience in addressing surprise attack and other nuclear-use scenarios through the simulation of “a Missile Attack Conference procedure.” After some practice runs, President Carter was invited to participate in the 6 October 1977 exercise. While many of the details surrounding Ivory Item remain classified, declassified documents and the recollections of a former official indicate that Carter provided useful feedback about MAC procedures and targeting alternatives that led to changes in the SIOP Execution Handbook, strict limitations on the number of people who could participate, and instructions to destroy any records of the President’s participation in the mock nuclear war scenario. When Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and his aides at the National Security Council (NSC) looked into the problem of nuclear surprise attack, they found that they had “inherited” crisis management procedures that were “neglected, rusty, and out of date.” Concerning “White House Emergency Procedures” (WHEP), the NSC Crisis Management Staff told Brzezinski that “there was concern in the JCS that the NCA [National Command Authority] might not be able to respond effectively in the event of a surprise attack.” They had started to stage Operation Alert (OPAL) drills involving helicopter evacuations, and the 9 July OPAL III drill “went off with precision and speed.” The “first goal” for U.S. “crisis management doctrine,” according to the NSC, “was to put the WHEP in good order,” while “the second goal was to help the President become familiar with the U.S. doctrine for nuclear ‘crisis management’ as it relates to the WHEP and the National Command Authority.”[1] [See Document 24] As part of the process to support the President’s nuclear education, on 31 March 1977, Brzezinski sent Secretary of Defense Brown a memorandum asking, among other things, for a “brief statement of the procedures for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial phase.” The statement would include information on the “command procedures for the conduct of such a war, including such operational aspects as the location and procedures for effective exercise of control.” Brzezinski asked that JCS Chairman General George S. Brown play a role in providing information to the extent appropriate.[2] [See Document 2] In response to White House interest, during the following weeks and months, Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs developed the top secret Ivory Item program to give decision makers practical experience in addressing surprise attack and other nuclear-use scenarios. During earlier years of Cold War nuclear competition, national security planners had devised organizational frameworks for making decisions in a military emergency, notably the “Missile Attack Conference,” which would be initiated by the Commander-in-Chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), presumably when there was unmistakable evidence of incoming missiles. The most “senior conferee” participant would decide whether the situation required presidential involvement. The purpose of the Ivory Item exercises was to “simulate a Missile Attack Conference procedure” conceived of as occurring on a “no-notice” basis. Before they were ready to bring in the President, the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense Brown developed and staged Ivory Item exercises beginning in May 1977. The preparations involved drafting presentations on early warning systems and the SIOP that could be shown to the Secretary of Defense and the President. [See Documents 5 and 6] Much of that material is heavily excised, but the SIOP material indicated that there were three possible responses to a surprise intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. At least two involved “Major Attack Options,” probably incuding hundreds, possibly well over a thousand nuclear warheads delivered by bombers and missiles. One was the “minimum execution” of Major Attack Option (MAO) 1; another was the “complete execution” of MAO 1. The purpose of the “minimum” MAO 1 option was to “minimize economic damage and fatalities” and to avoid attacks on the Soviet Government structure so as to permit negotiations. Implicitly, the second option involved even more massive attacks, including Soviet Government installations. Details on the third option are unavailable but possibly involved retaliation by Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers and ICBMs on “day to day” alert along with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). According to the briefing documents, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (the SIOP designers) used the Comprehensive Blast and Radiation Assessment (COBRA) computer program to estimate fatalities for the surprise attack alternative responses. Apparently developed during the 1960s, COBRA was used to predict “the expected fatalities from both prompt effects (blast and initial radiation) and delayed effects (fallout for a six-month period) for the specific attack option executed.” Pending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests may shed light on the origins and development of the COBRA program. By late September 1977, the Pentagon was ready to involve the President directly in a nuclear crisis simulation. Aside from President Carter, other participants in the 6 October 1977 Ivory Item exercise included Secretary of Defense Brown, JCS Chairman Gen. Brown (and other JCS members), Vice President Walter Mondale, and Brzezinski, along with his deputy, David Aaron. Most of the details surrounding Carter’s participation in Ivory Item remain shrouded in secrecy, but it is clear that the mock scenario involved an ICBM attack on the United States. Some details have also emerged about the President’s reaction, including his belief that too many people were on the line during the exercise. “[E]verybody’s ex[ecutive]/asst[assistant]” was there, according to Brzezinski’s military aide, William Odom. In an e-mail message to the National Security Archive, Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron recently described some of his recollections about the simulation: [W]hen the President got on the phone there were over 20 people on the line. He had no idea who most of them were. The SecDef, Chairman and Joint Chiefs, CIA Chief, yes, but almost all the rest he had never met. I remember that it was a cacophony of voices and Carter saying how can I take advice from these people, if I don't even know who they are?[3] Not long after Ivory Item, Brzezinski instructed the Secretary of Defense to keep the number of participants to a minimum in future exercises. Moreover, JCS Chairman Brown instructed the other Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief who had participated in Ivory Item to destroy any tapes or transcripts of the exercise.[4] “All personnel having access to the discussions during that conference must be briefed that presidential participation in the exercise is highly sensitive and the president’s Comments are even more so.” The 6 October 1977 Ivory Item scenario involved a Soviet ICBM attack on the U.S., as indicated in Deputy Secretary Duncan’s memorandum to President Carter on 14 October. [See Document 14] The ICBM attack had been posited because it “would give time for dialogue,” according to Duncan, unlike an SLBM attack, which would leave decision makers with only minutes of warning time. While Duncan explained some of the technological issues involved in an ICBM launch decision, such as launch time and the “implementing message,” left unsaid is what Carter had decided during the exercise. Although it is likely that he made a retaliatory decision, it is possible that he only informed Secretary of Defense Brown, the other duly constituted member of the National Command Authority, and possibly JCS Chairman Brown, who would have transmitted SIOP execution orders.