Russia's Appalling Losses In Ukraine

Opinion: Putin’s ‘Mad Max’ army lurches forward amid appalling casualties By Jonathan SweetMark Toth, 3 days ago “There are two types of people on the battlefield — the quick and the dead.” This Army saying is instilled in basic training then reinforced throughout one’s military career. Until last month, Ukraine was “the quick” in its defensive war against Russia. Kyiv, since day one of the war, has understood that to be quick requires embracing innovations and adaptations in techniques, tactics and procedures. Winners change methods, employment, and utilization of troops and weapon systems on the battlefield as needed. He who adapts fastest wins. Kyiv has repeatedly come out ahead in this regard. It has modified weapon systems to extend their ranges, enabling them to strike deep within the Russian interior. This has single-handedly created a Revolution in military affairs. Ukraine’s deployment of drones in modern warfare, alongside other new tactics, is designed to defeat a Russian invader intent on mass infantry charges and artillery as the primary means to win. Russia, in contrast, has been stuck in World War II-era tactics — more infantry, more tanks, more artillery more effort. Their only playbook has been to attack, attack, and attack some more until complete destruction of the objective is achieved — then move on to the next objective. The Russians have to deploy barrier troops to prevent their men from retreating and ensure forward momentum. After 45 months of combat, this playbook has cost Russia more than 1.1 million casualties, more than 11,000 tanks, nearly 24,000 armored fighting vehicles, and nearly 36,000 artillery and multiple launch rocket systems. Human life is not part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cost-calculus. The ends — and the only end really does seem to be the destruction of Ukraine — justify the means. The Kremlin will find more bodies to fill the uniforms — whether it’s mercenaries, conscripts, reserves, prisoners, or foreign fighters from North Korea, Chechnya, Cuba and Africa. Yet something has changed as the two sides battle it out over Pokrovsk. Russian ground forces have suddenly tried something new. Stefan Korshak writes in the Kyiv Post that they have tried infiltrating the Ukrainian side with smaller units and “going to ground” inside of the town and behind enemy lines. They then reappear to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and command from the rear, engaging in street fighting and close-quarters battles while evading Ukraine drones. As one officer observed, “very often there are situations when the enemy appears in Pokrovsk where we do not expect him.” Kyiv has been forced to employ Special Operation Forces to oust them. By attacking from within while still applying pressure from outside, Russian ground forces are threatening Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad. Last Sunday, they slowed the tempo of their ground activity to “extend logistics and bring up reinforcements to southern Pokrovsk.” Putin has elevated the outcome of the battle for Pokrovsk to a “must-win” status. His generals have been fighting for what is now mostly a symbolic piece of terrain for 21 months. Having deployed 110,000 Russian soldiers in the area, he is determined to conquer the town. As Shaun Pinner reflected, “Pokrovsk represents a place where Russia feels it must win, and where the Ukrainian armed forces are making them pay dearly for trying.” Putin told the White House and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in September that he intends to occupy Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region by the end of 2025. He needs Pokrovsk to make that happen — to build momentum necessary to eventually attack Ukraine’s four-city fortress belt of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka. Videos of Russian soldiers advancing towards Pokrovsk depict a disorganized, Mad Max, pick-up game of sorts. Bad weather, specifically fog, provides some concealment as they approach the battle lines. Pokrovsk is simply the next town. In 2023 it was Bakhmut, in 2024 it was Avdiivka. Putin will reinforce failure, continue his attacks, and thousands more will die for his aspirations — not in defense of Russia, but to satisfy his own delusions. For the defenders of Pokrovsk and future towns to be determined, finding and blocking Russian infiltration lanes is now a priority. The Ukrainian military, already stretched thin, must now cover even more terrain. As retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges noted recently on Polish state television, “It is very difficult to hold terrain, especially built-up areas, with just drones. You need manpower, and lots of artillery and rocket capability to defend over these long fronts … In the defense, you still need manpower.” Mounted assaults can be narrowed down to a few avenues of approaches based on terrain analysis. Infiltration lanes, however, are numerous. In the absence of manpower, the equalizer becomes interdiction. More attention and resources must be allocated to the area between the close and deep fight. As Frederick the Great said, “one who defends everything defends nothing.” Therefore, Ukraine must attack at the source — the assembly areas behind Russian lines — before they can split up into smaller groups to infiltrate into rear areas. For Russia, masking 110,000 soldiers and their equipment will be a challenge. They are vulnerable in their assembly areas and fuel points, and also when they move. NATO and the U.S. must do more to get artillery forward — tubes and munitions — to strike them before they reach the front line. But successful interdiction will not be enough. Russia continues to bomb Ukrainian population centers and has returned to targeting energy infrastructure to weaponize the coming winter. Ukraine must tweak its strategy to find balance in deep strikes intent on crippling the Kremlin’s ability to fund and sustain the war, while defending their homeland. During an attack on Ukraine Saturday evening, they were able to shoot down 89 percent of the Russian drones fired, but only 20 percent of the missiles. An 80 percent failure rate is unacceptable. Europe must do more to provide Ukraine an effective integrated air and missile defense capability and establish a no-fly zone. Deep strikes on oil refineries are achieving the desired effect. However, as Hodges emphasized, Ukraine must develop a methodology to asymmetrically engage Russia’s shadow fleet in ports while its ships take on oil. All eyes are on Pokrovsk this week, but regardless of the outcome, the war will continue until Russia is forced to stop attacking. The “just enough” strategy of barely preventing Ukraine from losing is still not enough against Putin’s changing Mad Max army. Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a military intelligence officer and led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012 to 2014. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.