[5] That President Carter approved retaliatory ICBM launches during the Ivory Item exercise is likely, but at what point did he order them? Did he decide to “ride out” the attack, or did he authorize launch-on-warning? “Riding out” would mean ordering a retaliatory strike only after receiving confirmation that Soviet ICBMs had detonated on U.S. soil. If that was the President’s initial inclination, the Joint Chiefs might have advised him against it, since command-and-control sites, ICBM silos, and bomber bases were highly vulnerable, and the initial blow could disrupt the U.S. ability to respond. If the Ivory Item scenario posited high confidence in NORAD’s indications of a Soviet ICBM attack, they might have advised a launch-on-warning, in which the President would order a retaliatory attack even before the Soviet missiles had hit their targets. The perils of launch-on-warning notwithstanding, SAC had already adopted it as a modus operandi and trained Minuteman launch officers to implement it. If President Carter agreed, he may have authorized immediate launch, possibly approving one of the MAO alternatives. Future declassification decisions on Ivory Item documents already under appeal may shed light on this point.[6] It would also be worth knowing more details about the scenario developed for Ivory Item. The available documentation suggests that the exercise posited a mock crisis so far gone that the Soviet leadership had already made the terrible error of ordering ICBM attacks against the United States, apparently precipitating a U.S. decision to retaliate. Whether President Carter wrote a personal diary entry about Ivory Item is unknown, but it would be interesting to know how he reflected on it, not least the enormous responsibility of making decisions, even if simulated, that would produce millions of casualties on both sides. In addition to the number of participants, President Carter also commented on the SIOP “Decision Handbook” that is among the contents included in the nuclear “Football,” the special case that travels with the President and enables him to make nuclear command decisions during a military crisis. Preferring a “more succinct checklist,” Carter apparently saw the presentation of the attack and retaliatory options as too complicated. According to a National Security Council (NSC) staff document recently published in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series, Carter’s participation “triggered revisions and changes in the SIOP based on Presidential guidance for the first time” ever. Before the simulation, “SIOP designers have had to imagine what the President would want to see and know in an emergency” [italics in original]. “Without a single clue from the President,” they had produced a “thick ‘Decision Handbook’” that was “the product of years of speculating in J–3 about the President’s needs.” That would begin to change. [See Document 24] The NSC Staff’s somewhat overwrought statement listed several “monumental” implications for strategic planning doctrine derived from Ivory Item, including the “refinement” of SIOP options, greater presidential awareness of the limitations of the escalation control concept, and an additional point that remains classified. Some of the “refinements” may have been a “revised Surprise Attack Response procedure” depicting “key elements” of U.S. decision-making, including “decision time” against “strategic forces launched.” A “less complex presentation of the three alternative responses” to surprise attack had also been developed. [See Document 16] Some details about the process by which the SIOP “Decision Handbook” was modified to suit President Carter show up in primary sources. The SIOP, emergency procedures, and problems with the “decision handbook” were discussed at a 17 November 1977 meeting involving Carter, Mondale, Brzezinski, JCS Chairman Brown, and Secretary of Defense Brown. [See Document 22] President Carter’s personal diary entry for 28 November suggests that the meeting had resolved the problems, noting that they “went through the SIOP procedures, walking through several drills.” “We’ve tried to simplify the process greatly since I’ve been in office,” he added, without mentioning that it was his own participation in Ivory Item that had led to the changes in the SIOP presentation.[7] While Carter raised questions about the presentation of SIOP options, so far as can be told, he did not question the targeting arrangements themselves or the high damage expectancies built into the SIOP. President Carter’s participation in the Ivory Item exercise on 6 October 1977 is clear enough, but it is difficult to document his involvement in subsequent exercises, although he is on record discussing scenarios with the Joint Chiefs. [See Document 24] Declassified documents further indicate that Secretary of Defense Brown proposed an Ivory Item scenario involving an SLBM attack and the “loss of sensors.” The Joint Staff developed another scenario called “Ivory Item Hotel” in which the Soviets had disabled the Defense Support Program’s (DSP) ground links with sabotage attacks on Buckley Air Force Base and on the site of a then-important AT&T facility in Lamar, Colorado. There are so many excisions in these documents that references to President Carter’s participation may have been withheld from release. It is also possible and even likely that because of edicts concerning “the privacy requirement for Ivory Item [that] has been imposed by highest authority” that the information was not preserved in the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, the circumstances remained in the memory of observers and participants, such as General Robert Rosenberg, a former NSC staffer, who recalled the scenario of one exercise where the “Red planners” destroyed U.S. command and control and intelligence “nodes,” and “the exercise ground to a halt.”[8] The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library maintains many classified files and records that will one day shed additional light on the President’s role in these exercises, such as the Ivory Item file in the records of Hugh Carter’s Office of Administration. That file has been requested, but the huge backlog of pending requests for presidential records at the National Archives means that declassification is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Whether President Carter wrote observations about the Ivory Item exercises for unpublished portions of his private diaries also remains to be learned. President Carter’s advisers saw the Ivory Item missile attack simulations as important for nuclear planning but also as a challenging complication. According to Odom, their impact was “far-reaching” in that they forced “the CINCs at SAC and NORAD to take a very close look at the short warning situation, C3, and Soviet doctrine.” For example, SAC generals had “new concerns” over C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) vulnerabilities but were “nervous about how far to go because of the enormous doctrinal, forces structure, and budget implications.” They wanted the lead to come from the NSC and the Secretary of Defense. Odom wanted the Ivory Item scenarios to extend to limited nuclear conflicts because they “can teach the President, you, Brown, and the Joint Chiefs a great deal about our present predicament.”[9] Whether that ever happened remains unclear. What the Joint Chiefs pioneered in the late 1970s had predecessors in far more elaborate war games that the Pentagon and U.S. government consultants such as Thomas Schelling had organized beginning in the early 1960s, if not earlier. Such games involved detailed simulations of politico-military crisis scenarios and the steps taken by Blue and Red Team participants to play them out one step at a time.[10] Whether war games prior to Ivory Item focused on approximations of specific missile attack scenarios is an interesting question, as is whether any U.S. presidents after Jimmy Carter ever participated in Ivory Item-type simulations. To bring such an intense and high-pressure experience out into the wider world, two researchers, Sharon K. Weiner (American University) and Moritz Kütt (University of Hamburg), have created a virtual reality simulation of missile attack decision-making called “The Nuclear Biscuit.” Requiring participants to “make decisions in situations of high stress and uncertainty,” their project analyzes the “retaliatory options [that] people consider valid, plus the information, advice, and other variables” involved. The final study that Kütt and Weiner are preparing should be a stimulating contribution to the study of crisis decision-making. Note: Thanks to John Tobin Fratis for research assistance, and, for last minute aid, to Stephen Schwartz, and Scott F. Thompson, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. IVORY ITEM DOCUMENTS I. Background Document 1 William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Chat with Lt. General Sitton, Director of the Joint Staff Document 1 William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Chat with Lt. General Sitton, Director of the Joint Staff,” 8 March 1977, Secret Mar 8, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28 During a conversation with Joint Staff Director General Ray Sitton, Odom found corroboration for his “assessment of the vulnerability of the NCA in a short warning situation.” Sitton further observed that “NEACP is good for command and control but not really where the President wants to be” [in a crisis]. Sitton said that he was “delighted that President Carter has shown interest in the SIOP and related command matters.” While Henry Kissinger had shown “great interest” in SIOP issues, “Nixon avoided them and Ford was hardly enthusiastic.” Document 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Our Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options and Regio Document 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Our Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options and Regional Nuclear Options,” 31 March 1977, Top Secret, attached to William Odom memo to Brzezinski, 24 March 1977, Top Secret [Document 9 in FRUS national security policy compilation] Mar 31, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material –Subject Files, box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine - Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO), 3/77-1/80 Brzezinski reported that the NSC’s “investigation of the White House Emergency Procedures for short warning nuclear attack has thrown up the question of our nuclear war doctrine.” Discussing problems relating to the SIOP, NSDM 242, policy guidance for preparing Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs), “war fighting procedures,” and the “vulnerability of the National Command Authority,” he recommended asking Secretary of Defense Brown and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for an explanation of such matters as current “nuclear war doctrine” and the “procedures they envisage for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial attack phase.” Carter approved the recommendation, and that same day Brzezinski wrote to Brown about several requests, one of which was for a “brief statement of the procedures for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial phase.” That would include information on “command procedures for the conduct of such a war, including such operational aspects as the location and procedures for effective exercise of control.” II. Invention of Ivory Item Document 3 Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., Document 3 Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM-1431-77, 6 May 1977, Top Secret, with messages and memos attached May 6, 1977 Source U.S. National Archives, Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [RG 218], Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item With the White House’s interest in strategic decision-making, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman were encouraged to develop a program for providing the President with practical training in the mechanisms of nuclear war. JCS Chair Brown informed the Chiefs about the plan for Ivory Item, a “no-notice SIOP execution exercise to test Missile Attack conference procedures” using “secure telephone circuits.” Brown explained that the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the JCS Chair could initiate an Ivory Item exercise, first by using non-secure lines to provide notice and to conduct a roll call, which would be followed by the use of secure lines and another roll call. After explaining to the participants that the call’s purpose was to “simulate a missile attack conference procedure,” the Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center would “talk through the response procedures contained in the [SIOP] Decision Handbook.” Brown noted that at a later stage Ivory Item “may be expanded to include a threat scenario and discussion of possible recommendations to the President.” Document 4 Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., “ Document 4 Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair George S. Brown to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army et al., “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM-1438-77, 21 May 1977, Top Secret, with messages and memo by Colonel [Alan B.] Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, attached May 21, 1977 Source RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item The first Ivory Item exercise took place on 12 May at the initiative of Secretary of Defense Brown. JCS Chairman Brown proposed ways to streamline the next one and cautioned the Chiefs about avoiding the use of speakers or extension phones, which can “degrade the quality of the secure conference.” The exercise could involve “a brief threat scenario” introduced by the Commander-in-Chief NORAD/Air Defense Command. A memorandum by one of Brown’s aides proposed a scenario involving an “attack of over 250 simulated ICBMs en route against U.S. targets including the Washington area.” The DDO “would read the major SIOP alternative responses and senior conferee[s] would terminate the scenario portion of the conference.” Document 5 Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 14 Document 5 Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 14 June 1977, with note by Assistant to the Chairman General William Y. Smith, “After Action Report” and papers on SIOP, Non-Time Constrained Nuclear Response,” and warning systems attached, Top Secret, excised copy Jun 14, 1977 Source RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item “Problems” experienced during an Ivory Item exercise on 1 June 1977 led the Joint Staff to recommend that Secretary of Defense Brown and other principals receive briefings on warning systems and SIOP and “decision handbook procedures.” During the exercise, the NMCC’s Deputy Director for Operations was to be “conference manager” and lead a discussion of SIOP execution procedures from a “bolt out of the blue” perspective. There was confidence that the DDO could do that well, but it was less clear whether “they can answer questions on the ‘consequences of execution details’” or about the SIOP’s nuances. Smith reported that he had spoken with Admiral Staser Holcomb about Harold Brown’s thoughts on “exercises involving the President.” According to the attached material, the SIOP included three alternatives in the event of a surprise attack situation. To estimate fatalities for the surprise attack alternative responses, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff used the Comprehensive Blast and Radiation Assessment (COBRA) computer program that “predicts the expected fatalities from both prompt effects (blast and initial radiation) and delayed effects (fallout for a six-month period) for the specific attack option executed.” Other scenarios concerned “non-time constrained” situations involving a developing international crisis where nuclear employment options could be considered. On the latter, Harold Brown commented that “it would be useful for the President and the VP to spend a morning (at NMCC or ANCC) going through such a scenario.” On page three of this document, a 16 June handwritten note by Lieutenant General William Y. Smith, Chairman Brown’s assistant, relayed “some thoughts Sec Def has about exercises involving the President.” Using another term for the “Decision Handbook,” Smith wrote, “It boils down to Sec Def, you, Dep Sec Def, Brzezinski getting together to discuss various Soviet attack options and possible US responses, how the ‘Black Book’ helps and is used, etc.” (Note: After his retirement from the military, General Smith became a member of the National Security Archive’s original advisory board.) Document 6 Memorandum from JCS Chair Brown to Secretary of Defense Brown, “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM 1514-77 Document 6 Memorandum from JCS Chair Brown to Secretary of Defense Brown, “Exercise Ivory Item,” CM 1514-77, 5 July 1977. Top Secret, Excised Copy Jul 7, 1977 Source RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Brown sent the Secretary of Defense detailed briefing charts on warning systems and “SIOP Execution Considerations.” Apparently, the charts would be made available to President Carter, who had seen some of them during his meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 12 January 1977.[11] Several systems for warning of missile launches were mentioned, but not discussed. They were PARCS (Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System), the satellite-based Defense Support Program (DSP) and the Cobra Dane radar system at Shemya in the Aleutian Islands. According to the SIOP material, of the three possible responses to an ICBM-only surprise attack, one was a “minimum execution” of Major Attack Option [MAO] 1, while another was a “complete execution” of MAO 1. The “minimum” MAO 1 option was designed to “minimize economic damage and fatalities” and to avoid attacks on the Soviet Government structure, which would make negotiations possible. Thus, for the maximum MAO 1 response, there were no Soviet targets slated for withholds. For a “non-time constrained” situation, where there had been intimations of crisis, the two MAO options would have involved the SAC bomber/ICBM alert force as well as any specially generated additional forces, along with SLBMs. According to the briefing material, the “minimum” option had two “major disadvantages,” neither of which is described. The implication was a preference for the larger attack option, perhaps because MAO 1’s emphasis on minimizing casualties meant excluding some military installations and government control structures that were co-located with population centers. The third undescribed surprise attack response, likely for a “bolt out of the blue” situation, would have involved the bomber/ICBM forces on alert at the time, although SLBMs would have played a role in any retaliatory action.[12] In the event of a “mounting crisis,” Selected Attack Options (SAO), for which there were five, would be possible. Document 7 Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman’s Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 19 Document 7 Colonel Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman’s Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 19 July 1977, with memoranda attached, including scenario for “Exercise Ivory Item Alfa,” 19 July 1977, Top Secret, Excised Copy Jul 19, 1977 Source RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Renshaw informed Brown that a new Ivory Item scenario had been prepared and that J-3 had proposed coordination with the White House Communications Agency if “Presidential participation” was anticipated. In comments on the scenario, Air Force Chief of Staff Jones mentioned the “need [for] more alternatives” or “sub options” within the alternatives and the lack of discussion about China. Document 8 Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Luncheon with Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Document 8 Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Luncheon with Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Friday August 5, 1977, 12:30 P.M. (60 minutes),” Top Secret, with Brown memorandum, “Luncheon with the JCS on 5 August,” 3 August 1977 Aug 5, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material, Office Files, box 101, Meetings, 77-12/77 Brzezinski cited South Korea, PRM-10, the B-1 bomber and cruise missiles, and SALT as major issues for discussion in this meeting. Brown’s memo included “command and control exercises” as a topic for discussion, which was a reference to “missile attack conferencing” and Ivory Item. The Chiefs may well have briefed Carter and Brzezinski on the developing Ivory Item arrangements. Document 9 JCS Chairman Brown to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item Scenario,” 12 September 1977, w Document 9 JCS Chairman Brown to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item Scenario,” 12 September 1977, with memoranda attached, Top Secret, excised copy Sep 12, 1977 Source RG 218, Records of George S. Brown, box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Chairman Brown sent the Secretary of Defense a revised Ivory Item scenario that was shorter than the 1 June exercise with “less instruction,” making it more suitable for presidential or vice-presidential participation. According to Colonel Renshaw’s memorandum, the scenario involved an ICBM attack only, with succeeding scenarios involving SLBMs only and a mix of ICBM and SLBMs. Document 10 Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The IVORY Item that Never Was,” 28 Sept Document 10 Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The IVORY Item that Never Was,” 28 September 1977, Top Secret Sep 28, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78 Odom recounted that an Ivory Item simulation was scheduled to occur that day but did not because Secretary of Defense Brown could not assemble all of the Joint Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief of various unified and specified commands (SAC, European Command, etc.) on a secure conference call. Odom said that the failure did not mean that the system would not work in a “real event,” because non-secure lines could be used, but it indicated the limitations of the secure call network and pointed to the necessity for Ivory Item to give the “NCA a sense of timing and communication realities.” Document 11 Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ivory Item,” 30 September 1977, Top Sec Document 11 Memorandum from William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ivory Item,” 30 September 1977, Top Secret Sep 30, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78 Odom reported that the Department of Defense held another Ivory Item exercise that reportedly went “very well,” except that Brzezinski was not included because the NMCC duty officer did not call the White House Communications Agency switch at the beginning of the exercise. When the Secretary of Defense asked that Brzezinski be called, it was too late. They were going to try again the following Monday (3 October). III. The First Presidential Ivory Item Exercise Document 12 The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter, 6 October 1977, Thursday Document 12 The Daily Diary of President Jimmy Carter, 6 October 1977, Thursday Oct 6, 1977 Source JCPL, Daily Diary Website On this day, President Carter participated in the Ivory Item exercise. According to his personal diary, “This was a busy day, putting out fires,” although he did not mention Ivory Item in the published diary. The only reference to the Joint Chiefs was a meeting to discuss SALT II.[13] The White House daily diary showed periods of time when a conference call could have occurred, for example, when he was meeting with Brzezinski or with Vice President Mondale. Document 13 Notes on Ivory Item, circa 6 October 1977 Document 13 Notes on Ivory Item, circa 6 October 1977 Oct 6, 1977 Source William Odom Papers, Library of Congress, box 2:178, 1977 folder In these rough notes on the Ivory Item conference—perhaps questions he had for Brzezinski—Odom wrote “who listens” and noted what the President said about the “choice of alternatives,” “evacuation,” and having “everybody’s ex/asst [on the] line.” The latter was a reference to the fact that so many people were listening in or trying to participate in the call that David Aaron remembered President Carter asking, “How can I take advice from these people if I don't even know who they are?” Document 14 Colonel [Alan B.] Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, with Memorandum to Document 14 Colonel [Alan B.] Renshaw, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, with Memorandum to the President from Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan attached, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 14 October 1977, Top Secret, Excised Copy Oct 14, 1977 Source RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item The following week, Charles Duncan wrote to President Carter that he had heard that the President had been “generally pleased” with the Ivory Item exercise. Noting that the scenario had been devised to “give time for dialogue,” Duncan stressed that in an actual crisis “time may be quite short, particularly if SLBMs are involved.” Warning time for ICBMs was 17 minutes, while warning times for an SLBM launch was only five minutes plus. [See Document 23] Duncan mentioned some details, excised from the text, about ICBM launch times that would be taken into account in the “implementing message,” presumably of SIOP options. At what point in the simulation President Carter chose to retaliate remains to be learned, for example, whether he launched “on warning” or chose to “ride out” the attack before retaliating. It is possible that he chose one of the Major Attack Options from the SIOP’s three choices for responding to surprise attacks. Document 15 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Zbigniew Brezinski, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 18 Octob Document 15 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Zbigniew Brezinski, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 18 October 1977, Top Secret Dec 31, 1969 Source President Carter’s dissatisfaction with the number of people on the line during the Ivory Item exercise is reflected in this directive from Brzezinski ordering that “unnecessary people” be excluded from the next simulation. He also asked that “standby communication” lines be made available with one being secure and the other open. Brzezinski also wanted to review with Brown the “new SIOP instructions format” before it went to the President. Document 16 JCS Message to Commanders-in Chief, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 20 October 1977, with Joint Staff mem Document 16 JCS Message to Commanders-in Chief, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 20 October 1977, with Joint Staff memos, draft message on Ivory Item “policies and procedures,” and draft of Secretary of Defense response to Brzezinski memo, 20 October 1977, Top Secret Oct 20, 1977 Source RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Brzezinski’s directive led quickly to a message for the CINCs of the unified and specified nuclear commands (SAC, European, Pacific, etc.) that they had to answer the phone personally during the Ivory Item exercises, that no speaker phones, extensions, or tape recorders were to be used, and that any transcripts or tapes of the 6 October conference were to be destroyed. “All personnel having access to the discussions during that conference must be briefed that presidential participation in the exercise is highly sensitive and the president’s comments are even more so.” Attached was a draft instructions message on Ivory Item procedures, with provisions for a “Backup” conference telephone that would be monitored by a “knowledgeable individual with immediate access to the principal.” A memorandum from George S. Brown to Harold Brown indicated actions taken in response to Brzezinski’s edict including a “revised Surprise Attack Response procedure” depicting “key elements” of U.S. decision-making including “decision time” against “strategic forces launched.” A less complex version of the “three alternative responses” to surprise attack would also be developed. [See Document 6 for some earlier information on those alternatives] Document 17 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 21 October 1977, Top Secret Document 17 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 21 October 1977, Top Secret Oct 21, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material -Inderfurth and Gates Chron Files, box 4, Gates Chron In his response, Brown mentioned the decisions to tighten up participation in Ivory Item to principals only and to create a backup circuit for future conferences, and his readiness to discuss “a proposed format for the condensed decision guide” when he flew with the President to Omaha for their visit to SAC headquarters. Document 18 JCS Chairman Brown to Chief of Staff U.S. Army et al., “Exercise IVORY ITEM,” 27 October 1977, C Document 18 JCS Chairman Brown to Chief of Staff U.S. Army et al., “Exercise IVORY ITEM,” 27 October 1977, CM-1678-77, with memoranda attached, 27 October 1977, Top Secret Oct 27, 1977 Source RG 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Drawing on the draft text [See Document 16] Brown sent the chiefs the updated instructions for Ivory Item telephone conferences, including prohibitions on the use of “extension phones, speakers, recorders, or other external devices.” IV. “Decision Handbook” Improvements and New Scenarios Document 19 Colonel Renshaw Memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Ivory Item Scenario Comments,” 31 Octobe Document 19 Colonel Renshaw Memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Ivory Item Scenario Comments,” 31 October 1977, with memorandum from Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Admiral Thor Hanson to JCS Chairman attached, 28 October 1977, Top Secret Oct 31, 1977 Source RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item This memorandum indicated that Secretary of Defense Brown proposed exercise scenarios “that introduce SLBM launch after a few minutes; and that involve loss of sensors,” presumably BMEWs radar or Defense Support System satellites. Document 20 William Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Your Monday Meeting with Harold Brown,” 28 October 1977, T Document 20 William Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Your Monday Meeting with Harold Brown,” 28 October 1977, Top Secret Oct 28, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78 In a memo for Brzezinski on his upcoming meeting with Harold Brown, Odom said that Brown would bring the “Revised SIOP Format” that President Carter sought—something close to what Air Force Chief of Staff David Jones had shown to Brzezinski en route to SAC. Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs) would also be a topic for the meeting. Odom saw creating them as a “useful staff exercise” but did not see them as “products for actual presidential choice.” Odom said the “real issue, if the President wants a number of options short of the SIOP variants, is the speed with which lesser strikes (i.e. LNOs) could be staffed by JCS/SAC in a crisis and in response to the unique political guidance at that time.” Document 21 JCS Chairman Brown to CINCSAC [Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command] Ellis, “Exercise Ivory It Document 21 JCS Chairman Brown to CINCSAC [Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command] Ellis, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 3 November 1977, Top Secret Nov 3, 1977 Source RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item For future Ivory Item exercises, Brown granted CINCSAC Ellis’s request for the participation of the Vice CINCSAC in the Airborne Command Post as well as to use the speaker on the balcony of the Command Center during the conference. The restrictions concerning recorders and other speakers remain in place and CINCSAC should keep the number of officers on the balcony to a “minimum” during the exercise. Document 22 Memorandum for the Vice President from John Matheny/Dennis Clift, “2:00 P.M. Meeting with the Pres Document 22 Memorandum for the Vice President from John Matheny/Dennis Clift, “2:00 P.M. Meeting with the President and the Secretary of Defense,” 17 November 1977, Top Secret Nov 17, 1977 Source JCPL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material - General Odom Files, box 28, Ivory Item 9/77-2/78 In keeping with his significant role in national security policy, which included having a nuclear “Football” assigned to his military aide, Vice President Mondale participated in the October Ivory Item exercise and met with President Carter and Secretary of Defense Brown to discuss emergency procedures and the SIOP. According to the White House diary, the President met with Mondale, JCS Chairman Brown, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Zbigniew Brzezinski on 17 November 1977. The briefing memorandum for this meeting mentioned the President’s criticism of the SIOP “decision handbook” noting that he wanted a “more succinct checklist.” Besides discussing the role of attacks on Warsaw Pact forces during a strategic war, Matheny and Clift referred to the short time for decisions that Duncan had mentioned: 17 minutes for a Soviet ICBM attack and five-plus minutes for a Soviet SLBM strike. Apparently, the meeting on 17 November resolved the complications involving the surprise attack procedures in the SIOP “decision handbook” that had concerned President Carter. On 28 November, he met again with the same senior officials and went through the SIOP step by step. Carter briefly described the meeting in his personal diary, where he wrote: [We] went through the SIOP procedures, walking through several drills. This is the first time that any president has done this, which is unbelievable. We’ve tried to simplify the process greatly since I’ve been in office. Carter did not mention Ivory Item or his participation in the simulation, which had led to the changes in the SIOP “decision handbook.” In his comments on the 28 November meeting, President Carter wrote that it had “taken eleven months to schedule this detailed drill procedure—which rehearsed our response to the use of nuclear weapons” and involved all of the principals, including the Vice President.[14] Document 23 JCS Chairman Message 5272 to CINCSAC [et al.], “Ivory Item Exercises,” with memos attached, 14 D Document 23 JCS Chairman Message 5272 to CINCSAC [et al.], “Ivory Item Exercises,” with memos attached, 14 December 1977, Top Secret Dec 13, 1977 Source NARA, Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown File, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item During a 28 November discussion with Harold Brown and the Chiefs about Ivory Item scenarios, the President raised questions about the use of the “real world missile attack conference procedure” to report “hostilities in your areas of interest” [e.g., Europe, Pacific]. As a result, Brown informed the CINCs that the “Missile Attack Conference procedure” was “being changed to affirm the desire for reports of this nature which bear on the decisionmaking process.” There will be no need for “negative reports on area hostilities.” As for future scenarios, “inputs regarding regional hostilities will be provided in scenario scripts.” Document 24 Memorandum From Crisis Management Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Document 24 Memorandum From Crisis Management Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), “NSC Annual Report, 10 December 1977, Top Secret, Excised Copy Dec 10, 1977 Source (FRUS Document 46) This report by the NSC “Crisis Management Staff”—in which William Odom likely had a hand, given his responsibility for crisis management issues—provided an overview of the Carter White House’s efforts to enhance its capabilities to meet emergency situations. One such effort, following up on Brzezinski’s emphasis on familiarizing the President with “U.S. doctrine for nuclear ‘crisis management,’” was the October 1977 Ivory Item exercise. According to the report, presidential participation in a missile attack simulation “had never been done before, and the event triggered revisions and changes in the SIOP based on Presidential guidance for the first time in history. Before the drill “SIOP designers have had to imagine what the President would want to see and know in an emergency” [italics in original]. “Without a single clue from the President,” they had produced a “thick ‘Decision Handbook”—presumably, the compendium carried in the nuclear “Football,” which was “the product of years of speculating in J-3 about the President’s needs.” That would begin to change. The NSC staff found that Ivory Item had “monumental” implications for strategic planning doctrine, including “refinement” of SIOP options, greater presidential awareness of the limitations of the escalation control concept, and an additional point that remains classified. Given what has been disclosed in other documents, perhaps that excised point concerned the need for presidential experience with exercise scenarios involving different amounts of warning time. Document 25 JCS Chairman George S. Brown Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, “Presidential/Tasking Questio Document 25 JCS Chairman George S. Brown Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, “Presidential/Tasking Questions,” with memos and draft replies to the President attached, 16 December 1977, Top Secret, Excised copy Dec 16, 1977 Source NARA, Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown File, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Brown sent the Secretary a draft reply to President Carter concerning their discussions on 28 November. This version of the reply is far more excised than the letter that Brown sent (see below), although one topic, “Reference Warsaw Pact Fatalities,” that may have been excised from Brown’s reply, survived declassification review. Apparently, President Carter wanted information on nuclear casualty levels in Eastern Europe. Document 26 Secretary of Defense Brown memo to President Carter, “Ivory Item and Surprise Attack Procedures” Document 26 Secretary of Defense Brown memo to President Carter, “Ivory Item and Surprise Attack Procedures” 19 December 1977, Top Secret, excised copy Dec 18, 1977 Source JCP, Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Material, box 21, Jimmy Carter Sensitive 1/77-9/78 Having met with President Carter on 28 November to discuss the SIOP and responses to surprise attack situations, Brown provided information to respond to questions and issues that had arisen. They concerned communications, hardening of command centers, and recalling bombers. Brown welcomed the suggestion that President Carter observe an Ivory Item exercise at the NMCC because it would “provide a useful insight into the procedures and processes that support SIOP decision-making and execution of our nuclear forces.” Document 27 Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory It Document 27 Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 6 March 1978, Top Secret Mar 6, 1978 Source NARA, Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown File, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item During his 28 January 1978 meeting with the Chiefs and Secretary Brown at the NMCC, President Carter raised questions about the vulnerability of the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites (apparently one question had to do with whether lasers could damage or “blind” the DSP). Secretary Brown tasked the Chiefs to prepare Ivory Item scenarios that were responsive to the concerns about DSP vulnerability. [See Document 20] The two scenarios that the Joint Staff developed were identical except for the way that the Soviets tried to “kill” the DSP. In one, “Ivory Item Hotel,” the Soviets disabled the DSP’s ground links with sabotage attacks at Buckley Air Force Base and Lamar, Colorado. In the other, “Ivory Item India,” the Soviets targeted the ground links with SLBMs launched from the Gulf of Mexico. Apparently, the Joint Staff found the “Hotel” scenario more plausible because a Soviet Yankee submarine in the Gulf of Mexico would not go undetected. Document 28 Message from Acting JCS Chair General Rogers to CINCAD [Commander-in-Chief Aerospace Defense Command Document 28 Message from Acting JCS Chair General Rogers to CINCAD [Commander-in-Chief Aerospace Defense Command] General Hill, with attachments, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 17 March 1978, Top Secret Mar 17, 1978 Source RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Rogers turned down General Hill’s request to use extension speakers during Ivory Item exercises. “Restriction of these sensitive exercise discussions is essential to their ultimate purpose.” Document 29 JCS Acting Chairman David Jones to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with attachments Document 29 JCS Acting Chairman David Jones to Secretary of Defense, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with attachments including “Hotel” and “India” Ivory Item Scenarios, and memorandum from Assistant to the Chairman General William Y. Smith, 25 April 1978, Top Secret, Excised copy Apr 28, 1978 Source RG 218, George S. Brown Records, Box 30, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Acting Chairman Jones sent Secretary Brown the Ivory Item “Hotel” scenario along with a precis. One of the enclosed memoranda indicated that the Joint Staff preferred the “Hotel” over the “India” scenario. The scenarios for both are heavily excised, although Document 27, above, summarizes their premises. The Smith memorandum provided questions raised by the President and advisers during their visit to the NMCC with the responsive information included in a report sent to Brzezinski on 9 March. Document 30 Colonel Wolcott memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 10 July 1978, with Document 30 Colonel Wolcott memorandum to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” 10 July 1978, with attachments, Top Secret Jul 10, 1978 Source RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item CINCAD General Hill repeated his request to use speaker phone extensions on the grounds that his “Ivory Item support team” could help him better assist NCA decision-making. JCS Chairman Jones wrote to General William Y. Smith about his concern that this would set a precedent with other CINCs “wanting more people on the line.” The proposed reply granted the request as long as the “privacy requirement for Ivory Item [that] has been imposed by highest authority” was observed, and the matter was handled in a separate message. Document 31 Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory It Document 31 Colonel [W.R.] Frederick, Chairman’s Staff Group, to Chairman and Assistants, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with attachments, 19 July 1978, Top Secret, Excised Copy Jul 19, 1978 Source RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item The Chiefs discussed holding a military-only (Washington principals and the CINCs) Ivory Item exercise using the “Delta” scenario on 21 July1978. The simulation was delayed because of disagreements over the scenario. Document 32 Message from JCS Chairman to Generals Ellis and Hill, with attachments, “Ivory Item Exercise Scena Document 32 Message from JCS Chairman to Generals Ellis and Hill, with attachments, “Ivory Item Exercise Scenario Transmission Proposal,” 12 August 1978, Top Secret, excised copy Aug 12, 1978 Source RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Little comes through from these heavily excised messages and papers except that there was continuing discussion of the CINCAD’s request for permission to use speaker extensions during the Ivory Item exercises. V. Whether Canadians Should Participate Document 33 Colonel Wolcott to Chairman’s Assistants, “Ivory Item Exercise,” with attachments, 21 August 1 Document 33 Colonel Wolcott to Chairman’s Assistants, “Ivory Item Exercise,” with attachments, 21 August 1978, Top Secret, excised copy Aug 21, 1978 Source RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item These memos concerned the possibility of Canadian participation in the Ivory Item exercises with J-3 (operations) supporting and J-5 (strategy and plans) opposing their inclusion, although neither side was 100 percent behind their own position. The issue had been raised at the time of the first exercise in May 1977 because “NORAD Canadians might play key role in real-world surprise attack,” but the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman objected. Document 34 Chairman’s Assistants Memorandum to Chairman, “CINCAD Quarterly Report 13 October 1978,” with Document 34 Chairman’s Assistants Memorandum to Chairman, “CINCAD Quarterly Report 13 October 1978,” with attached memoranda and letters, 30 November 1978, Top Secret, Excised copy Nov 30, 1978 Source RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item Debate over Canadian participation in Ivory Item exercises continued. Apparently, one argument against the idea was the risk of exposure of SIOP information, as suggested by this statement: the “ability to accomplish purpose of Ivory item, i.e. test of [excised words, probably a reference to SIOP] surprise attack procedures, may be impaired.” On the other side of the issue was Chairman Jones, who said in a note to General William Y. Smith that the “big advantage of having them in is that we can use the displays & systems which would be used in a real crisis.” Jones proposed having two kinds of exercises: with and without the Canadians. Document 35 JCS Message to CINCAD and CINCSAC, “Ivory Item,” 7 June 1979, with attachments, Top Secret, Exci Document 35 JCS Message to CINCAD and CINCSAC, “Ivory Item,” 7 June 1979, with attachments, Top Secret, Excised Copy Jun 7, 1979 Source RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item According to one of the attachments, General Hill’s question about Canadian participation was still unanswered. Small portions of the scripts for Ivory Item Delta III, which would be a “free play” exercise, and for Prize Ring Delta have been declassified. Document 36 Captain G. Flynn to Assistants to Chairman, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with routing slip and scenari Document 36 Captain G. Flynn to Assistants to Chairman, “Exercise Ivory Item,” with routing slip and scenarios attached, 24 August 1979, Top Secret, excised copy Aug 24, 1979 Source RG 218, JCS Chairman David Jones Records, Box 28, 385 Exercise Ivory Item These heavily excised documents concerned the latest Ivory Item exercise, “Kilo.” NORAD’s bi-national structure had been addressed because “Kilo” would allow participation by Canadian officers. “Kilo” was a missile warning assessment drill designed to “exercise JCS Emergency Conference Procedures” and provide training in the use of data from warning systems. Apparently, it would be a “no notice” exercise in order to “enhance realism” and let participants react to “real world situations” instead of a script. NOTES [1] . For the Carter administration’s early efforts to update emergency procedures, among other issues, see William E. Odom, “The Origins and Design of Presidential Decision-59: A Memoir,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). [2] . Brzezinski to Brown, 31 March 1977, document 10 in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy [FRUS 1977-80 Vol. 4] (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2024). [3] . Ambassador David Aaron, e-mail to editor, 2 April 2024. [4] . In those days, the Commanders of various unified and specified commands were routinely known as Commanders-in-Chief or CINCs. That remained so until October 2002, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that they would be designated as Commanders. The Commander-in-Chief title would be “used to connote or indicate the President of the United States of America.” Apparently Rumsfeld told the Joint Chief’s general counsel, “There is only one CINC under the Constitution and law, and that is POTUS.” [5] . According to a former Pentagon official, during nuclear exercises and simulations, President Carter was “careful.” He would “make a decision but not tell anyone what it was except, perhaps, Harold Brown.” Carter would say “I’ve made my decision.’ He didn’t want the whole system to be anticipating the President.” Daniel Ford, The Button – The Pentagon’s Command and Control System Does It Work? (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1985), 91-92. [6] . Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1993) is the first detailed publicly available exposition and analysis of launch-on-warning. It is worth quoting a statement made by former NSC staffer Robert Rosenberg, who witnessed at least one SIOP practice: “I know of no other President who actually participated in SIOP exercises.” Carter “participated in in a series of what we call CPXs [command post exercises], communications, command and control exercises, where the Commander in Chief is in communication with the [commanders] responsible for executing the SIOP.” See Ford, The Button, at 27. [7] . Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 141. [8] . According to a history of Cold War war games, military officials have considered information on presidential participation in war games to be sacrosanct and never to be disclosed. See Thomas B. Allen, War Games: The Secret World of the Creators, Players, and Policy Maker Rehearsing World War III Today (New York: Berkley Books, 1989), 213. For the Rosenberg quote, see Ford, The Button, at 27. [9] . See documents 65 and 82 in FRUS 1977-80 Vol. 4. [10] . For war games and simulations during the Cold War, see Allen, War Games; Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s,” Social Studies of Science 30 (2000): 163-223; and Reid B.C. Pauley, “Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 43 (2018): 151-192. [11] . Don Oberdorfer and Edward Walsh, “Carter to Press Liberalizing of Korea, Withdrawal of GIs,” Washington Post, 13 January 1977. [12] . For details on SAC alert forces during the Cold War, see Strategic Air Command, Office of the Historian, Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991 (Offutt Air Force Base, 1991), 93 and 97. [13] . Carter, White House Diary, 115. [14] . Carter, White House Diary, 141. nuclear.jpg RELATED LINKS New State Department History Details Nuclear Targeting and Continuity of Government, 1977-1980 Apr 17, 2024 The Presidential Nuclear "Football" From Eisenhower to George W. Bush Jul 18, 2023 Nuclear Weapons and the Law of War Jun 6, 2023 Colonel Odom’s “Chilling” Four A.M. Phone Call Mar 24, 2022 False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks Put U.S. Forces on Alert in 1979-1980 Mar 16, 2020 Presidential Control of Nuclear Weapons: The "Football" Sep 25, 2018 U.S. Presidents and the Nuclear Taboo Nov 30, 2017 Declassified Pentagon History Provides Hair-Raising Scenarios of U.S. Vulnerabilities to Nuclear Attack Through 1970s Nov 19, 2012 Jimmy Carter's Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declassified Sep 14, 2012 National Security Archive Suite 701, Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street, NW Washington, D.C., 20037 Phone: 202/994-7000 Fax: 202/994-7005 Contact by email Join Our Mailing List 'Like' us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter Subscribe to our YouTube Channel GWU logo​ Charity Navigator Four star charity Support Our Work - Donate The National Security Archive is committed to digital accessibility. 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